AINMHYS  BOOK  FVND 


OTHER  BOOKS  BY  DR.  FLEWELLING 


CHRIST  AND  THE   DRAMAS  OF  DOUBT 

PERSONALISM  AND  THE  PROBLEMS  OF 
PHILOSOPHY 

PHILOSOPHY  AND  THE  WAR 


Bergson  and 
Personal  Realism 


BY 

RALPH  TYLER  FLEWELLING 

Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the 
University  of  Southern  California 


THE  ABINGDON  PRESS 
NEW  YORK  CINCINNATI 


Copyright,  1920,  by 
RALPH  TYLER  FLEWELLING 


lU 


To 
MY  FATHER  AND  MOTHER 


435503 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2007  with  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/bergsonpersonalrOOflewrich 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction 21 

SECTION  I 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CHANGE 

CHAPTER  I 

BERGSON'S  DEFINITION  OF  BEING 

Uncertainty  in  the  Definition  of  Matter 32 

This  uncertainty  arises  from  the  use  of  words  with 
double  meaning,  from  imperfect  physical  analogies, 
and  from  the  mystery  of  life.  The  confusion  arising 
from  the  attempt  to  describe  both  matter  and  spirit 
by  the  abstract  term  "perception."  The  diflSculty 
attending  a  description  of  matter  as  the  inverse  of 
movement. 

Failure  to  Note  a  Real  Distinction   between 

Matter  and  Spirit 36 

Again  matter  and  spirit  cannot  be  safely  identified 
under  the  term  "image."  If  matter  is  an  aggregate 
of  images,  and  perception  is  the  reference  to  another 
"image"  which  is  myself,  we  remain  either  in  a  world 
which  is  wholly  phenomenal,  or  we  do  not  reach  a 
realm  of  thought  at  all.  This  fate  follows  his  defi- 
nition of  personality  as  clearly  as  it  does  his  definition 
of  body. 

From  this  Definition  of  Matter  Arises  Contu- 
sion IN  THE  Meaning  of  Self 40 

The  personal  factor  cannot  be  ruled  out  of  per- 
ception.    Perception  cannot  be  fundamental  reality. 

7 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

The  Idea  of  "Duration"  Alone  is  Insufficient 
TO  Solve  the  Conflict  between  Mind  and 

Matter 43 

"Duration"  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  solution  is  endowed 

with  the  unique  powers  of  personality. 

The  Resort  to  a  Theory  of  Vibration  as  the 

Basis  of  Explanation 45 

Metaphysical  conclusions  drawn  from  the  intro- 
duction of  the  vibratory  theory  are  purely  materialistic 
and  leave  the  problem  still  unsolved.  The  persistent 
ghost  of  exorcised  intellectualization. 

CHAPTER  n 
THE  DEFINITION  OF  MEMORY  AND  LIFE 

The  Meaning  of  "Pure"  Memory 55 

Memory  is  the  intersection  of  mind  and  matter; 
"pure"  memory  is  experience  after  the  event.  The 
failure  to  complete  the  connection  between  matter 
and  spirit. 

Of    the    Relation    between    Perception     and 

Memory 58 

We  are  met  by  the  fact  that  neither  perception  nor 
memory  is  anything  apart  from  persons  in  a  personal 
world.  Memory  must  be  of  concrete  experiences  by 
concrete  persons.  Bergson's  "pure"  memory  must  be 
held  practically  synonymous  with  the  more  common 
term  "personality"  if  it  is  to  be  retained. 

The    Assumed    Independence    of    Memory   and 
Matter  is  Not  Tenable  on  these  Terms.  .     64 
Independence  between  thought  and  thing  can  be 
attained  only  by  the  assumption  of  a  higher  unity. 

8 


CONTENTS 

The    Metaphysical    Bearing    of    the    Things 

WHICH  Escape  Our  Explanation 66 

Dualism  that  exists  by  express  consent  of  creative 
intelligence. 

The  Definition  of  Life 69 

(a)  Life  as  the  Intersection  of  Streams  of  Reality 
and  as  Initial  Impulsion. 

We  must,  then,  explain  the  creation  of  these  inde- 
pendent streams,  and  find  that  we  have  but  committed 
ourselves  to  the  infinite  regress.  If  life  is  to  be  funda- 
mental, it  must  also  be  self-creative. 

(6)  Life  a^  Duration. 

Bergson  here  comes  to  the  heart  of  the  problem, 
but  needs  to  recognize  the  personal  implications  of 
the  idea. 

(c)  Life  as  Vital  Impulse. 

The  unforeseen  requirements  of  a  vital  impulse  ade- 
quate for  homogeneity.  It  must  in  a  real  sense  be 
deterministic  or  it  cannot  explain  the  world. 

(d)  Life  as  the  Point  of  Minimum  Cognition. 
Here  the  thing  to  be  remembered  is  that  intuition 

can  never  in  actual  perception  be  entirely  clear  of  intel- 
lectualization. 

CHAPTER  m 
INTUITION  AND  INTELLIGENCE 

It  is  Necessary  to  Attain  Accuracy  in  the  Use 

OF  THE  Term  "Intuition" 86 

Differences  of  nature  must  not  be  concealed  by  the 
use  of  a  general  term.  Used  indiscriminately  as  a 
name  for  the  mental  process  in  man,  instinct  in  ani- 
mals, and  cellular  attraction  in  plants.  Any  real 
choice  is  attended  by  possession  of  personality. 

9 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

The  Intellectual  Element  in  All    Hxjman    In- 
tuition       90 

Human  intuition  is  inseparable  from  intelligence. 
Unintelligible  intuition  would  be  meaningless  on  the 
human  plane. 

Intuition  as  a  Practical  Guide  in  Life 93 

We  may  be  able  to  pronounce  it  valuable,  but 
hardly  superior,  and  not  infallible.  It  is  an  inferior 
guide  under  new  or  unusual  conditions. 

Implications  of  Such  a  Doctrine  as  to  the  Nature 

OF  Truth 96 

General  truths  are  an  expression  of  the  nature  of 
life,  and  as  such  are  a  part  of  reality. 

The  Theory  of  Intuition  as  an  Aid  to  Religious 

Ideas 99 

It  does  not  provide  a  solution  of  the  problem  of 
revelation,  of  miracle,  nor  of  spirituality. 

In  What  Sense  Can  Intuition  be  Said  to  Bring 

Us  Nearer  Reality? 104 

Intuition  as  acting  personality  in  distinction  from 
reflecting  personality.  Conscious  choice  becomes 
unconscious  habit,  and,  therefore,  life  itself. 

CHAPTER  IV 
THE  THEORIES  OF  SPACE  AND  TIME 

Space  as  a  Qualityless,  Homogeneous  Medium.  .  110 

Space  gains  a  universal  validity  not  from  its  inde- 
pendent, objective  character  but  because  it  has 
meaning  for  a  Supreme  Creative  Intelligence  which 
wills  a  world  of  spatial  relations. 

10 


CONTENTS 

The  Idea  of  Time  as  a  Form  op  Space 112 

This  idea  arises  from  the  distinction  necessary 
between  time  as  given  by  reflection,  and  the  time  of 
successive  experiences  which  is  really  duration.  But 
I  do  not  relate  things  and  events  to  myself  after  the 
same  order.  There  is  a  difference  between  enume- 
ration of  objects  and  succession  of  events. 

Time  as  Contracted  Experience 117 

The  difference  between  time  and  consciousness  of 
time  flown.  The  individual  must  in  the  end  pay 
homage  to  the  clock. 

Time  as   Duration 120 

The  conflict  between  the  idea  of  duration  as  expe- 
rience and  as  applying  to  matter.  Time,  materially 
speaking,  derives  its  meaning  from  the  unfinished 
character  of  the  world. 

CHAPTER  V 
FREEDOM  AND  CAUSATION 

The  Conception  of  Freedom  in  the  Philosophy 

OF  Change 133 

Bergson  aims  to  escape  both  mechanism  and  deter- 
minism by  the  doctrine  of  duration,  but  his  unclearness 
on  duration  as  applied  to  matter  vitiates  the  result 
because  choice,  which  is  the  mark  of  freedom,  is 
dependent  upon  personal  duration. 

The  Value  and  Possibility  of  a  Purposeless 

Freedom 137 

A  freedom  of  accident  cannot  account  for  a  rational 
world.  Such  a  freedom  is  valueless  for  religion. 
Freedom  is  inseparable  from  personality.  The 
highest  freedom  is  consonant  with  highest  intelligence 
and  moral  character.     Apart  from  this,  skepticism. 

11 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

Or  Causation  as  Freed  from  Determinism 142 

(a)  Duration  in  Things  as  Different  from  Duration 
in  Self. 

Whatever  the  "elan"  may  be,  it  must  act  subject 
to  the  time  order — that  is,  successively — and  with  pre- 
vision for  the  future  if  there  is  to  be  an  evolutionary 
progress.  If  this  progress  is  real,  duration  in  things 
does  not  differ  from  duration  in  us,  and  the  "elan"  is 
purposive. 

(6)   The  Only  Free  Causation  is  Personal. 

This  is  the  only  ground  on  which  we  can  maintain 
the  reality  of  evolution. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  NATURE  OF  CREATIVE  BEING  IN 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CHANGE 

The  Implications     of     Impersonausm     as  to 

Ground  of  Being 152 

Bergson  posits  a  God  subject  to  matter,  and  so 
creatively  inadequate.  This  God  is  lacking  also  in 
moral  qualities  and  hence  is  inadequate  to  create  a 
world  with  moral  values. 

The  Meaning  of  Duration  and  Change  in  the 

Creative  Being 156 

Duration  in  the  World  Ground  implies  abiding  self- 
consciousness  in  order  to  remain  creatively  active. 
Such  a  World  Ground  must  retain  unchanging  moral 
and  spiritual  purpose.  It  must  be  not  morally  subject 
to  the  world.  It  must  relate  itself  to  but  transcend 
the  temporal  order. 

12 


CONTENTS 

A  True  World-Ground  Must  be  Self-Creative.  169 

An  example  of  self -creative  activity  to  be  found  in 
finite  personality.  A  creative  being  might  through  the 
evolution  of  the  world  be  realizing  himself,  which 
might  be  the  essential  definition  of  a  living  God. 

CHAPTER  Vn 

THE  FRAGH^E  FLOWER  OF  HUMAN 

PERSONALITY 

The  Impossibility  of  an  Impersonal  Freedom.  .   174 

Personality  the  needed  element  in  a  philosophy  of 
change. 

Bergson's  Definition  of  Personality 176 

Distinguished  by  its  indefiniteness,  in  shifting  from 
"body"  to  "image"  to  "I."  Its  unity  is  phenomenal, 
a  matter  of  mental  concentration.  Personality  be- 
comes a  thing  of  degree.  Haunted  by  an  insurmount- 
able dualism.  As  an  impediment  to  the  "elan,"  per- 
sonality is  reduced  to  the  rank  of  inert  matter. 

Disappearance  of  the  Ground  of  Personal  Im- 
mortality    188 

While  philosophy  may  not  be  charged  to  prove 
immortality,  there  is  reason  to  doubt  the  validity  of 
any  system  which  leaves  no  room  for  an  instinct  so 
universal  and  necessary.  Thus  alone  can  the  creative 
continuity  of  the  "elan  vitale"  be  maintained. 

A  Doctrine  of  Personality  is  Fundamental  to 

Metaphysical  Understanding 193 

No  abiding  philosophy  can  omit  the  ultimate  ex- 
planation. 

13 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

SECTION  n 
PERSONAL  REALISM 

CHAPTER  Vm 
THE  AIM  AND  METHOD  OF  REALISM 

Realism  in  General 197 

At  its  best,  realism  strives  to  maintain  the  obvious, 
and  to  stop  the  analyzing  away  of  the  true  nature  of 
being. 

Neo-Realism 198 

Neo-realism  seeks  to  escape  the  unrealities  of  dia- 
lectic by  affirming  independence  of  the  objects  of 
consciousness  and  the  identity  of  object  and  percept. 
In  the  case  of  one  school  this  leads  to  the  position  that 
reality  is  the  relation  of  subject  and  object  in  percep- 
tion, but  ignores  the  self -identifying  nature  of  the  sub- 
ject which  makes  perception  possible. 

Personal  Realism 200 

(a)  Personal  Realism  Affirms  Indivisibility  of  Per- 
sonality. 

It  holds  that  reality  is  a  connection  and  a  relation 
indivisible  except  in  abstract  analysis.  Pluralism  is  a 
fact  only  to  the  rationalizing  nature  of  man.  The 
only  unity  is  a  personal  one.  There  is,  strictly  speak- 
ing, no  dissociation  of  personality,  but  what  is  so 
termed  is  a  dissociation  of  conscious  states. 

(6)  Personal  Realism  Aims  an  Advance  over  Ordi- 
nary f  OTTOS  of  Personal  Idealism. 

Personal  idealism  posits  self-consciousness  as 
fundamental  to  thought;  personal  realism  affirms  per- 

14 


CONTENTS 

sonality  as  the  Ground  of  being  and  the  indivisible 
real.  Personality  in  the  World  Ground  is  limiting 
only  because  of  uncertain  notions  of  space  and  time. 
"Things  as  they  are"  must  include  personality,  and 
because  personality  includes  change  and  freedom  we 
avoid  a  static  world. 

(c)  Personal  Realism  Aims  through  a  Doctrine  of 
Personality  to  Unite  the  Oppositions 

Personality  presents  the  common  ground  of  recon- 
ciliation demanded  by  modern  thought.  It  presents 
an  unmistakable  example  of  self-causation,  and  of 
identity  in  change.  In  a  world  of  mystery  we  must 
choose  the  mystery  least  incompatible  with  the  whole 
of  life.  Is  it  better  to  be  thrust  back  upon  a  lawless 
unintelligible  ground  of  being,  or  shall  we  recognize  its 
identity  with  the  supreme  mystery  of  all  life,  the 
mystery  of  personality?  This  standpoint  gives 
distinct  relief  in  the  solution  of  the  deepest  problems, 
which  are  ultimately  those  that  gather  about  the 
meaning  of  personality. 

CHAPTER  IX 
THE  DEFINITION  OF  PERSONALITY 

The  Meaning  of  Personality  in  a  System  of  Per- 
sonal Realism 223 

Personality  as  the  indivisible  unit  of  reality.  It 
is  not  a  combination  of  states  of  consciousness,  nor  do 
we  consider  the  brain  as  the  seat  of  the  independent, 
self-existing  soul.    It  is  the  essentially  real. 

Some  Essential  Features  of  Personality 225 

(a)  Self-Definition  and  Recognition  of  Other  Person- 
alities, 

15 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

Personal  identity  differs  from  numerical  identity 
by  relation  to  the  temporal  order.  The  personality 
realizes  itself  through  personal  relations. 

{b)  Duration. 

(c)  Freedom. 

To  deny  freedom  would  be  to  deny  moral  account- 
ability. 

(d)  Carnality. 

Causality  is  the  unique  possession  of  personality. 

The  Self-Conscious  and  Self-Creative  Elements 

IN  Personality 236 

By  self-consciousness  in  man  we  mean  the  unique 
power  of  conscious  self-consciousness  through  which  he 
judges  the  motives  of  his  action,  and  so  becomes  moral. 
The  self -creative  element,  a  first  cause,  the  operation 
of  which  we  each  experience.  Finite  causation 
is  limited  by  the  world  of  relations;  infinite  cause  is 
limited  only  by  moral  nature  and  purpose. 

Personality  the  Fundamental  Reality 238 

In  ultimate  analysis,  the  personality  is  the  one  sur- 
vivor of  time  and  change. 

CHAPTER  X 

PERSONAL  REALISM 

AND  THE  TROUBLESOME  PROBLEMS  OF 

PHILOSOPHY 

The  Question  of  Causal  Explanation 240 

Any  mechanical  or  impersonal  explanation  is 
inconsistent  with  the  maintenance  of  evolutionary 
progress.  No  explanation  is  to  be  had  apart  from 
purpose.    The  only  self -creativity  we  know  is  personal. 

16 


CONTENTS 

Vibratory  theories  only  delay  the  real  problem  which 
immediately  arises  of  how  differing  speeds  of  vibration 
are  interpreted  not  as  vibrations  but  as  qualities. 
The  hypothetical  nature  of  such  theories. 

Space  and  Time 247 

Emphasis  must  be  put  upon  the  space  and  time 
transcending  nature  of  personality. 

The  Dualism  of  Thought  and  Thing 250 

This  dualism  is  not  to  be  overcome  by  ignoring 
either  element.  The  relation  of  the  two  orders  re- 
mains the  question  of  philosophy.  In  making  "rela- 
tion" the  real,  neo-realism  drops  into  an  abstraction 
akin  to  that  of  idealism.  The  prime  reality  is  not  the 
relation  but  the  relator.  The  reality  is  persons  in  a 
personal  world.  The  unity  of  personality  is  ultimate 
and  less  mysterious  than  philosophical  abstraction. 

Error  and  Evil 254 

Error  is  not  accounted  for  in  the  commonly 
accepted  realism  of  perception.  To  avoid  the  issue  is 
to  raise  too  many  problems.  The  idealistic  solution 
of  the  problem  of  evil  must  submit  to  the  test  of  the 
concrete  instance.  The  only  possible  justification  of 
the  existence  of  error  and  evil  is  personal. 

CHAPTER  XI 
PERSONALISM  AND  THE  GROUND  OF  BEING 

Personality  Assumed  or  Implied  is  the  Basis  of 

Explanation  in  Current  Theories 261 

This  is  because  the  law  of  the  sufficient  reason 
demands  an  intelligent  source  for  an  intelligible 
world.  "Unknowables,"  "monads,"  "atoms,"  "vor- 

17 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

tices,"  "electrons,"  or  "elans,"  in  so  far  as  they  explain 
are  endowed  with  causality,  freedom,  duration,  and 
even  self-identity,  which  are  the  elements  that  make 
up  personality. 

Affirming  Personality  in  the  World-Ground  is 
NOT  TO  Confuse  God  with  His  World.  .  . .  263 
God  is  immanent  in  his  world,  as  is  the  artist  in  his 
picture.  It  is  the  expression  of  himself,  but  it  is  not 
himself.  The  demand  that  matter  shall  serve  as  a 
sort  of  body  for  the  Deity  is  due  to  faulty  thinking. 

A   Changing   World   Implies   not   a   Changing 

BUT  A  Living  God 265 

To  live  implies  an  enriching  content  of  experience 
rather  than  a  changing  moral  purpose. 

Personal  Realism  Provides  a  Philosophical  Basis 
FOR  A  Doctrine  of  Incarnation 270 

(o)  Impossibley  holding  a  view  of  God  as  Static,  to 
show  how  he  covld  he  in  Christ. 

Questions  of  human  limitations,  foreknowledge, 
omnipotence,  etc.,  no  longer  haunt  us  if  the  chief 
attributes  of  God  relate  to  character.  They  become 
merely  academic  questions. 

(6)  Does  away  with  the  Question  of  how  God  could 
manifest  himself  in  historic  time. 

Time  and  space  are  to  him  both  transcended  and 
real. 

A  Personal  World-Ground  Provides  fob  "God, 

Freedom,  and  Immortality." 274 

An  impersonal  God  or  World-Ground  is  lacking  in 
all  qualities  which  give  the  idea  practical  value  to  man, 
reelects  the  system  of  necessity,  and  closes  the  door  in 

18 


CONTENTS 

the  face  of  humanity's  one  undying  instinct,  the  hope 
of  personal  survival. 

CHAPTER  Xn 
DfDIVIDUALISM  AND  PERSONALISM 

The  revival  of  learning,  break-up  of  feudalism, 
growth  of  democracy,  new  emphasis  on  science  and 
the  liberation  of  philosophy,  all  facilitated  the  growth 
of  individualism. 

Politically,  set  forth  in  the  work  of  Rousseau  and 
Marx;  in  literature,  Groethe,  romanticism,  realism, 
Nietzsche;  educationally  in  Rousseau's  theory  of 
education;  ethically  represented  in  Spinoza;  reli^ 
giously,  in  the  Methodist  and  kindred  movements; 
scientifically,  the  dominance  of  the  empirical  method, 
Haeckel  and  modern  science;  philosophically,  in 
modem  realism,  relativism,  empiricism,  and  skepti- 
cism  

The  CuLTiJRAii  Ideai^  of  Individualism 282 

The  perverted  and  irresponsible  view  of  individual 
culture  which  neglects  the  moral  attainments. 

The  Contrastinq  Ideals  of  Personausm 284 

Its  essential  principle  the  necessity  of  moral  and 
spiritual  values  in  all  true  culture  of  personality. 

The   Present   Conflict  between  Individualism 

AND  Personalism 286 

Individualism  with  its  doctrine  of  Superman  devel- 
oped at  the  expense  of  the  many  and  without  moral 
regard  is  opposing  a  personalism  which  contends  for 
the  inalienable  cultural  rights  of  all  men. 

19 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

The  Cross  as  the  Solution  of  the  Deeper  Prob- 
lems OF  Life 287 

As  the  individual  reaches  his  highest  personal 
attainment  through  sufiFering  for  righteousness,  so 
the  cross  becomes  the  symbol  of  an  uncompleted 
world  in  process  of  perfection. 

Index 291 


20 


INTRODUCTION 


mXRODUCTION 

The  philosophy  of  change  is  as  old  as  Hera- 
clitus,  yet  it  has  appeared  again  and  again  in  the 
field  of  the  history  of  philosophy,  whenever 
other  systems  that  have  long  contested  the 
field  have  shown  signs  of  weakness,  decay,  or 
deadlock.  It  is  a  natural  compromise  between 
the  systems  of  sheer  materialism  and  sheer 
idealism.  It  offers  as  reality  something  more 
tangible  than  abstract  idea,  namely,  a  law  of 
change,  and  something  less  objective  than  the 
theories  of  materiahsm. 

It  provides  a  movement  under  which  the  self- 
creative  soul  may  express  itself,  and  cross  the 
line  from  subject  to  object,  while  it  denudes 
materialism  of  its  static  inertia  and  helplessness, 
and  gives  to  nature  and  life  a  unity. 

One  cannot  read  the  pages  of  the  latest 
philosopher  of  change,  Mr.  Bergson,  without 
being  reminded  of  many  names  in  the  history 
of  philosophy  which  his  doctrines  suggest. 

One  recalls  the  impetus  which  another  French 

philosopher,  Descartes,  gave  to  mechano-mate- 

rialistic   speculation,    which   had   its   effect   in 

running  out  to  its  limit  the  materiahstic  hypoth- 

23 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

esis,  and  making  clear  the  demand  for  something 
better.  One  remembers  the  relation,  or  at 
least  the  concomitance,  of  this  movement  with 
the  movement  of  realism  in  letters  and  in  art. 
And  though  the  term  is  used  in  a  different  way 
when  speaking  of  realism  in  philosophy  it  is 
not  to  be  forgotten  that  there  is  more  than  a 
casual  connection  between  them. 

When  one  reads  the  doctrine  of  intuition, 
as  against  intellectualization,  one  cannot  over- 
look the  results  of  French  romanticism  with  its 
great  emphasis  on  the  value  of  the  psychological 
reaction  of  the  individual,  disclosed  in  the 
intuitionalism  of  Pascal  and  the  surviving 
individualism  in  modern  life  which  is  known 
as  a  doctrine  of  the  superman,  which  is  the 
haunting  spirit  of  modern  literary  realism. 

With  the  conscious  barrenness  of  idealistic 
dialectic  on  the  one  hand  and  a  sense  in  many 
quarters  of  the  breakdown  of  materiahstic 
explanation  on  the  other,  it  is  the  most  natural 
thing  in  the  world  that  philosophy  of  the  present 
hour  should  witness  a  new  appeal  to  the  things 
which  sense  does  not  reach  and  which  intellect- 
ualization seems  only  to  obscure. 

Essentially  the  Bergsonian  system  seems  to 
us  an  attempt  to  give  philosophical  expression 
to  a  demand  of  the  times;  to  offset  the  exclusive 
claims  of  materialism  for  reality;  to  refute  the 

24 


INTRODUCTION 

idealistic  trust  in  pure  dialectic;  to  provide  a  * 
definition  of  life  which  shall  transcend  those 
of  science  and  yet  leave  room  for  spontaneity, 
contingency,  and  life;  and,  not  least  of  all,  to 
restore  philosophy  to  the  popular  interest  and 
to  the  uncritical  by  simplification. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  Bergson  has  accom- 
plished many  of  the  items  of  such  a  program, 
whether  or  not  he  ever  had  such  a  course  in 
mind.  He  has  done  work  which  we  believe  is 
of  great  significance  in  the  clearing  of  philo- 
sophical ideals.  If  at  times  we  seem  hyper- 
critical in  our  discussion  of  his  teachings,  it  is 
that  by  rather  extreme  measures  we  may 
attract  attention  to  elements  of  danger  which 
are  easily  overlooked  by  reason  of  the  winning 
charm  and  contagious  enthusiasm  of  the  philos- 
opher. 

It  seems  good  to  have  a  really  great  philoso- 
pher with  so  popular  an  appeal,  and  no  doubt 
many  of  the  points  here  complained  of  will 
be  cleared  up  by  Mr.  Bergson  himself  in  subse- 
quent works.  The  purpose  of  this  volume  is 
to  show  that  the  philosophy  of  change  is  not 
complete  so  long  as  it  remains  upon  the  abstract 
and  impersonal  basis.  The  difficulty  with 
Bergson's  realism,  as  well  as  with  that  of  the 
neo-realists  with  whom  he  is  often  classed,  is 
that  in  this  abstract  element  they  are  nearer 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

idealism  than  they  dream.  Their  need  is  to 
bring  theory  to  the  test  of  the  concrete  instance 
in  life.  The  concrete  instance  is  based  upon 
the  experience  of  a  person  in  a  world  of  persons. 
And  there  is  an  element  in  personality  which 
at  least  since  the  days  of  Kant  must  be  recog- 
nized as  existing  in  its  own  right.  It  is  this 
element  of  personality  which  we  feel  is  needed 
to  complete  and  ground  a  true  philosophy  of 
change.  Such  a  system  was  worked  out  to 
great  completeness  in  America  by  Borden 
Parker  Bowne  under  the  name  of  Personalism. 
We  have  presumed  here  to  call  it  a  system  of 
personal  realism. 

Acknowledgments  are  due  to  my  colleagues 
Professors  Ulrey,  Dixon,  and  Healey  of  the 
University  of  Southern  California,  to  M.  Poin- 
care,  vice-Rector  of  the  Sorbonne,  and  to  Pro- 
fessor Bergson. 

It  is  not  pleasant  to  disagree  with  one  to 
whom  there  is  a  sense  of  personal  obligation 
linked  with  so  profound  an  admiration  and 
esteem. 

These  considerations  are  not  offered  in  a 
spirit  of  contention  nor  as  an  attempt  at  finality, 
but  in  the  humble  hope  that  they  may  be  not 
altogether  without  value  in  that  conflict  of 
ideas  by  which  comes  the  more  perfect  state- 
ment of  truth. 


INTRODUCTION 

Acknowledgment  should  be  made  to  the  following 
firms  for  courtesies  in  connection  with  the  quotations 
used  in  this  book: 

Henry  Holt  &  Co.,  publishers  of  Creative  Evolution,  by 
Henri  Bergson. 

The  Macmillan  Company  for  quotations  from  Bergson's 
Matter  and  Memory;  and  Time  and  Free  Will;  also  Bo- 
sanquet's  Value  and  Destiny  of  the  Individual. 

G.  P.  PvinaTrCs  Sons,  New  York,  for  quotations  from 
Bergson's  Metaphysics. 

Charles  Scribner*s  Sons  for  quotations  from  Poincare's 
Science  and  Method. 

Houghton  Mifflin  Company  for  Lucy  Larcom's  poem 
«A  Strip  of  Blue." 

The  Yale  University  Press  for  quotations  from  Hock- 
ing's Meaning  of  God. 

Lane  for  Naidu's  "Suttee"  from  the  Golden  Threshold. 

Dana^  Estes  &  Co.  for  Knowles's  "The  Tenant"  from 
On  Life's  Stairway. 

The  University  of  Chicago  Press  for  quotations  from 
Coe's  Psychology  of  Religion. 

Alcan,  Paris,  for  quotations  from  Piat's  La  Personne 
Humaine. 

Open  Court  Publishing  Company  for  Lane's  translation 
of  Herder's  poem  "Self." 

Thomas  Bird  Mosher  for  the  poem  "Sometimes,"  to  be 
found  in  The  Rose  Jar,  by  Thomas  S.  Jones,  Jr. 

The  Author. 
Paris,  April,  1919. 

«7 


SECTION  I 
THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CHANGE 


CHAPTER  I 
BERGSON'S  DEFINITION  OF  BEING 

In  any  system  of  philosophy,  the  definitions 
of  being,  reality,  and  life  are  more  important 
than  any  house  of  speculation  that  may  be  built 
upon  them.  The  definition  is  fundamental, 
and  by  it  the  remainder  of  the  system  must 
stand  or  fall.  It  is,  then,  important  to  any 
critical  review  of  the  Bergsonian  philosophy 
that  we  should  seek  the  exact  definition  which 
is  given  to  being,  reality,  and  life. 

The  foremost  clue  to  this  definition  will  be 
given  us  if  we  can  ascertain  first  of  all  the  aim  of 
the  author.  Bergson  aims  in  his  definition  of 
matter  to  avoid  the  chief  difficulty  which  besets 
materiaHsm.  This  difficulty  is  the  unavoid- 
able skepticism  which  arises  from  the  affirmation 
of  a  reality  which  exists  independent  of  all 
intelligence,  and  which  ends  in  the  denial  of 
knowledge.  This  is  his  endeavor  when  he 
presents  the  definition  of  matter  in  this  fashion: 

Matter  in  our  view  is  an  aggregate  of  images,  and  by 

image  we  mean  a   certain  existence  which  is  more  than 

that  which  the  ideaHst  calls  a  representation,  but  less  than 

that  which  the  realist  calls  a  thing — an  existence  placed 

31 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

half  way  between    the  "thing"  and  the  representation. 
This  conception  of  matter  is  simply  that  of  common  sense.  ^ 

Uncertainty  in  the  Definition  of 
Matter 
However  much  we  may  sympathize  with  the 
attempt  thus  to  overcome  the  age-long  dispute 
in  philosophy,  one  can  scarcely  feel  satisfied 
with  a  solution  which  seems  so  largely  verbal. 
Though  strictly  defining  the  meaning  of  the 
term  "images,"  the  common  connotation  of  the 
word  is  different,  and  this  shadow  of  meaning 
creeps  into  Bergson's  discussion.  The  confusion 
thus  created  becomes  most  apparent  when  he 
comes  to  define  the  relation  of  matter  to  per- 
sonality or  spirit. 

I  call  matter  the  aggregate  of  images,  and  perception  of 
matter  these  same  imxiges  referred  to  the  eventual  action  of 
one  particidar  imagey  my  hody.^ 

Here  is  a  system  which  I  term  my  perception  of  the 
universe,  and  which  may  be  entirely  altered  by  a  very 
slight  change  in  a  certain  privileged  image — my  body. 
This  image  occupies  the  center;  by  it  all  the  others  are 
conditioned;  at  each  of  its  movements  everything  changes, 
as  though  by  the  turn  of  the  kaleidoscope.  Here,  on  the 
other  hand,  are  the  same  images,  but  referred  each  one  to 
itself;  influencing  each  other  no  doubt,  but  in  such  a  man- 
ner that  the  effect  is  always  in  proportion  to  the  cause: 
this  is  what  I  term  the  universe.^ 

1  Matter  and  Memory,  pp.  vii-viii. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  8. 
'Ibid.,  p.  12. 


DEFINITION  OF  BEING 

In  this  case  we  have  the  same  term,  "image," 
applied  to  two  systems,  to  that  of  perception 
or  thought  which  later  becomes  memory  or 
spirit,  and  to  that  of  matter  as  independent 
existence.  The  question  at  once  arises  as  to 
the  validity  of  this  double  use  of  the  term. 
Certainly,  no  questions  existed  previously  which 
do  not  remain  under  the  disguise  of  words. 
Either  self  is  identical  with  matter  or  it  is  not. 
As  an  image  in  the  sense  of  one  body  among 
others  it  might  be,  but  if  we  have  a  mind  for 
that  which  transcends  materiality,  we  still  have 
two  worlds,  and  have  not  advanced  by  our 
definition.  What  Bergson  seems  to  have  hoped 
by  this  device  was  to  obtain  a  suspension  of 
judgment  or  truce  in  hostilities  whereby  we 
will  accept  things  as  they  appear  to  common 
sense  and  not  push  the  remorseless  logic  of  the 
mind  to  either  the  extreme  of  materialistic 
agnosticism  or  idealistic  subjectivism.  The 
great  question  is  how  can  we  stop  by  fiat  and 
be  satisfied  with  the  truce  of  ambiguous  terms? 

In  still  another  passage  he  defines  matter  as 
the  inverse  of  movement,  which  is  fife.  As 
steam  from  a  vessel  escapes  into  the  air,  the 
condensed  drops  of  water  fall  back,  opposing 
themselves  to  the  rising  vapor.  The  drops 
represent  matter  and  the  steam  spirit,  or  life. 
He  says: 

33 


feERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

In  reality,  life  is  a  movement,  materiality  is  the  inverse 
movement  and  each  of  these  two  movements  is  simple,  the 
matter  which  divides  the  world  being  an  undivided  flux, 
and  undivided  also  the  life  that  runs  through  it,  cutting 
out  in  it  living  beings  along  its  track.  Of  these  two  cur- 
rents the  second  runs  counter  to  the  first,  but  the  first 
obtains,  all  the  same,  something  from  the  second.*  The 
movement  is  of  the  very  essence  of  reality.^ 

*  Creative  Evolution,  pp.  249,  250. 

*  "If  matter  so  far  as  extended  in  space  is  to  be  defined  (as 
we  believe  it  must)  as  a  present  which  is  always  beginning 
again,  inversely  our  present  is  the  very  materiality  of  our  ex- 
istence, that  is  to  say,  a  system  of  sensations  and  movements, 
and  nothing  else"  (Matter  and  Memory,  p.  178). 

"Each  of  these  qualities  resolves  itself,  on  analysis,  into 
an  enormous  number  of  elementary  movements.  Whether 
we  see  it  in  vibrations  or  whether  we  represent  it  in  any 
other  way,  one  fact  is  certain,  it  is  that  every  quality  is 
change.  In  vain,  moreover,  shall  we  seek  beneath  the  change 
the  thing  which  changes:  it  is  always  provisionally,  and  in 
order  to  satisfy  our  imagination,  that  we  attach  the  move- 
ment to  a  mobile.  The  mobile  flies  forever  before  the  pur- 
suit of  science,  which  is  concerned  with  mobility  alone.  In 
the  smallest  discernable  fraction  of  a  second,  in  the  almost 
instantaneous  conception  of  a  sensible  quality,  there  may  be 
trillions  of  oscillations  which  repeat  themselves.  The  perma- 
nence of  a  sensible  quality  consists  in  this  repetition  of  move- 
ments, as  the  persistence  of  life  consists  in  a  series  of  palpita- 
tions. The  primal  function  of  perception  is  precisely  to 
grasp  a  series  of  elementary  changes  under  the  form  of  a 
quality  or  of  a  simple  state,  by  a  work  of  condensation.  The 
greater  the  power  of  acting  bestowed  upon  an  animal  species, 
the  more  numerous,  probably,  are  the  elementary  changes 
that  its  faculty  of  perceiving  concentrates  into  one  of  its 
instants.  And  the  progress  must  be  continuous  in  nature, 
from  the  beings  that  vibrate  almost  in  unison  with  the  oscil- 

34 


DEFINITION  OF  BEING 

When  we  consider  still  further  Bergson's 
claim  that  matter  is  simply  "run-down"  or 
exhausted  life,  we  see  how  great  is  the  need  for 
clarifying  definition  and  analysis,  for  in  Berg- 
son's scheme  of  things  both  matter  and  life 
spring  from  a  common  creator  in  which  the 
mechanical  order  is  opposed  to  the  living  order, 
and  is  likewise  produced  by  it. 

He  says: 

All  our  analyses  show  us  in  life,  an  effort  to  remount 
the  incline  that  matter  descends.  In  that,  they  reveal  to 
us  the  possibility,  the  necessity  even,  of  a  process  the 
inverse  of  materiality,  creative  of  matter  by  its  interruption 
alone.' 

On  this  basis  fife  could  not  create  matter  until 
it  already  had  some  matter  to  oppose  it.  But 
this  shakes  our  original  structure  to  its  founda- 
tions because  it  raises  the  question  we  presumed 
settled  at  the  start.  Instead  of  allowing  us  to 
assume  that  motion  is  original,  it  forces  us  to 
weigh  whether  it  is  matter  or  movement  or  life 
that  is  original.  We  shall  find  ourselves  philo- 
sophically in  the  situation  of  the  man  who 
could  find  no  way  out  except  by  lifting  himself 
on  his  own  bootstraps. 

lations  of  the  ether,  up  to  those  that  embrace  trillions  of  these 
oscillations  in  the  shortest  of  their  simple  perceptions"  (Cre- 
ative Evolution,  p.  301). 

•  Creative  Evolution,  p.  245. 
35 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

Failuee  to  Note  a  Real  Distinction 
Between  Matter  and  Spirit 

Any  system  of  philosophy  which  attempts 
definitions  that  shall  of  themselves  reconcile 
the  dualism  of  spirit  and  matter  is  doomed  to 
fall  into  a  similar  confusion.  For  philosophy 
and  for  life  there  is  the  one  great  secret,  and 
that  secret  is  beyond  intelhgible  expression 
and  analysis.  The  secret  of  hfe  resides  measur- 
ably within  the  depths  of  our  own  personalities. 
We  have  there  exposed  as  by  a  flashhght  a 
small  portion  of  the  garment  of  mystery.  How 
can  atoms  of  energy  with  their  deducible  heat 
units  be  traced  into  the  purpose  and  will  of  the 
individual .f^  Mr.  Bergson  recognizes  this  fact 
when  in  the  introduction  to  Matter  and  Mem- 
ory^ he  denies  a  parallelism  between  the  two 
series  psychical  and  physiological.  Why  not, 
then,  openly  admit  that  in  personality  itself  we 
chance  upon  the  unexplained  mystery  of  con- 
nection between  the  worlds  of  matter  and  of 
spirit?  And  if  perchance  we  seek  the  solution  of 
the  larger  mystery  of  eflScient  causation,  it 
might  be  that  personality  in  the  "elan"  would 
settle  problems  for  which  there  is  promise  of 
settlement  by  no  other  conceivable  premise. 

If  we  frankly  recognize  the  dualism  between 


*  Bowne,  Metaphysics,  p.  17. 
36 


DEFINITION  OF  BEING 

matter  and  spirit,  we  can  at  least  say  that  the 
mystery  of  their  connection  lies  in  the  unsounded 
depths  of  personality.  We  need  deny  the 
reality  of  neither  world.  Spirit  would  then  be 
simply  that  which  acts,  and  matter  that  which 
is  acted  upon.^ 

Inasmuch  as  any  clear  consideration  of  the 
questions  at  issue  in  metaphysics  must  recog- 
nize the  existence  of  the  two  realms  of  matter 
and  spirit,  it  would  seem  undesirable  for  us  to 
attempt  to  cover  both  by  the  use  of  a  word 
constantly  confusing.  The  classing  of  contra- 
dictory ideas  under  identical  terms  can  never 
lead  to  clearness  nor  to  the  solution  of  the 
prpblem.  An  illustration  of  this  method  is  to 
be  found  in  the  description  of  the  self  in  Matter 
and  Memory.^    Here  we  have  the  self  referred 

^Bowne,  Metaphysics,  p.  17. 

•  "We  will  assume  for  the  moment  that  we  know  nothing 
of  theories  of  matter  and  theories  of  spirit,  nothing  of  the 
discussions  as  to  the  reality  or  ideality  of  the  external  world. 
Here  I  am  in  the  presence  of  images,  in  the  vaguest  sense 
of  the  word,  images  perceived  when  my  senses  are  opened 
to  them,  unperceived  when  they  are  closed.  All  of  these 
images  act  and  react  upon  one  another  in  all  their  elementary 
parts  according  to  constant  laws  which  I  call  laws  of  nature, 
and  .  .  .  th'e  future  of  the  images  must  be  contained  in  their 
present  and  will  add  to  them  nothing  new. 

"Yet  there  is  one  which  is  distinct  from  all  the  others, 
in  that  I  do  not  know  it  only  from  without  by  perceptions, 
but  from  within  by  affections:  it  is  my  body.  I  examine 
the  conditions  in  which  these  affections  are  produced:^!  find 

37 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

to  as  one  image  among  others,  and  further  as 
an  image  that  is  given  us   in   consciousness. 

that  they  always  interpose  themselves  between  the  excita- 
tions that  I  receive  from  without  and  the  movements  which 
I  am  about  to  execute,  as  though  they  had  some  undefined 
influence  on  the  final  issue.  I  pass  in  review  my  diflFerent 
affections:  it  seems  to  me  that  each  of  them  contains,  after 
its  kind,  an  invitation  to  act,  with  at  the  same  time  leave  to 
wait  and  even  to  do  nothing.  I  look  closer:  I  find  movements 
begun  but  not  executed,  the  indication  of  a  more  or  less  useful 
decision,  but  not  that  constraint  which  precludes  choice.  I 
call  up,  I  compare  my  recollections:  I  remember  that  every- 
where in  the  organic  world,  I  have  thought  I  saw  this  same 
sensibility  appear  at  the  very  moment,  when  nature  having 
conferred  upon  the  living  being  the  power  of  mobility  in 
space,  gives  warning  to  the  species,  by  means  of  sensation, 
of  the  general  dangers  which  threaten  it,  leaving  to  the  indi- 
viduals the  precautions  necessary  for  escaping  from  them. 
Lastly,  I  interrogate  my  consciousness  as  to  the  part  which 
it  plays  in  affection:  consciousness  replies  that  it  is  present, 
indeed,  in  the  form  of  feeling  or  of  sensation,  at  all  the  steps 
in  which  I  believe  I  take  the  initiative,  and  that  it  fades  and 
disappears  as  soon  as  my  activity,  by  becoming  automatic, 
shows  that  consciousness  is  no  longer  needed.  Therefore  all 
these  appearances  are  deceptive,  or  the  act  in  which  the 
effective  state  issues  is  not  one  of  those  which  might  be  rig- 
orously deduced  from  antecedent  phenomena,  as  a  movement 
from  a  movement;  and  hence  it  really  adds  something  new 
to  the  universe  and  to  its  history.  Let  us  hold  to  the  ap- 
pearances; I  will  formulate  purely  and  simply  what  I  feel  and 
what  I  see:  all  seem  to  take  place  as  if,  in  this  aggregate  of 
images  which  I  call  the  universe,  nothing  really  new  could  hap- 
pen except  through  the  medium  of  certain  particular  images, 
the  type  of  which  is  furnished  me  by  my  body.  .  .  .  The  afferent 
nerves  are  images,  the  brain  is  an  image,  the  disturbance 
traveling  through  the  sensory  nerves  and  propagated  in  the 

38 


DEFINITION  OF  BEING 

This  self  is  referred  to  indifferently  as  "I," 
"body,"  "consciousness,"  and  "representation." 
Following  this  description  of  matter  as  an 
aggregate  of  images  among  which  images  my 
body  becomes  (for  me)  a  center,  one  feels  moved 
to  ask  the  following  questions:  If  matter  is  an 
aggregate  of  images,  and  perception  is  the  refer- 
ence to  another  image,  which  is  myself,  do  we 
not  remain  in  a  world  which  is  wholly  phenom- 
enal? If  we  do  not,  then  we  cannot  reach  a 
realm  of  thought  at  all. 


brain  is  an  image  too.  .  .  .  Here  are  external  images,  then 
my  body,  and  lastly,  the  changes  brought  about  by  my  body 
in  the  surrounding  images.  I  see  plainly  how  external  images 
influence  the  image  that  I  call  my  body:  they  transmit  move- 
ment to  it,  and  I  also  see  how  this  body  influences  external 
images;  it  gives  back  movement  to  them.  My  body  is  then, 
in  the  aggregate  of  the  material  world,  an  image  which  acts 
like  other  images,  receiving  and  giving  back  movement,  with, 
perhaps,  this  difference  only  that  my  body  appears  to  choose 
within  certain  limits  the  manner  in  which  it  shall  restore 
what  it  receives.  But  how  could  my  body  in  general  and  my 
nervous  system  in  particular  beget  the  whole  or  a  part  of 
my  representation  of  the  universe?  You  may  say  that  my 
body  is  matter  or  that  it  is  an  image;  the  word  is  of  no  im- 
portance. If  it  is  matter,  it  is  a  part  of  the  material  world, 
and  the  material  world,  consequently,  exists  around  it  and 
without  it.  If  it  is  an  image,  that  image  can  give  but  what 
has  been  put  into  it;  and  since  it  is  by  hypothesis  the  image 
of  my  body  only,  it  would  be  absurd  to  expect  to  get  from  it 
that  of  the  whole  universe.  My  body,  an  object  destined 
to  move  other  objects,  is,  then,  a  center  of  action;  it  cannot 
give  birth  to  a  representation"  (pp.  1-5). 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

As  "aggregate  of  images"  cannot  tell  the 
whole  story  of  matter  with  its  visible  unity, 
so  neither  can  "perception"  account  on  this 
basis  for  the  processes  of  thought,  of  purpose, 
of  will,  which  are  the  finest  and  most  real 
elements  of  experience.  The  moment  we  strive 
for  a  general  term  which  shall  represent  both 
matter  and  spirit  we  have  emptied  its  meaning 
to  the  vanishing  point  by  one  of  those  "efforts 
at  intellectualization"  which  Bergson  so  greatly 
deplores. 

The  actual  line  of  demarcation  is  pronounced, 
and  the  controversy  of  philosophy  must  be 
settled  by  clear  thinking  rather  than  by  ambigu- 
ous terms.  The  nature  of  the  strife  cannot 
thus  be  changed  any  more  than  could  the 
desperate  points  at  issue  in  the  great  American 
war  be  lost  in  the  reference  to  it  by  a  humorous 
writer  as  "the  late  unpleasantness." 

From  this  Definition  of  Matter  Arises 
Confusion  in  the  Meaning  of  Self 
Out  of  this  confusion  in  the  definition  of 
being  arises  a  further  confusion  as  to  the  mean- 
ing of  personality,  or  self.  The  self  is  referred 
to  under  the  general  term  "body."  Yet  we  say 
"my  body,"  and  "I,"  in  contrast  with  my  body. 
This  may  be  a  convenient  form  of  expression 
if  we  are  trying  to  break  down  the  borders 

40 


DEFINITION  OF  BEING 

between  materiality  and  spirit.  The  device 
may  enable  me  to  group  my  body  as  an  image 
with  other  bodies  that  comprise  the  material 
world,  but  the  world  has  long  since  discarded 
the  crude  conception  of  organs  of  the  body  as 
the  seat  of  the  soul.  There  is  great  question 
whether  any  progress  is  to  be  made  by  recurring 
to  the  old  expedient.  According  to  Bergson's 
usage,  the  self  is  alternately  matter  and  spirit 
as  best  suits  the  occasion.  But  he  still  further 
differentiates  spirit  from  perception  by  making 
it  always  bound  to  time  flown.  He  says:  *Tt 
is  in  very  truth  within  matter  that  pure  per- 
ception places  us,  and  it  is  really  into  spirit 
that  we  penetrate  by  means  of  memory. ^° 

Has  spirit,  then,  no  "now".^  Does  it  not 
take  its  seat  until  perception  is  a  thing  of  the 
past.f^  Does  it  not,  rather,  enter  into  the 
bodily  channels  through  which  it  must  reach 
matter  to  determine  what  and  how  much  it 
shall  perceive .f^  It  might  be  conceived  a  great 
spiritual  and  scientific  blessing  to  the  world 
if  men  could  perceive  things  as  they  are,  but 
unfortunately  the  human  personality  so  warps 
its  perception  that  in  many  cases  the  man  per- 
ceives only  that  which  he  wishes  or  expects. 
In  all  cases  involving  exactness  of  perception, 
allowance  must  needs  be  made  for  the  "personal 

"  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  235. 

41 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

equation."  In  courts  of  law  the  prepossessions, 
expectations,  and  seK-interests  of  the  individual 
are  recognized  as  having  important  bearing 
on  what  the  witness  honestly  thinks  he  saw. 
Here  is  a  side  of  perception  which  may  be  incon- 
venient to  consider,  but  which  nevertheless 
must  be  met  if  we  are  to  go  any  distance  along 
the  road  to  the  solution  of  the  problems  involved. 
By  the  Bergsonian  method  perception  is 
placed  in  contrast  with  memory  or  spirit.  From 
matter  identified  with  perception  in  such  wise 
as  to  include  spirit  we  leap  to  spirit  as  memory, 
and  memory  is  considered  as  the  opposite  of 
matter.  Perception  is  supposed  to  be  clear, 
simple,  bearing  only  truth,  being  of  the  nature 
of  reality,  very  reality  itself.  No  recognition 
is  given  to  the  fact  that  "pure"  perception  may 
be  mistaken  perception,  or  at  least  may  become 
the  basis  of  mistaken  intellectualization.  Some 
way  must  be  left  in  which  it  is  possible  to 
account  for  the  difference  of  perception  between 
the  trained  and  the  untrained  mind  and  eye. 
The  botanist,  for  instance,  perceives  a  hundred 
things  about  the  plant  he  discovers  by  the  way- 
side which  do  not  appear  to  the  man  who  is 
ignorant  of  botany.  The  perceptions  of  the 
common  man  not  only  differ  from  those  of  the 
trained  chemist,  but  they  differ  in  such  degree 
as  to  make  of  scant  value  to  the  scientific  world 

42 


DEFINITION  OF  BEING 

the  perception  of  the  untrained.  The  value  of 
the  simplest  perception  is  found  to  lie  in  great 
part  in  the  quality  and  training  of  the  perceiving 
mind.  No  account  is  taken  of  the  fact  that 
elementary  perception  must  appeal  to  memory 
and  thought  for  correction.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  any  attempt  to  divide  the  two  is  an  illus- 
tration of  vicious  "intellectuaUzation."  Per- 
ception is  taken  as  the  brighter  light;  memory 
is  but  its  inefficient  penumbra.  Perception  is 
more  real  as  being  the  very  heart  of  reality; 
memory,  or  spirit,  is  only  a  picture  of  what  has 
been.  Throughout  this  play  of  forces  the  "I" 
passes  like  a  shuttle  to  and  fro,  becoming  alter- 
nately matter  and  spirit,  but  never  a  self- 
directing  identity  above  the  flux  of  experience. 

The  Idea  of  "Duration"  Alone  is 

Insufficient  to  Solve  the  Conflict 

BETWEEN  Mind  and  Matter 

In  so  far  as  the  philosophy  of  change  has 

found  any  solution  of  the  difficulty  thus  raised 

it  has  provided  it  in  its  doctrine  of  duration. 

Matter  is  supposed  to  be  in  space,  spirit  to  be  extra- 
spatial;  there  is  no  possible  transition  between  them. 
But  if,  in  fact,  the  humblest  function  of  spirit  is  to  bind 
together  the  successive  moments  of  the  duration  of  things, 
if  it  is  by  this  that  it  comes  into  contact  with  matter  and 
by  this  also  that  it  is  first  of  all  distinguished  from  matter, 
we  can  conceive  an  infinite  number  of  degrees  between 

43 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

matter  and  fully  developed  spirit — ^a  spirit  capable  of 
action  which  is  not  only  undetermined,  but  also  reasonable 
and  reflective." 

Pure  duration  is  the  form  which  the  succession  of  our 
conscious  states  assumes  when  our  ego  lets  itself  live,  when 
it  refrains  from  separating  its  present  state  from  its  former 
states.  For  this  purpose  it  may  not  be  entirely  absorbed 
in  the  passing  sensation  or  idea;  for  then  on  the  contrary, 
it  would  no  longer  endure. ^^ 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  under  the  term 
"duration"  Bergson  implies  the  self -identifying 
quahty  of  human  personality.  It  is  distin- 
guished from  matter,  it  distinguishes  itself  from 
matter;  it  survives  the  fleeting  states  of  percep- 
tion and  binds  the  various  successions  into  a 
harmony  of  experience.  And  so  far  as  we  can 
understand  his  philosophy,  this  element  of 
duration  is  the  unique  possession  of  the  spirit. 
This  may  at  first  glance  be  questioned  but 
appears  more  likely  upon  reflection.  When  he 
speaks  of  duration  in  matter  it  seems  to  have  a 
meaning  relative  to  the  self -identifying  qualities 
of  the  individual  rather  than  to  any  original  or 
intrinsic  power  in  matter  itself.  Thus,  though 
he  does  not  perhaps  avow  it  in  words,  he  brings 
the  mysterious  relationship  between  matter  and 
spirit  to  the  only  place  to  which  in  the  end  it 


"  Matter  and  Memory,  pp.  295-296. 
"  Time  and  Free  Will,  p.  100. 
44 


DEFINITION  OF  BEING 

can  be  brought,  the  alembic   of  human  person- 
ality. 

The  Resort  to  a  Theory  of  Vibration 
AS  THE  Basis  of  Explanation 

An  account  of  Bergson's  definition  of  matter 
would,  however,  be  incomplete  without  a  con- 
sideration of  his  doctrine  of  movement  as  the 
basis  of  reality. ^^ 

13  "Analysis  resolves  it  [matter]  into  elementary  vibrations, 
the  shortest  of  which  are  of  very  slight  duration,  almost 
vanishing,  but  not  nothing"  (Creative  Evolution  p.  201). 

"REAL  MOVEMENT  IS  RATHER  THE  TRANS- 
FERENCE OF  A  STATE  THAN  A  THING.  .  .  Now. 
certainly  the  difference  is  irreducible  (as  we  have  shown  in 
an  earlier  work) — [T.  &  F.  W.]  between  quality  on  the  one 
hand  and  pure  quantity  on  the  other.  But  this  is  just  the 
question:  Do  real  movements  present  merely  differences  of 
quantity  or  are  they  not  quality  itself,  vibrating,  so  to  speak, 
internally,  and  beating  time  for  its  own  existence  through 
an  often  incalculable  number  of  moments?  ...  If  our  belief 
in  a  more  or  less  homogeneous  substratum  of  sensible  quali- 
ties has  any  ground,  this  can  only  be  found  in  an  act  which 
makes  us  seize  or  divine,  in  quality  itself,  something  which 
goes  beyond  sensation,  as  if  this  sensation  itself  were  preg- 
nant with  details  suspected  yet  unperceived.  Its  objectivity 
— that  is  to  say,  what  it  contains  over  and  above  what  it 
yields  up — must  then  consist,  as  we  have  foreshadowed, 
precisely  in  the  immense  multiplicity  of  the  movement  which 
it  executes,  so  to  speak,  within  itself  as  a  chrysalis.  Motion- 
less on  the  surface,  in  its  very  depths  it  lives  and  vibrates" 
(Matter  and  Memory,  pp.  267-270). 

"To  movement,  then,  everything  will  be  restored,  and  into 
movement  everything  will  be  resolved"  (Creative  Evolution, 
p.  250). 

45 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

By  adopting  the  theory  that  movement  is 
original  the  philosophy  of  change  seizes  by  the 
horns  the  ancient  dilemma  between  a  self- 
creating  Absolute,  and  an  Unknowable  involved 
in  an  infinite  regress.  By  assuming  that  motion 
is  itself  never  begun  but  was  from  eternity  we 
seem  to  have  a  suflGicient  ground  for  the  world 


"As  a  matter  of  fact,  no  one  represents  to  himself  the 
relation  between  quantity  and  quality  in  any  other  way 
[than  as  one  merely  of  vibration].  To  believe  in  realities 
distinct  from  that  which  is  perceived,  is  above  all  to  recog- 
nize that  the  order  of  our  perceptions  depends  on  them  and 
not  on  us.  There  must  be,  then,  within  the  perceptions 
which  fill  a  given  moment,  the  reason  of  what  will  happen 
in  the  following  moment.  And  mechanism  only  formulates 
this  belief  with  more  precision  when  it  ajflSrms  that  the  states 
of  matter  can  be  deduced  one  from  the  other.  It  is  true  that 
this  deduction  is  possible  only  if  we  discover,  beneath  the 
apparent  heterogeneity  of  sensible  qualities,  homogeneous 
elements  which  lend  themselves  to  calculation.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  if  these  elements  are  external  to  the  qualities  of 
which  they  are  meant  to  explain  the  regular  order,  they  can 
no  longer  render  the  service  demanded  of  them,  because  then 
the  qualities  must  be  supposed  to  come  to  overlie  them  by  a 
kind  of  miracle,  and  cannot  correspond  to  them  unless  we 
bring  in  some  preestablished  harmony.  So,  do  what  we  will, 
we  cannot  avoid  placing  those  movements  within  these  quali- 
ties, in  the  form  of  internal  vibrations,  and  then  considering 
the  vibrations  as  less  homogeneous,  and  the  qualities  as  less 
heterogeneous,  than  they  appear,  and,  lastly,  attributing  the 
difference  of  aspect  in  the  two  terms  to  the  necessity  which 
lies  upon  what  may  be  called  an  endless  multiplicity  of  con- 
tracting into  a  duration  too  narrow  to  admit  of  a  separation 
of  its  moments"  (Matter  and  Memory,  pp.  270-272). 

46 


DEFINITION  OF  BEING 

of  matter  which  relieves  us  from  the  embarrass- 
ment of  the  ancient  question  which  remained 
after  assuming  that  all  began  with  a  fire-mist,  or 
a  jiggling  of  atoms,  and  desired  to  know  who 
jiggled  the  atoms  and  how  the  first  impulse  was 
given.  We  see  at  once  that  on  such  a  theory 
we  begin  by  investing  both  matter  and  motion 
with  eternity.  There  is  strong  temptation  at 
this  moment  to  embarrass  the  situation  with 
dialectic.  Doubts  will  come  as  to  how,  if 
motion  has  been  from  all  eternity,  there  can  be 
any  progress  at  all,  or  how  from  such  a  starting 
point  we  can  obtain  the  benefits  of  evolution. 
If  all  the  motion  that  now  is  is  the  exact  equiva- 
lent of  the  motion  that  always  has  been  we  have 
still  to  account  for  the  increment  of  evolution. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  transcendence  of  time  can 
be  the  possession  of  personality  alone,  and  not 
of  matter  nor  of  motion,  if  we  are  going  to 
retain  any  such  thing  as  progress  or  evolution 
possessing  any  meaning  for  thinking  and  pur- 
posive beings.  Any  other  course  must  inevi- 
tably land  us  in  the  darkest  materialism. 

Under  this  theory  that  motion  is  original, 
the  "vital  elan,"  life,  the  universe,  and  God 
are  only  an  intricate  system  of  vibrations.  Nor 
will  it  serve  any  useful  purpose  to  disclaim  our 
materialistic  conclusion,  because  when  we 
think  of  movements  or  vibrations  we  are  com- 

47 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

pelled  to  think  in  materialistic  terms.  Move- 
ments are  movements  of  something  in  space, 
vibrations  are  vibrations  of  material  atoms. 
Even  if  we  go  farther  in  our  work  of  idealization 
and  speak  instead  of  "seons,"  "electrons,"  or 
"vortex  rings,"  we  shall  not  escape  the  materi- 
alistic implication.  We  may  thereby  complete 
an  interesting  intellectual  exercise,  and  may  be 
giving  wide  range  to  our  imaginations,  but  we 
shall  only  deceive  ourselves  if  we  think  we  have 
dehvered  ourselves  in  any  wise  from  the  body 
of  this  materialistic  death. 

When  we  place  all  our  hope  forlorn  on  a 
matter  of  vibrations  it  is  not  beyond  the  bounds 
of  reason  that  we  should  further  demand, 
"Vibrations  of  what.'^"  Are  these  vibrations 
material  or  spiritual  .^^  Are  they  vibrations  of 
atoms,  seons,  electrons,  or  of  monads,  spiritual 
influences?  Are  we  witnessing  the  movement 
of  forces  which  enter  into  what  we  know  as 
matter — that  force  which  is  forever  blocking 
and  hindering  the  ascent  of  life,  the  conquest  of 
the  spirit — or  are  we  actually  witnessing  magic, 
a  dance  of  the  gods?  If  it  should  be  the  latter, 
we  are  all  at  sea  because  we  have  passed  beyond 
the  kingdom  of  science.  Whichever  horn  of  the 
dilemma  we  choose  to  take  there  is  nothing  to 
save  us  from  landing  in  the  bald  materialism  of 
ancient   atomism.    In    the   case   of   vibrating 

48 


DEFINITION  OF  BEING 

"atoms"  or  "aeons"  the  only  reason  we  think 
we  have  made  progress  toward  a  solution  of 
our  difficulty  is  because  we  have  imaginatively 
endowed  a  quaking  infinitesimal  of  matter  with 
all  the  powers,  occult,  purposive,  and  intelligent, 
which  in  our  scientific  enthusiasm  we  have 
denied  to  God.  Unless  we  can  identify  motion 
with  intelligence  we  have  not  been  helped 
along  the  dusty  distances  by  any  assumption 
of  motion  as  the  fundamental  reality. 

It  will  at  once  be  seen  that  under  this  theory 
not  only  matter,  but  perception,  mental  reac- 
tion, reflection,  the  various  universe — all  become 
merely  a  problem  in  variation  of  wave-lengths, 
a  difference  in  speed  of  vibrations  in  certain 
somewhat  fictional  infinitesimals  of  matter. 
Of  course,  in  order  to  get  the  desired  intelhgible 
and  spiritual  results,  there  must  be  in  these  pri- 
mal or  elementary  bodies  or  forces  certain 
intelligent  and  spiritual  elements,  but  it  is  not 
permitted  to  speak  of  these,  nor  to  allow  them 
any  standing.  "No  Passing"  is  written  across 
each  one  of  them.  If  these  needed  elements 
were  given  a  place,  they  might  prove  too  much 
and  might  become  embarrassing  to  our  doctrine 
that  movement  is  original.  In  keeping  with 
this  theory,  one  speed  of  vibration  gives  red, 
another  blue,  the  absence  of  vibration  gives 
black,  while  purple  spells  confusion.     As  the 

49 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

dance  goes  faster  or  slows  down  we  go  from 
light  to  sound,  to  taste  and  smell.  In  this 
novel  and  fascinating  arrangement  wherein  all 
qualitative  changes  are  reducible  to  quanti- 
tative movements,  what  is  to  hinder  the  tracing 
of  those  personal  qualities  which  distinguish 
one  man  from  another  to  a  slightly  different 
period  of  vibration?  The  ancient  Pythago- 
rean speculation  rises  like  a  ghost  out  of  the 
dim  and  distant  past.  It  might  be  that  we 
each  of  us  possess  our  "keynote."  The  long 
outlawed  reflections  of  astrology  might  return 
to  the  field  to  convince  us  that  character  and 
destiny,  criminality  or  saintliness  are  not,  as  we 
have  thought,  a  matter  of  personal  praise  or 
blame,  but  one  of  sympathetic  vibration  in 
accordance  with  which  one  moves  in  keeping 
with  his  horoscope  to  his  keynote  in  the  well- 
timed  music  of  the  spheres.  All  that  one  seems 
to  need  is  a  touch  of  imagination — and  credu- 
lity. 

One  specter  remains  at  the  feast,  however, 
to  disturb  our  mental  harmony:  it  is  the  stub- 
born question.  Has  intuition,  "pure  intuition," 
or  perception,  which  is  reality,  given  us  this 
result,  or  have  we  arrived  in  the  quagmire  by 
a  process  of  gross  "intellectualization"?  This 
is  an  uncomfortable  thought,  for,  by  the  terms 
of  this  philosophy,  rationalization  leads  away 

50 


DEFINITION  OF  BEING 

both  from  life  and  from  reality,  and  the  old 
problem  remains.  In  spite  of  the  warning 
that  if  we  are  to  reach  reality  it  is  dangerous  to 
think,  or  intellectualize,  we  cannot  avoid  the 
abyss  of  reflection.  In  our  slumbers  of  vibra- 
tory self-repose  and  hypnotic  world-satisfac- 
tion, alas,  what  dreams  may  come!  This  re- 
flection is  forced  upon  us;  in  pure  perception, 
or  in  any  other  kind  of  perception,  we  are  not 
conscious  of  vibrations  at  all,  but  of  colors, 
sights,  sounds,  and  bodies  which  the  moment 
we  perceive  them  are  given  an  intelligible  sig- 
nificance and  a  place  in  our  world.  It  is  plain 
that  we  arrived  at  a  belief  in  the  vibratory 
theory,  not  by  that  which  we  have  perceived, 
nor  by  that  which  the  scientists  have  perceived, 
using  the  term  "perception"  in  the  Bergsonian 
sense.  It  becomes  clear  that  we  have  reached 
our  theory  by  one  of  those  processes  of  intel- 
lectualization,  concerning  which  Mr.  Bergson 
has  warned  us  as  leading  us  directly  away  from 
the  reality.  It  is  very  certain  that  whatever 
neo-realism  or  any  other  kind  of  realism  may  be 
able  to  do  for  us^  it  cannot  by  any  principles  of 
realistic  perception  establish  for  us  a  world 
founded  on  an  atomic  or  vibratory  theory. 
Our  choice  between  them  and  the  absolute  ideal- 
ists (if  choose  we  must)  would  needs  be  a  choice 
between  idealistic  pantheism  on  the  one  hand 
51 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

and  idealistic  materialism^'*  on  the  other.  Any 
one  having  paid  the  price  of  admission  can 
attend  either  show.  Neither  one  promises  to 
give  much  satisfaction  beyond  mere  passing 
entertainment. 

One  thing  is  certain,  however  much  the 
researches  of  science  may  be  able  to  establish 
the  fact  of  the  vibratory  changes  of  matter  and 
their  relations  to  changes  in  perception  of 
qualities,  the  question  of  how  these  vibrations  get 
into  thought  as  diverse  qualities  of  being  has  not 
been  touched.  We  certainly  have  never  yet 
explained  anything  by  discovering  another 
word  with  which  to  describe  it.  This  much 
must  be  admitted,  though  failure  to  understand 
it  has  filled  the  world  with  ponderous  and 
tedious  volumes  which  serve  no  better  purpose 
than 

"To  cramp  the  student  at  his  desk, 
And  make  old  bareness  picturesque" 

with  the  moss  of  high-sounding  opinion. 

Why  do  vibrations  moving  at  "m,"  "n,"  or 
**y"  feet  per  second  over  the  same  field  stir 
emotions  of  patriotism  that  inspire  men  to 
press  unflinchingly  up  the  slope  of  death  to 
endure   the   ultimate   sacrifice   with  glad   and 


"  We  beg  to  be  forgiven  this  contradictory  term,  but  can 
think  of  none  other  so  expressive  of  our  meaning. 

52 


DEFINITION  OF  BEING 

willing  hearts?  Why  are  vibrations  say  at 
"n"  to  be  interpreted  into  the  sweetest  voice 
that  man  ever  knows,  that  which  sang  above 
his  cradle?  Why  do  certain  other  vibrations 
moving  at  say  "y"  speed  mean  to  me  the 
dearest  face  that  my  eyes  look  upon?  A  little 
reflection,  Horatio,  will  show  one  things  not 
dreamed  of  in  the  vibratory  philosophy.  This 
world  of  personal  meaning  and  interpretation 
has  many  realities  which  can  neither  be  ex- 
plained by  rates  of  atomic  vibration,  nor  can 
they  find  satisfactory  ground  in  any  origin 
which  is  pure  movement.  When  Bergson  hits 
upon  the  doctrine  of  duration  to  solve  this 
problem  he  is  very  near  to  the  truth,  but  he 
cannot  reap  the  rich  reward  of  such  a  theory 
while  he  remains  in  the  toils  of  any  abstract 
or  impersonal  "duration"  whatever.  The  only 
way  out  is  to  assume  duration  in  the  only  place 
where  it  possesses  intelligible  meaning,  namely, 
in  the  relating  self. 


53 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  DEFINITION  OF  MEMORY 
AND  LIFE 

Let  us  turn  to  the  discussion  of  memory  and 
its  relation  to  matter  and  perception.  We  are 
told: 

If  it  is  memory  alone  that  lends  to  perception  its  sub- 
jective character,  the  philosophy  of  matter  must  aim  in  the 
first  instance,  we  said,  at  eliminating  the  contributions  of 
memory.  We  must  now  add,  that  as  pure  perception 
gives  us  the  whole,  or  at  least  the  essential  part,  of  matter 
(since  the  rest  comes  from  memory  and  is  super-added  to 
matter),  it  follows  that  memory  must  be,  in  principle,  a 
power  absolutely  independent  of  matter.  If,  then,  spirit 
is  a  reality,  it  is  here,  in  the  phenomenon  of  memory,  that 
we  may  come  into  touch  with  it  experimentally.  And 
hence  any  attempt  to  derive  pure  memory  from  an  oper- 
ation of  the  brain  should  reveal  on  analysis  a  radical 
illusion.^ 

Again  he  says : 

It  is  within  matter  that  pure  perception  places  us  and 
it  is  really  into  spirit  that  we  penetrate  by  means  of 
memory.^ 


*  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  81. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  235. 

54 


MEMORY  AND  LIFE 

The  Meaning  of  "Pure"  Memory 
Let  us  consider,  first  of  all,  the  use  made  of  the 
term  "pure"  memory  and  what  might  possibly 
be  its  meaning  and  connotation  for  a  system  of 
philosophy. 

Bergson  helps  to  clear  the  way  for  us  by 
asserting^  that  by  this  term  he  does  not  mean 
that  which  the  psychologists  ordinarily  treat 
as  memory.  He  declares  that  the  meaning 
ordinarily  given  to  the  term  concerns  only 
mental  habit,  and  not  memory  as  he  wishes  to 
think  of  it.  What  then  is  memory?  Memory 
is  the  intersection  of  mind  and  matter.  Though 
he  does  not  so  state  it,  memory  is  a  person  in 
the  act  of  perceiving.  Now,  "pure"  memory 
is  experience,  not  in  the  moment  of  perception, 
but  experience  after  the  event  has  been  related 
to  the  self.  At  the  farthest  reach  of  the  self 
in  the  direction  of  matter  stands  "pure"  per- 
ception which  entirely  lacks  this  self-relating 
element,  and  cannot  be  distinguished  from 
matter.  At  the  opposite  pole  stands  "pure" 
memory,  in  which  the  particular  event  has 
been  related  to  the  self,  to  the  past,  and  to  the 
universe,  in  other  words,  the  experience  has 
become  a  part  of  personality.  Just  as  "pure" 
perception  stands  related  to  matter,  so  "piwe" 


«  Matter  and  Memory,  pp.  94-95,  passim. 
$5 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

memory  stands  related  to  spirit,  that  is,  it  is 
not  to  be  distinguished  from  it.  If  we  might 
be  permitted  to  diagram  the  situation,  it  would 
appear  thus: 


T 

*PP 

P 

u 

ue 

e 

r 

IT 

r 

e' 

e'c 

c 

M 

e 

e 

M 

M 

s 

P 

P 

e 

e 

p 

t 

t 

m 

m 

i 

i 

i 

o 

o 

r 

o 

o 

r 

r 

i 

1 

n 

1 

n 

1 

y 

1 

y 
1 

t 

1 

It  is  obvious  by  the  diagram  that  the  final 
term  of  connection  between  matter  and  spirit 
is  missing.  This  is  because  the  mistake  is  made 
of  identifying  "pure"  memory  with  spirit  and 
so  leaving  our  conclusion  incomplete.  "Pure" 
memory  and  spirit  may  be  considered  as  pos- 
sessing identity  analogous  to  that  possessed  by 
"pure"  perception  and  matter;  but  if  they  are 
identical,  we  make  no  progress  by  using  varying 
terms,  and  are  not  justified  in  making  distinc- 
tions without  a  difference.  The  instructive 
part  of  the  diagram  is,  that  all  the  way  from 
spirit  up  to  and  including  "pure"  perception 
we  have  wholly  the  terms  of  personal  experi- 

56 


MEMORY  AND  LIFE 

ence.  So  far  as  there  is  any  movement  at  all 
it  is  on  the  part  of  the  human  subject.  The 
description  becomes  then  but  a  measure  of  the 
degrees  by  which  the  person  knows  his  world. 
The  two  realities  that  stand  out  are  the  world 
of  matter  and  the  person  or  spirit.  The  inter- 
vening spaces  are  but  the  symbols  of  intellect- 
ual analysis,  the  description  of  a  personal 
realism.  For,  while  "pure"  perception  may 
be  taken  as  practically  coincident  with  matter, 
and  "pure"  memory  as  coincident  with  spirit 
or  personality,  yet  in  concrete  experience  we 
know  only  perception  and  "pure"  memory, 
memory  having  slipped  out  in  the  shuffle  as  a 
meaningless  term.  In  truth,  we  cannot  in 
practice  divide  perception  from  "pure"  memory, 
for  the  relating  faculty  is  busy  in  the  very 
midst  of  perception,  and  even  goes  before  it. 
We  are  conscious  of  the  "I"  before  we  are 
conscious  of  material  fact,  and  we  perceive  the 
fact  in  its  relation  to  ourselves.  We  carry  our- 
self  into  it,  to  use  a  Bergsonian  expression. 
What  we  are  determines  in  no  inconsiderable 
degree  what  we  shall  see,  what  our  perceptions 
shall  be.  Without  this  relating  capacity  we 
shall  not  get  a  perception  at  all,  for  we  should 
then  be  incapable  of  any  experience  of  the  out- 
side world.  Personality  is  this  mysterious 
"synthesis  of  'pure'  memory  and  *pure'  per- 

57 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

ception;  that  is  to  say,  of  mind  and  matter/' 
and  this  is  what  we  mean  by  the  term  "personal 
realism." 

Of  the  Relation  between  Perception 
AND  Memory 

Bergson  acknowledges  the  purely  hypotheti- 
cal nature  of  "pure"  perception  in  the  following 
terms : 

Our  perception,  we  said,  is  originally  in  things  rather 
than  in  the  mind,  without  us  rather  than  within.  The 
several  kinds  of  perception  correspond  to  so  many  direc- 
tions actually  marked  out  in  reality.  But,  we  added, 
this  perception,  which  coincides  with  its  object,  exists 
rather  in  theory  than  in  fact;  it  could  only  happen  if  we 
were  shut  up  within  the  present  moment.  In  concrete 
perception  memory  intervenes,  and  the  subjectivity  of 
sensible  qualities  is  due  precisely  to  the  fact  that  our 
consciousness,  which  begins  by  being  only  memory, 
prolonged  a  plurality  of  moments  into  each  other,  con- 
tracting them  into  a  single  intuition.* 

We  believe  that  Bergson's  definition  looks 
in  the  right  direction,  but  we  do  not  believe 
that  it  is  stated  with  suflScient  clearness,  nor 
that  it  is  adequate  and  satisfying.  The  average 
mind  will  ask  certain  questions  that,  unpro- 
vided for,  will  be  found  embarrassing.  It 
is  clear  that  if  memory  is  the  intersection  of 
mind  and  matter,  we  can  from  mere  intersec- 
tion, keeping  strictly  to  our  figure  of  speech, 

*  Matter  and  Memory,  pp.  291,  292, 
58 


MEMORY  AND  LIFE 

get  nothing  as  a  result  that  will  be  of  a  different 
order  than  the  two  elements  already  provided. 
If  we  are  going  to  use  memory  as  a  term  in  which 
to  express  spirit,  there  is  a  question  as  to  how 
it  can  be  the  product  of  mind  and  matter.^ 
That  is  to  say,  if  we  are  serious  in  putting  for- 
ward this  dictum,  our  definition  acquires 
standing  because  we  have  given  to  the  term 
"mind"  the  content  of  "spirit."  We  cannot 
by  combining  two  material  things  get  a  third 
of  a  higher  and  spiritual  order.  Pushing  the 
case  a  step  farther,  should  we  say  that  memory 
is  the  result  of  the  intersection  of  mind  and 
matter  or  that  it  is  the  remembrance  of  such 
intersection,  we  are  met  with  the  problem  of 
what  or  who  does  the  remembering.  Bergson 
has  positively  shown  us  in  another^  place  that 
the  body  can  in  no  sense  be  considered  the 
storehouse  of  sensation.  We  have,  then,  re- 
moved the  possibility  of  considering  "body"  in 

8  Our  diflSculty  here  lies  in  the  common  meaning  of  the 
word  "memory."  We  cannot  use  the  word  intelligently 
without  thinking  of  it  as  related  to  something  which  is  past. 
Bergson  uses  it  in  distinction  from  "pure"  memory  with  the 
meaning  we  ordinarily  assign  to  perception.  The  moment  an 
event  is  past  it  has  already  been  related  to  the  self-experience 
and  has  thus  become  "pure"  memory.  The  trouble  in  terms 
arises  from  the  attempt  to  secure  a  word  which  will  be  a  general 
term  and  which  will  also  express  what  we  mean  by  person. 
In  the  nature  of  the  case  such  an  effort  is  doomed  to  confusion. 

•  Matter  and  Memory,  pp.  233,  234;  p.  79;  pp.  136,  137. 
59 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

the  loose  way  in  which  we  have  previously 
hidden  the  fact  of  personality.  Whither,  then, 
can  we  fly? 

When  we  stop  to  reflect,  we  recognize  two 
requirements,  the  presence  of  which  makes 
patent  and  meaningful  this  term  "memory." 
First,  it  is  evident  that  memory  which  is  not 
memory  of  concrete  facts  or  experiences  is 
memory  of  nothing.  It  may  be  claimed  that 
in  making  this  statement  we  are  going  back  to 
the  meaning  of  the  term  which  has  been  speci- 
fically repudiated.  But  this  will  be  not  quite 
the  fact.  If  memory  is  to  be  the  relating  of  the 
past  to  the  present  or  the  future,  it  must  be  the 
relating  of  specific  experiences. 

The  second  requirement  in  memory  of  which 
we  spoke  is  this.  Memory  is  nothing  apart 
from  a  remembering  individual  or  personality. 
Memories  that  are  only  generalities  experienced 
by  generalities  would  convey  no  definable 
meaning.  It  is  because  memory  is  the  rela- 
ting of  concrete  events  to  a  concrete  self-iden- 
tifying unit  that  it  comes  to  possess  an  assign- 
able meaning.  When  we  have  come  thus  far 
the  discovery  is  forced  upon  us  that  what  we 
have  been  considering  under  the  name  of  "pure" 
memory  is  really  expressed  under  the  term 
"person."  To  us  this  term  is  far  more  apt  and 
less  conducive  of  confusion. 

60 


MEMORY  AND  LIFE 

That,  then,  which  stands  above  the  inter- 
section of  mind  and  matter,  that  which  gathers 
the  succession  of  experiences  up  into  itself, 
that  which  Bergson  posits  under  the  figure  of 
the  rolHng  snowball  of  experience,  that  which 
brings  to  the  present  every  moment  of  its  past, 
and  that  which  is  able  to  act  with  reference  to 
an  unexperienced  future,  is  what  we  really  mean 
by  the  term  "person." 

After  telling  us  repeatedly  that  perception 
is  the  coincidence  of  the  perceiver  and  the  thing 
perceived;  that  we  attain  reality  by  "putting 
ourselves  in  things";  that  this  relation  is  the 
reality,  we  are  hardly  prepared  to  be  told  that 
this  coincidence  is  not  a  fact  but,  rather,  a 
theory.  But  this  is  what  seems  to  accrue  and 
this  result  must  be  held  to  spring  from  the 
previous  attempt  to  unite  the  world  of  thought 
and  thing  under  an  abstraction.  Thought  and 
thing  are  concretely  related  only  in  a  thinking 
subject.^ 

^  "Let  us,  on  the  contrary,  banish  all  preconceived  idea  of 
interpreting  or  measuring;  let  us  place  ourselves  face  to  face 
with  immediate  reality;  at  once  we  find  that  there  is  no 
impassable  barrier,  no  essential  difference,  no  real  distinction, 
even,  between  perception  and  the  thing  perceived,  between 
quality  and  movement.  Our  perception,  we  said,  is  originally 
in  things  rather  than  in  the  mind,  without  us  rather  than 
within.  The  several  kinds  of  perception  correspond  to  so 
many  directions  actually  marked  out  in  reality.  But,  we 
added,  this  perception,  which  coincides  with  its  object,  exists 

61 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

That  the  idea  of  personahty  is  necessary  to 
bring  these  definitions  of  perception  and  mem- 
ory out  from  the  region  of  unclear  ideas  becomes 
more  apparent  as  we  consider  them  in  contrast 
and  relation.     He  says: 

If  we  take  perception  in  its  concrete  form,  as  a  synthesis 
of  pure  memory  and  pure  perception,  that  is  to  say,  of 
mind  and  matter,  we  compress  within  its  narrowest  limits 
the  problem  of  the  union  of  soul  and  body.* 

It  is  apparent  from  this  quotation  that  the 
term  pure  perception  has  no  concrete  meaning, 
and  like  the  symbol  of  an  algebraic  equation, 
is  used  for  purposes  of  argument  and  analysis. 
We  learn  that  pure  perception,  which  is  indis- 
tinguishable from  matter,  which  coincides  with 
matter,  has  only  a  theoretical  value,  never 
existing  as  a  concrete  fact.  Thus  that  "pure 
perception  which  is  not  to  be  distinguished  from 
matter"  has  vanished  into  thin  air.  Would  we 
be  justified  in  saying  that  with  it  had  gone 

rather  in  theory  than  in  fact:  it  could  only  happen  if  we  were 
shut  up  in  the  present  movement.  In  concrete  perception 
memory  intervenes,  and  the  subjectivity  of  sensible  qualities 
is  due  precisely  to  the  fact  that  our  consciousness,  which  begins 
by  being  only  memory,  prolongs  a  plurality  of  movements 
into  each  other,  contracting  them  into  a  simple  intuition. 
Consciousness  and  matter,  body  and  soul,  were  thus  seen  to 
meet  each  other  in  perception"  (Matter  and  Memory,  pp. 
291,  292). 

*  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  325. 


MEMORY  AND  LIFE 

that  material  world  on  which  are  based  so  many 
hopes  of  explanation?  It  would  seem  as  if  in 
this  apparently  innocent  statement  we  had 
gone  the  way  of  all  absolute  idealism  or  subject- 
ivism. We  should  scarcely  fare  better  with  our 
definition  of  pure  memory  did  we  not  in  floun- 
dering about  in  the  metaphysical  sea  strike  our 
feet  on  the  recognized  shore  of  personality. 
Here  as  in  Lowell's  verses,  we 

"Can  but  exult  to  feel  beneath  our  feet. 
That  long  stretched  vainly  down  the  yielding  deeps. 
The  shock  and  sustenance  of  solid  earth." 

Pure  memory,  removed  from  the  event  and 
become  merely  a  relation  of  experience  to 
experience,  would  also  vanish,  leaving  no  trace 
bbhind,  did  we  not  unconsciously  give  it  a 
content  which  the  term  does  not  imply.  One 
state  of  consciousness  could  take  no  cognizance 
of  preceding  or  succeeding  states,  could  have  no 
sense  of  succession  or  past,  unless  it  were  raised 
out  of  the  level  of  successions,  where  it  belongs, 
into  something  else.  That  something  else, 
abiding  above  the  succession  of  experiences, 
maintaining  its  seK-identity  in  the  midst  of  all 
changes  that  can  come,  is  the  personality.  A 
state  could  not  relate  other  states  to  itself 
because  it  could  not  abide  to  do  the  relating, 
nor  could  it  retain  its  identity  while  receiving 
63 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

them  into  itself.  There  is  neither  unity  nor 
intelligence  without  taking  the  term  "pure" 
memory  from  its  usual  and  also  from  its  general 
meaning,  and  endowing  it  with  the  concrete 
qualities  of  personality.  Bergson  gives  it  these 
qualities,  but  does  not  provide  for  them  in  his 
definition. 

The  Assumed  Independence  of  Memory 

AND  Matter  is  Not  Tenable  on 

THESE  Terms 

Unless  we  move  forward  to  the  assumption 
of  personality  as  fundamental  to  experience 
and  life,  we  cannot  abide  by  the  claims  which 
are  set  forth  for  memory,  as  independent  of 
matter.® 

We  cannot  by  a  method  of  analysis  make 
memory  absolutely  independent  of  matter  if 
we  begin  and  end  by  defining  it  as  the  intersec- 
tion of  mind  and  matter.  When  we  use  these 
terms  mind  is  thought  of  as  spirit  or  pure 
memory.  Memory  is  then  put  as  the  least 
possible  remove  from  perception.  Pure  mem- 
ory as  existing  apart  from  present  perception, 
because  it  is  really  independent  (in  the  sense  of 
being  not  entirely  dependent),  self -relating 
unity,  might  be  possible.  But  memory,  as 
Bergson  uses  the  term,  must  lie  in  precise  or 

•  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  81. 
64 


MEMORY  AND  LIFE 

concrete  experiences.  We  are  forced  to  explain 
then  how  things  that  are  "absolutely  inde- 
pendent" can  be  said  to  intersect,  find  common 
ground,  and  pass  over  into  each  other.  Let 
it  be  understood  that  at  this  point  we  have  no 
dispute  with  the  facts  of  experience.  Our 
quarrel  is,  rather,  with  the  foregoing  definition. 
Memory  as  akin  to  perception  does  hold  a 
certain  dependence  upon  the  material  world. 
So  long  as  we  keep  our  senses  we  shall  not 
perceive  a  blank  space  where  there  is  a  stone 
wall,  nor  walk  upon  water  as  if  it  were  dry  land, 
nor  pass  through  the  partition  of  our  house 
where  there  is  no  opening.  Memory  cannot 
be  defined  as  the  intersection  of  mind  and  matter 
without  introducing  the  entire  brood  of  material- 
istic conclusions  which  the  philosophy  of  change 
sets  out  to  avoid.  Memory  may  spring  from 
the  reaction  of  a  personality  upon  matter, 
which  is  a  fundamentally  different  way  of  put- 
ting it. 

We  cannot  by  this  expedient  of  finite  person- 
ality hope  to  find  more  than  a  temporary  refuge 
from  the  metaphysical  storm.  If  we  are  to 
find  any  basis  of  intelligibility,  something 
beyond,  akin  both  to  matter  and  to  human 
personality,  upon  whose  intelligent  creative 
will  and  purpose  both  mind  and  matter  depend, 
must  be  affirmed. 

65 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

Perhaps  the  ingenuity  of  human  discovery 
may  some  day  lay  bare  within  the  whirling 
vortices  of  atoms  powers  strangely  mysterious 
to  us  now,^^  which  will  make  less  difficult  the 
leap  from  what  we  term  matter  to  that  which 
we  term  God,  but  any  creative  force  which  is 
to  give  adequate  explanation  of  our  world 
cannot  leave  out  intelligence  nor  the  uniqueness 
of  human  purpose  as  it  fulfills  its  desires,  and 
therefore  must  contain  within  itself,  in  larger 
and  more  efficient  measure,  these  self-same 
powers. 

Only  by  some  such  assumption  are  we  per- 
mitted to  arrive  at  any  real  independence 
between  thought  and  thing.  It  is  an  independ- 
ence, not  because  the  two  things  are  of  such 
nature  that  there  are  no  means  of  interaction 
between  them,  but  independent  because  they 
are  creatively  so  endowed  that  personality, 
even  though  it  be  finite,  may  understand, 
utilize,  and  master  in  some  measure  the  universe 
of  which  it  is  a  part. 

The  Metaphysical  Bearing  of  the 
T/HiNGs  which  Escape  our 
Explanation 
One  cannot  travel  far  in  metaphysical  expla- 


in For  Biological  Statement  of  the  problem  see    Wilson, 
The  Cell  in  Development  and  Inheritance  (1911),  pp.  431-434. 


MEMORY  AND  LIFE 

nation  without  being  troubled  by  insistent 
doubts  and  misgivings  at  the  verities  which  are 
forever  escaping  the  terms  of  his  philosophy, 
the  inadequacy  which  human  expression  always 
experiences  when  it  attempts  the  explanation 
of  life.  A  study  of  all  the  philosophies  which 
have  existed  since  the  world  began  would 
disclose  at  least  this  common  ground  of  opin- 
ion— that  the  eventual  thing  cannot  be  expressed. 
So  far  as  this  fact  is  concerned,  it  matters 
little  whether  we  tie  up  our  mystery  in  a  bundle 
of  words,  and,  casting  it  into  the  abyss,  turn 
our  backs,  mumbling  the  equations  of  science 
rapidly,  as  a  frightened  peasant  would  tell 
his  beads,  or  whether  we  sum  up  our  mystery 
in  the  term  "forces,"  or  the  "Unknowable,"  we 
cannot  eradicate  the  fact  of  the  existence  of  that 
which  passes  beyond  our  power  of  explanation. 
When  it  comes  to  mysteries,  however,  there 
is  happily  such  a  thing  as  choice  of  mysteries. 
We  may,  like  Bassanio,  choose  the  casket  which 
shall  decide  our  metaphysical  fate.  Here  too 
there  may  not  be  wanting  certain  inscriptions 
by  which  wit  and  judgment  may  be  guided  in 
its  choice.  Personality  is  the  one  thing  in 
common  experience  which  baffles  all  powers  of 
description  and  explanation.  From  it  comes 
every  event  of  unique  or  efficient  causation  that 
we  can  actually  trace  and  identify.  Within 
67 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

its  depths  lie  hidden  the  strange  mingling  of 
mind  with  matter  which  we  hope  to  explain. 
Bergson  has  called  it  the  synthesis  of  pure 
memory  and  pure  perception.  We  do  not  make 
it  any  more  mysterious  when  we  call  it  plainly 
personality.  Such  being  the  case,  it  might  be 
found  in  the  interests  of  clearness  advisable  to 
drop  from  terms  merely  technical  and  abstract 
to  those  of  concreteness  and  actuality.  Let  us 
name  the  fundamental  mystery  of  being  person- 
ality. Let  us  recognize  that  the  terms  we  use 
inadequately  to  describe  it  are  like  those  of  the 
functional  psychologists,  abstractions  or  sym- 
bols which  assist  in  analyzing  and  rationalizing 
the  fundamental  and  indivisible  fact. 

Nor  should  it  be  lost  from  our  view  that  we 
must  assume  another  fundamental  mystery 
before  we  can  complete  our  system.  That 
mystery  is  the  existence  of  a  personality  behind 
the  world  of  matter  and  of  personalities.  All 
will  be  found  in  the  end  to  resolve  itself  into 
this  final  mystery.  If  we  can  assume  this,  the 
other  mysteries  fall  marvelously  into  line.  The 
unsolved  dualism  of  life  becomes  then  not  a 
dualism  or  conflict  between  mind  and  matter, 
nor  is  it  akin  to  that  pluralism  which  renders 
the  conflict  universal,  the  hand  of  each  being 
set  against  his  brother;  neither  is  it  the  dualism 
of  good  and  evil,  destined  to  go  on  forever: 


MEMORY  AND  LIFE 

it  is,  rather,  a  dualism  of  contrasting  wills,  a 
dualism  which  exists  with  purposive  and  express 
consent  of  the  supreme  Intelligence  whose 
purpose  and  aim  seems  to  be  the  solution  of 
dualism  by  a  progress  which  gives  meaning  to 
all  evolution,  eventuating  in  a  world  of  person- 
alities whose  moral  outlook  and  supremacy  is 
like  his  own. 

The  Definition  of  Life 
When  we  approach  the  consideration  of 
Bergson's  definition  of  life,  we  shall  find  him 
using  several  different  expressions  in  which  to 
convey  his  meaning.  We  find  him  thinking  of 
life  as  the  intersection  of  the  two  great  inde- 
pendent streams  of  reality — matter  and  spirit. 
We  shall  find  it  described  as  "formidable 
thrust,"  or  as  "pure  duration,"  or  as  "vital 
impulse."  Life  is  an  order  of  reality  that  is 
original,  whereas  matter  is  an  order  that  is 
derived.  ^^ 

One  need  not  be  unappreciative  of  the  great 
modern  debt  to  Bergson  for  his  attempt 
scientifically  to  restate  the  familiar  problems  of 
philosophy,  in  noting  the  confusion  likely  to 
arise  from  any  impersonal  and  abstract  defi- 
nition of  life,  such  as  he  has  given  us. 

He   frequently   describes   life   as   a   current 

"  Sc.  Wildon  Carr,  The  Philosophy  of  Change,  p.  145. 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

which  opposes  itself  to  the  stream  of  matter/^ 
divided  into  species  and  individuals  by  une- 
qual stresses  of  opposition.  Again,  the  two 
streams  of  reality  are  matter  and  spirit  and  the 
very  intersection  of  the  two  is  life  itself.  In 
another  connection  we  are  told  that  "Life  in 
general  is  mobility  itself,"^^  which  leads  us  back 
to  a  coincidence  with  spirit.  Again,  "Regarded 
in  what  is  its  true  essence,  namely,  as  a  tran- 
sition from  species  to  species,  life  is  a  contin- 
ually growing  action. "^^  Again,  life  is  a  stream 
which  in  its  evolution  continues  an  initial 
impulsion.  ^^ 

In  the  interest  of  clearness  we  believe  that 
definiteness  at  this  point  is  of  exceeding  import- 
ance. If  life  is  the  intersection  of  spirit  and 
matter,  then  spirit  is  really  the  creator  of  life, 
spirit  is  the  abiding  some-what  from  which  by 
reason  of  its  contact  with  matter  individual 
examples  of  life  repeatedly  arise.  If,  however, 
life  is  the  initial  impulsion  continued  through 
evolution,  it  must  be  coincident  with  if  not 
superior  to  the  first  stream  of  reality,  which  is 
spirit.  If  by  life  we  mean  a  push  in  the  sense 
of  causal  activity,  we  are  forced  to  ask  whether 


12  Creative  Evolution,  pp.  268f. 

13  Ibid.,  p.  128. 
"  Ibid.,  p.  128. 
16  Ibid.,  p.  246. 

70 


MEMORY  AND  LIFE 

it  belongs  to  the  order  of  matter  or  to  the  order 
of  spirit,  or  derives  from  some  source  above 
the  two  which  originated  both  movements  or 
streams.  Just  as  in  the  illustration  of  the 
steam  and  the  drops  of  water  Bergson  assumed 
the  existence  of  matter  as  a  factor  in  its  own 
genesis,  here  he  assumes  life  as  its  own  creator. 
Thus  his  dualism  amounts  to  an  impasse  be- 
cause he  makes  both  matter  and  spirit  self- 
generative  and  independent.  We  have  thus 
moved  about  the  circle,  but  we  have  explained 
nothing.  This  destiny  must  ever  follow  the 
attempt  to  get  at  the  source  of  the  material  or 
spiritual  order  by  any  process  of  impersonalism. 
We  are  inevitably  committed  to  the  infinite 
regress  unless  we  assume  personality  as  the 
ground  of  being. 

Life  as  Duration 

Nor  will  the  unqualified  assumption  of  "pure" 
duration  as  the  definition  of  life  yield  us  ade- 
quate results.  Duration  is  really  the  experi- 
ence of  succeeding  states  of  consciousness 
before  they  are  gathered  into  the  temporal 
synthesis.  Duration  is  the  soul  side  of  per- 
ception (with  reference  to  the  element),  and 
coincides  with  memory.  "Pure"  duration  is 
these  synthesized  and  related  successions.  Just 
because  duration  gathers  into  itself  these  past 
71 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

experiences  and  brings  them  to  bear  upon  the 
present  moment,  introducing  purpose  and 
uniqueness  into  the  moving  stream,  Bergson 
defines  it  as  of  the  essence  of  Hfe.  No  fault 
can  be  found  with  such  a  definition  except  its 
indefiniteness.  He  is  by  the  term  "pure  dura- 
tion" implying  exactly  that  which  is  gathered 
up  in  the  common  term  "personality,"  for  a 
consciousness  of  duration,  that  is,  of  succession 
in  states,  is  possible  only  to  a  unity  that  abides 
self-consciously  above  the  flux;  that  gathers  the 
successive  states  into  relation  to  itself;  which 
grows  by  these  experiences  and  yet  transcends 
them  in  its  own  self -recognition.  The  only 
concrete  example  of  such  synthesizing  and  self- 
identifying  unity  which  is  given  us  is  found  in 
persons.  If,  then,  we  remove  from  the  idea 
of  duration  those  abstractions  due  to  intellect- 
ualization,  we  shall  find  the  definition  a  true 
one  and  deeper  than  we  dreamed.  The  truth 
might  be  stated  in  plain  words  that  life  is,  in 
whatever  phase  we  find  it,  the  expression  of 
personality.  If  it  be  self-conscious,  according 
to  the  manner  of  our  own  experience,  it  is  human 
personality;  if  it  be  unconscious,  speaking  after 
our  order,  it  must  be  an  expression,  in  some  form 
which  we  may  not  determine,  of  a  creative 
personality.  Only  thus  can  we  reach  that 
indeterminateness,   or   freedom,   which   is   the 

72 


MEMORY  AND  LIFE 

promise  of  Bergson's  philosophy,  and  also  avoid 
the  meshes  of  mechanical  causation. 

Life  as  Vital  Impulse 
When  we  come  to  consider  the  doctrine  of 
initial  "vital  impulse"  to  account  for  the  homo- 
geneity of  the  universe,  we  shall  be  equally  at 
loss  from  the  impersonal  standpoint.  We  must 
press  on  and  invest  this  originative  impulse 
with  purposive  powers.  A  homogeneity  result- 
ing from  a  vital  impulse  which  is  a  mere  push 
acquires  its  homogeneity  from  the  absolute 
equation  of  cause  and  effect,  the  law  of  the 
sufficient  reason.  It  matters  little  what  term 
we  apply  to  that  original  creative  impulse,  it 
must  contain  within  itself  a  power  sufficient  to 
account  for  that  which  it  has  created.  It  must 
be  something  more  than  a  blind  stumble  in  the 
dark,  which  fortuitously  set  in  motion  powers 
far  beyond  its  own  ken  or  reckoning.  Either 
that  homogeneity  of  which  we  speak  springs 
from  an  adequate  creative  purpose  (in  which 
we  seem  to  wed  ourselves  to  the  system  of  abso- 
lute idealism),  or,  if  no  adequate  creative 
purpose  were  present,  we  are  inevitably  tied  to 
a  system  of  mechanical  causation,  bound  to 
find  every  effect  potentially  (which  means 
actually)  present  within  its  cause.  The  latter 
conclusion  renders   evolution   impossible,  just 

73 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

as  the  former  creates  a  system  of  determinism. 
Now,  the  avowed  object  of  the  philosophy  of 
change  is  to  avoid  this  conclusion.  A  vital 
impulse  which  was  an  initial  accident,  an  upset 
of  static  forces  and  nothing  more,  can  never, 
to  logical  minds,  give  adequate  explanation  of 
anything  but  a  world  of  accident  and  disorder. 
It  can  never  account  for  a  world  of  order,  or  of 
personalities,  to  say  nothing  of  a  world  of  free- 
dom. 

We  are  beset  with  parallel  difficulties  when 
we  think  of  the  original  impulse  as  purposive 
and  personal,  adequate  for  the  creation  of  a 
world  of  persons,  but  moving  only  through  an 
initial  impulsion.  Here,  again,  we  happen  upon 
that  world  of  grim  determinism  which  Berg- 
son  has  discovered  to  be  the  nightmare  of 
Absolutism.  It  appears  that  just  as  we  resort 
to  a  personal  realism  to  express  for  ourselves 
the  relation  of  the  individual  to  his  world, 
assuming  as  our  fundamental  proposition  the 
reality  of  the  person  and  the  reality  of  his 
correspondences,  so  if  we  would  keep  freedom  or 
uniqueness  anywhere,  we  must  assume  a  funda- 
mental Personality  to  express  the  relation  be- 
tween first  cause  and  the  world  that  springs 
therefrom.  Moreover,  this  relation  must  be 
not  past.  It  must  not  be  the  beginning  of  a 
long  and  exhaustless  succession,  but  an  ever- 

74 


MEMORY  AND  LIFE 

present,  ever-continuing  relationship,  without 
which  the  whole  order  of  matter  and  spirit,  exist- 
ing in  time  and  space,  would  be  nonexistent  or 
would  pass  away.  Only  thus  can  we  have  a 
unity  which  is  other  than  a  tedious  and  unchang- 
ing identity.  The  old  recourse  to  potential- 
ities has  been  exploded  times  enough,  so  that 
it  is  unnecessary  to  recall  it  here,  but  it  may 
be  well  to  recall  that  in  a  system  of  mechanical 
causation  where  the  effect  is  contained  in  the 
cause  we  can  have  no  progress  at  all.  This 
fact  bears  the  test  of  actual  experience.  No 
progress  is  made  in  society,  not  an  invention 
enters  in  to  lift  heavy  burdens  from  the  backs  of 
men,  no  discovery,  no  new  thought  is  possible 
according  to  the  law  of  mechanical  causation. 
It  is  because  life  in  its  uniqueness  is  forever 
trampling  under  foot  this  law  of  effect  wholly 
contained  in  its  mechanical  or  phenomenal 
cause;  because  it  is  ever  transcending  the  limits 
laid  down  in  the  mechanistic  scheme,  that  there 
remains  a  hope  that  in  civilization,  in  arts,  in 
knowledge,  to-morrow  shall  be  better  than  to- 
day, or  to-day  be  anything  more  than  parallel 
with  all  the  days  that  have  gone  before. 

Thus  also  we  must  conclude  that  the  evolution 
of  a  world  of  life,  with  its  varying  species  and 
its  growing  adaptabilities,  is  dependent  at  every 
step  upon  the  entrance  of  a  unique  creative 

75 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

energy  which  acts  m  its  realm  after  the  manner 
of  that  creative  energy  which  in  us  binds  our 
world  to  new  purposes,  new  thoughts,  and  new 
ideals. 

If  unity  is  to  mean  anythmg,  it  must  be 
something  more  than  a  form  of  words.  Homo- 
geneity in  the  universe  means  a  continually 
active,  living  creative  power,  or  else  we  have 
but  the  homogeneity  of  determinism  and  death. 

Life  as  the  Point  of  Minimum 
Cognition 
Can  we,  then,  agree  with  the  assumption 
that  we  get  closest  to  life  in  the  moment  of 
pure  perception,  that  intuitional  moment  when, 
as  Bergson  expresses  it,  we  "put  ourselves  in 
things".^  Yes,  and  no.  Yes,  if  we  give  full 
force  to  that  term  which  Bergson  so  apparently 
neglects,  namely,  "ourselves."  No,  if  we  mean 
that  perception  devoid  to  the  greatest  degree 
of  mental  and  experiential  content  gives  the 
truest  picture  of  life.  If  this  last  assumption 
were  true,  if  truest  perception  were  innocent 
of  all  intellectualizing;  if  it  were  greatest  and 
nearest  life  in  the  measure  of  its  freedom  from 
all  relation  to  past  experiences  which  make  up 
our  personality,  then  the  only  course  left  the 
true  philosopher  would  be  to  seek  with  all  his 
powers  the  Nirvana  of  minimum  cognition. 

76 


MEMORY  AND  LIFE 

If  we  are  to  assume  the  realistic  view  of  per- 
ception as  the  act  of  "putting  ourselves  into 
things,"  we  ought  in  all  fairness  to  define  the 
meaning  we  intend  to  include  in  the  term 
"ourselves."  It  might  be  we  should  thus 
introduce  in  an  apparently  innocent  term 
assumptions  that  have  an  unconsciously  pro- 
found bearing  on  all  that  follows.  We  are 
convinced  that  this  is  true  in  the  present  case. 
We  cannot  even  in  the  "purest"  perception  rid 
ourselves  of  the  distinction  fundamental  to  all 
perception,  the  distinction  between  the  "me" 
and  the  "not  me."  Any  process  which  removes 
from  perception  that  rationalizing  element  which 
the  perceiving  person  inevitably  brings  with  him 
has  also  removed  perception.  We  cannot  have 
perception  that  possesses  any  meaning  unless 
it  bears  some  relation  to  an  individual.  The 
meaning  of  any  particular  perception  or  intui- 
tion is  made  in  considerable  part  by  what  the 
individual  himself  actually  is.  The  only  seem- 
ing exception  to  this  would  be  in  the  infant 
just  born,  who  is  following  an  intuition  for  the 
first  time,  as,  for  instance,  that  of  food.  Even 
here  it  is  clear  that  a  second  experience  would 
not  be  a  "pure"  intuition  or  perception  but  a 
following  of  habit  already  laid  down  by  previous 
experience.  My  own  feeling  is  that  the  first 
act  should  not  be  called  an  act  of  intuition  just 
77 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

because  it  is  devoid  of  experience,  and  so  of 
mental  content.  If  we  were  to  grant,  for  pur- 
poses of  argument,  that  the  following  of  this 
first  instinct  for  food  is  an  intuition,  we  must 
remember  that  this  intuition  is  already  laid 
down  according  to  the  laws  of  the  child's  being. 
That  is  to  say,  the  child  brings  a  child  nature  to 
the  act  of  intuition,  and  that  first  act  is  at  some 
distance  removed  from  the  intuition  of  a  simple 
cell  by  reason  of  the  mental  machinery  attend- 
ant upon  it  and  prepared  to  act.  In  other 
words,  the  intuition  is  intelligent,  filled  with 
conclusions  of  relationship  between  the  indi- 
vidual and  his  world,  though  the  individual 
himself  has  not  created  them  nor  set  them  up. 
If  intuition  or  perception  were  to  be  "pure"  as 
being  devoid  of  all  such  intelligible  meaning, 
it  would  be  nothing  at  all,  perception  of  nothing 
by  nothing.  In  other  words,  the  process  of 
perception  is  a  fundamental  and  indivisible 
realism,  which  in  concrete  cases  must  be  as- 
sumed, and  which  can  be  analyzed  and  divided 
only  in  abstract  thought,  in  the  same  manner 
in  which  we  use  the  term  of  x"  in  mathematics. 
When  we  "put  ourselves  in  things"  we  must 
remember  that  the  "ourselves"  part  of  the 
equation  is  quite  as  important  as  the  "thing." 
If  we  remove  the  "ourselves,"  we  have  no 
equation  left. 

78 


MEMORY  AND  LIFE 

Nowhere  does  a  realism  of  the  personal  type 
become  more  apparently  necessary  than  at 
this  point,  that  is,  in  the  mysterious  relation 
that  exists  between  mind  and  matter  in  the  act 
of  perception.  If  in  this  act  brain  can  pass 
over  into  mind,  or  soul  into  body,  we  have  not 
two  orders  of  reality — matter  and  spirit — but 
one.  If  brain  becomes  mind  we  have,  of  course, 
materialism.  Nor  can  we  gain  eventual  peace 
by  flying  to  a  doctrine  of  psychic  parallelism, 
for  that  too  lands  us  in  an  abyss,  and  an  abyss 
of  worse  choosing,  for  we  have  then  an  irre- 
concilable dualism  that  vitiates  the  possibihty 
of  knowledge.  Inasmuch  as  we  must  assume 
some  mystery  somewhere,  it  is  best  to  assume 
it  where  it  is  actually  seen  to  exist,  in  the  actual 
relation  between  the  individual  and  his  world, 
and  to  assume  it  in  such  wise  that  neither  the 
individual  nor  his  world  will  become  unreal. 
We  assume,  then,  that  personality  is  the  ulti- 
mate fact,  the  primal  and  independent  mystery. 
And  though  it  be  more  or  less  a  temperament 
of  mind  what  one  shall  choose,  it  may  be  worth 
while  to  ask  if  this  will  not  be  as  good  a  choice 
as  that  realism  which  makes  all  reality  only  a 
relation  (and  in  this  is  perilously  close  to  idealism 
without  its  strength),  or  that  older  realism 
which  attempted  to  avoid  mystery  by  doing 
away  with  spirit.     It  might  be  as  good  a  choice 

79 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

as  that  idealism  which  banishes  matter  to  the 
ghostly  realm  of  ideas,  or  that  empiricism 
which  was  satisfied  because  it  had  lost  all  power 
of  thought  in  an  Unknowable  which  was  really 
but  an  infinite  regress.  It  might  be  found  on 
examination  that  realism  of  the  personal  type 
will  not  yield  more  difficulties  but  less  in  an 
attempt  to  comprehend  the  meaning  of  the 
world.  At  any  rate,  if  we  assume  our  mystery 
to  be  hidden  in  personality  we  possess  a  concrete 
fact  for  analysis  and  study  that  may  ultimately 
yield  more  of  its  secret.  This  gives  us  better 
promise  of  light  than  that  which  may  be  wrung 
from  invisible  aeons.  Absolutes  or  Unknow- 
ables.  There  is  no  promise  that  by  them  we 
can  ever  bring  our  judgments  to  the  concrete 
tests  of  life  and  experience. 

That  certain  rationalizing  which  man  in 
distinction  from  the  animals  carries  into  his 
very  intuitions  is  not  only  his  glory  but  is  the 
secret  of  his  understanding  of  the  world.  The 
ignorant  man,  not  having  access  to  much  of 
reason,  may  depend  more  upon  his  intuitions 
than  does  the  scholar,  and  his  intuitions  may, 
acting  more  quickly,  lead  him  more  safely  than 
the  scholar's  reasoning.  We  ought,  however, 
to  remember  that  in  the  one  case  the  quickness 
may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  whole  life  has 
not  gone  beyond  the  practical  interest  of  food 

80 


MEMORY  AND  LIFE 

and  self-preservation.  Even  our  intuitional 
man  is  safest  in  those  intuitions  that  have  been 
affected  by  long  years  of  habit  and  many  expe- 
riences. It  is  the  experienced  guide  that  I 
choose  to  pole  my  canoe  down  the  rapids,  not 
the  most  elemental  one,  because  the  experienced 
man  faced  suddenly  by  a  new  situation  which 
may  mean  drowning,  will  be  more  likely  to  act 
wisely  than  the  greenhorn  who  depends  on 
intuition  rather  than  upon  experience  and 
training.  Moreover,  in  sensing  of  hidden  rocks 
and  treacherous  currents  and  those  elements 
by  which  the  individual  enters  into  the  world 
around  him  it  is  evident  that  experience  and 
rationalizing  bear  a  practical  power  which  one 
cannot  afford  to  despise,  inasmuch  as  they 
transcend  what  either  man  or  animal  can  do  by 
mere  intuition.  This  view  is  borne  out  by  the 
decreasing  death-rate  of  civilization  and  the 
thousand  ameliorative  results  of  intellectuali- 
zation  brought  to  bear  on  the  simplest  and  most 
elemental  relationships  of  life. 


81 


CHAPTER  III 
INTUITION  AND  INTELLIGENCE 

The  philosophy  of  change  includes  under  the 
single  term  "instinct,"  or  "intuition,"  all  the 
general  activities  of  the  world  which  fall  under 
the  reign  of  uniformity  or  law.^    The  term  is 

^  "It  has  been  asked  how  far  instinct  is  conscious.  Our 
reply  is  that  there  are  a  vast  number  of  differences  and  degrees, 
that  instinct  is  more  or  less  conscious  in  certain  cases,  uncon- 
scious in  others.  The  plant,  as  we  shall  see,  has  instincts; 
it  is  not  likely  that  these  are  accompanied  by  feeling.  Even 
in  the  animal  there  is  hardly  any  complex  instinct  which  is  not 
unconscious  in  some  part  at  least  of  its  exercise.  But  here  we 
must  point  out  a  difference,  not  often  noticed,  between  two 
kinds  of  unconsciousness,  namely,  that  in  which  consciousness 
is  absent  and  that  in  which  consciousness  is  nullified.  Both  are 
equal  to  zero,  but  in  one  case  the  zero  expresses  the  fact  that 
there  is  nothing,  in  the  other  that  we  have  two  equal  quantities 
of  opposite  sign  which  compensate  and  neutralize  each  other. 
The  unconsciousness  of  a  falling  stone  is  of  the  former  kind: 
the  stone  has  no  feeling  of  its  fall.  Is  it  the  same  with  the 
unconsciousness  of  instinct,  in  the  extreme  cases  in  which 
instinct  is  unconscious?  When  we  mechanically  perform  an 
habitual  action,  when  the  somnambulist  automatically  acts 
his  dream,  unconsciousness  may  be  absolute;  but  this  is 
merely  due  to  the  fact  that  the  representation  of  the  act  is 
held  in  check  by  the  performance  of  the  act  itself,  which 
resembles  the  idea  so  perfectly  and  fits  it  so  exactly  that 
consciousness  is  unable  to  find  room  between  them.  Repre- 
ss 


INTUITION  AND  INTELLIGENCE 

taken  as  applying  to  inanimate  and  animate 
objects    alike.    Stones,    plants,    animals,    and 


sentation  is  stopped  up  by  action.  The  proof  of  this  is,  that  if 
the  accomplishment  of  the  act  is  arrested  or  thwarted  by  an 
obstacle,  consciousness  may  reappear.  It  was  there  but 
neutralized  by  the  action  which  fulfilled  and  thereby  filled  the 
representation.  The  obstacle  creates  nothing  positive,  it 
simply  makes  a  void,  removes  a  stopper.  This  inadequacy 
of  act  to  representation  is  precisely  what  we  here  call  con- 
sciousness. 

"If  we  examine  this  point  more  clearly,  we  shall  find  that 
consciousness  is  the  light  that  plays  around  the  zone  of 
possible  actions  or  potential  activity  which  surrounds  the 
action  really  performed  by  the  living  being.  It  signifies 
hesitation  or  choice.  Where  many  equally  possible  actions 
are  indicated  without  there  being  any  real  action  (as  in  delib- 
eration that  has  not  come  to  an  end),  consciousness  is  intense. 
Where  the  action  performed  is  the  only  action  possible  (as 
in  the  activity  of  the  somnambulistic  or  more  generally  auto- 
matic kind),  consciousness  is  reduced  to  nothing. 

"Representation  and  knowledge  exist  none  the  less  in  the 
case  if  we  find  a  whole  series  of  systematized  movements,  the 
last  of  which  is  already  prefigured  in  the  first,  and  if,  besides, 
consciousness  can  flash  out  of  them  at  the  shock  of  an  obstacle. 
From  this  point  of  view  the  consciousness  of  a  living  being  may 
be  defined  as  an  arithmetical  difference  between  potential  and 
real  activity.  It  measures  the  interval  between  representation 
and  action"  (Creative  Evolution,  pp.  143,  144). 

"Now,  in  both  cases,  in  the  instinct  of  the  animal  and  in 
the  vital  properties  of  the  cell,  the  same  knowledge  and  the 
same  ignorance  are  shown.  All  goes  on  as  if  the  cell  knew, 
of  the  other  cells,  what  concerns  itself;  as  if  the  animal  knew, 
of  the  other  animals,  what  it  can  utilize — all  else  remaining  in 
shade.  It  seems  as  if  life  as  soon  as  it  has  become  bound  up 
in  a  species  is  cut  off  from  the  rest  of  its  own  work,  save  at 
one  or  two  points  that  are  of  vital  concern  to  the  species  just 
83 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

man  are  all  said  to  possess  instinct.  The  same 
term  covers  the  action  of  gravity  in  a  falling 
stone,  the  affinity  of  chemical  substances,  the 
torsion  of  a  plant's  tendrils,  automatic  action 
in  animals  and  man.  As  is  always  true  in  such 
an  attempt  at  generalization,  many  pitfalls  lie 
in  the  way.     We  are  forced  to  make  distinctions 

arisen.  Is  it  not  plain  that  life  goes  to  work  here  exactly 
like  consciousness,  exactly  like  memory?  We  trail  behind  us, 
unawares,  the  whole  of  our  past;  but  our  memory  puts  into 
our  present  only  the  odd  recollection  or  two  that  in  some 
way  complete  our  present  situation.  Thus  the  instinctive 
knowledge  which  one  species  possesses  of  another  on  a  certain 
particular  point  has  its  root  in  the  very  unity  of  life,  which  is, 
to  use  the  expression  of  an  ancient  philosopher,  'a  whole 
sympathetic  to  itself.*  It  is  impossible  to  consider  some  of 
the  special  instincts  of  the  animal  and  of  the  plant,  evidently 
arisen  in  extraordinary  circumstances,  without  relating  them 
to  those  recollections  seemingly  forgotten,  which  spring  up 
suddenly  under  the  pressure  of  an  urgent  need"  (Creative 
Evolution,  p.  167). 

"Though  the  plant  is  distinguished  from  the  animals  by 
fixity  and  insensibility,  movement  and  consciousness  sleep 
in  it  as  recollections  which  may  waken"  (Creative  Evolution,  p. 
119). 

"Even  if  we  could  refer  the  instincts  of  animals  to  habits 
intelligently  acquired  and  hereditarily  transmitted,  it  is  not 
clear  how  this  sort  of  explanation  could  be  extended  to  the 
vegetable  world,  where  effort  is  never  intelligent,  even  sup- 
posing it  is  sometimes  conscious.  And  yet,  when  we  see 
with  what  sureness  and  precision  climbing  plants  use  their 
tendrils,  what  marvelously  combined  maneuvers  the  orchids 
perform  to  secure  their  fertilization  by  means  of  insects,  how 
can  we  help  thinking  that  these  are  so  many  instincts.'*" 
(Creative  Evolution,  p.  170.) 

84 


INTUITION  AND  INTELLIGENCE 

between  the  various  kinds  of  instincts,  dis- 
tinctions which  to  many  will  seem  too  contrast- 
ing to  be  included  under  a  single  term.  Bergson 
distinguishes  between  the  instinct  which  is 
attended  by  consciousness  and  instinct  where 
consciousness  is  absent.  Consciousness,  he  tells 
us,  is  not  present  in  the  instinct  of  inanimate 
objects.  A  falling  stone  has  no  feeling  of  its 
fall.  Even  the  animal  is  at  the  most  only 
partially  conscious  of  its  instinct.  In  man 
instinct  is  conscious,  but  the  consciousness  of 
instinct  is  nullified  when  action  has  become 
wholly  automatic,  as  in  bicycle  riding  or  in  the 
action  of  a  sleep-walker.  Consciousness  is 
really  the  sign  of  the  presence  of  intelligence 
and  signifies  hesitation  or  choice.  The  instinct 
of  plant  or  animal  in  matters  of  vital  interest 
wherein  it  touches  some  other  species  seems  to 
Bergson  to  imply  recollection  of  the  past,  trans- 
mitted from  parent  to  offspring.  It  might  not 
be  amiss  to  call  attention  in  passing  to  the  purely 
verbal  and  imaginary  character  of  such  trans- 
mission. The  idea  is  as  figurative  as  Spencer's 
doctrine  of  transmitted  "race  experience." 
But  to  Bergson  it  is  a  reality  springing  from 
the  unity  of  life.  He  turns  from  the  idea  that 
instinct  is  laid  down  in  animals  by  intelligently 
formed  habit  because  that  would  not  enable 
him  to  account  for  such  examples  of  instinct 

85 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

as  are  shown  by  the  tropisms  of  plants  and 
the  efforts  of  the  orchids  at  cross-fertiliza- 
tion. 

It  is  Necessary  to  Attain  Accuracy  in  the 
Use  of  the  Term  "Intuition" 
We  do  not  intend  in  these  pages  to  contradict 
the  idea  that  intuition  gets  closer  to  life  than 
intelligence.  What  we  propose  is  to  show  that 
the  term  "intuition"  must  be  more  closely 
defined,  and  that  in  using  it  we  must  never  lose 
sight  of  the  inseparable  intellectual  elements 
which  it  contains.  That  the  intuition,  at  least 
in  man,  contains  inseparable  intellectual  ele- 
ments is  a  fact  of  which  Bergson  is  himself 
quite  aware,  and  which  no  one  familiar  with 
Kant's  great  contribution  to  thought  can  over- 
look. It  seems  to  us,  however,  that  the  whole 
doctrine  of  the  philosophy  of  change  as  it  relates 
to  theory  of  thought  is  weakened  by  failure  to 
make  the  distinction  which  Bergson  recognizes 
a  basic  and  established  part  of  his  system. 
We  may  seem  to  acquire  a  certain  unity  by  the 
use  of  general  terms,  but  when  those  general 
terms  conceal  differences  of  nature,  as  well  as 
of  degree,  their  seeming  unity  is  a  deception. 
This  always  will  be  true  unless,  indeed,  we  take 
the  general  term  to  mean  no  more  than  the 
least  common  denominator.    Assuming  a  least 

86 


INTUITION  AND  INTELLIGENCE 

common  denominator  and  then  taking  the 
highest  factor  of  our  highest  quantity  as  if  it 
were  the  least  common  denominator  is  a  fallacy 
common  to  philosophy.  In  mathematics,  which 
depend  upon  the  concrete  symbol,  the  fallacy 
is  easily  detected;  in  metaphysics  or  episto- 
mology,  where  one  must  use  the  inaccurate 
symbols  of  language,  one  may  easily  be  uncon- 
scious of  vitiating  fallacies. 

Let  us  look  for  a  moment  at  the  use  which  is 
made  in  the  philosophy  of  change,  of  the  word 
"intuition."  We  shall  find  that  while  it  is 
the  highest  factor  of  one  of  the  elements  of  our 
generalization,  it  is  also  frequently  used  as  if 
it  were  the  lowest  common  denominator  of 
them  all.  For  example,  this  term  is  used  to 
describe  not  only  the  instinct  which  is  exempli- 
fied in  the  conscious  life  and  activities  of  the 
animals,  and  that  higher  and  unique  possession 
of  creative  and  intelligent  action  of  the  thinking 
man;  it  is  likewise  used  of  mere  cellular  attrac- 
tion and  the  chemical  affinity  of  unconscious  life. 
The  reaching  out  of  a  simple  cell  toward  food 
or  light,  or  its  response  to  chemical  change, 
wonderful  as  those  responses  of  the  cell  to  its 
environment  may  be,  should  not  be  identified 
with  the  intuition  of  a  thinking  being.  For 
instance,  he  says  of  certain  plants: 

When  we  see  with  what  sureness  and  precision  climbing 
87 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

plants  use  their  tendrils,  what  marvelously  combined 
maneuvers  the  orchids  perform  to  secure  their  fertiliza- 
tion by  means  of  insects,  how  can  we  help  thinking  of 
these  as  so  many  instincts?^ 

We  have  a  right  to  inquire  here  whether  by 
instinct  he  means  unconscious  automatic  reac- 
tion to  stimulus.  If  so,  that  is  one  thing;  but  if 
he  means  to  imply  conscious,  intelligent,  or  psy- 
chical effort,  that  is  quite  another  matter.  If 
he  does  not  mean  to  imply  this  latter  suppo- 
sition, he  has  chosen  an  unfortunate  "metamor- 
phizing"  form  of  words,  and  instinct  is  surely 
not  the  most  appropriate  term  to  use. 

There  may  be  fundamental  qualities  in  the 
cell,  or  the  cell  may  be  so  constituted  that  by 
its  nature  it  reaches  after  the  thing  that  will 
enter  into  its  structure  to  build  it  up.  It  may 
likewise  avoid  elements  that  are  destructive, 
but  when  in  this  connection  we  speak  of  the 
choice  of  the  cell,  we  are  not  using  that  word  in 
the  sense  in  which  we  would  use  it  of  a  human 
being.  We  might  recall  the  rejection  by  mole- 
cules of  water  of  molecules  of  oil.  The  refusal 
of  the  water  to  amalgamate  with  oil  is  not, 
strictly  speaking,  a  matter  of  choice  on  the  part 
of  the  water.  It  is  a  matter  inherent  in  the  na- 
ture of  two  contrasting  elements.  I  may  use  the 
word  "choice"  to  express  the  fact  that  the  two 

'  Cited  above,  Creative  Evolution,  p.  170. 
88 


INTUITION  AND  INTELLIGENCE 

cannot  combine,  but  it  is  obvious  that  in  apply- 
ing it  I  have  been  using  a  figure  of  speech.  If  I 
lose  sight  of  the  fact  under  cover  of  the  word  in 
which  I  have  expressed  it  and  then  go  on 
"anthropomorphizing"  my  drop  of  water,  I 
can  easily  make  it  account  for  everything  in 
heaven  and  earth,  and  there  is  no  limit  except 
the  limit  of  my  imagination.  This  is  exactly 
what  is  done  times  without  number  by  the 
uncritical.  We  cannot  use  the  term  "intuition" 
or  "instinct"  as  applicable  in  the  same  sense  to 
tropisms  in  the  simplest  forms  of  life,  to  instinct 
in  animals  and  to  intuition  in  man.  The  incon- 
sistency is  apparent  to  us  if  we  give  the  term 
"intuition"  its  lowest  instead  of  its  highest 
possible  meaning.  If  we  should  make  intuition 
consonant  merely  with  cellular  attraction,  and 
then  try  to  make  it  the  basis  of  explanation  of 
all  conscious  and  intelligent  life,  we  should  see 
this.  Such  a  proposition  is  immediately  absurd 
except  to  the  blindest  and  most  thoroughgoing 
materialist  who  does  not  believe  in  purpose,  or 
will,  or  moral  responsibility,  but  only  in  piti- 
lessly driving  forces.  Hence,  when  we  use  the 
terms  "choice,"  "purpose,"  "consciousness," 
"perception,"  and  "intuition,"  we  must  use 
them  with  minute  discrimination  or  we  must 
suffer  the  misfortune  of  being  continually  misled 
in  our  conclusions.     Cellular  aflSnity  may  be 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

wholly  elemental  and  mechanical,  instinct  in 
animals  may  be  an  unconscious  response  to  the 
demands  of  habit  and  life,  but  intuition  in  man 
is  a  psychological  fact.  No  one  should  attempt 
to  unite  the  truths  and  processes  of  chemistry, 
biology,  and  psychology  under  a  common  term 
which  would  assume  all  three  to  be  identical. 

The  Intellectual  Element  in  all 
Human  Intuition 
Following  along  the  lines  already  laid  down, 
it  will  be  seen  that  we  must  not  only  rec- 
ognize the  fact  that  all  human  intuition  is 
shot  through  with  intelligence,  with  intellect- 
ualization,  but  we  must  use  our  term  as  if  this, 
and  not  something  else,  were  the  fact.  The 
acknowledgment  of  error  or  of  sin  is  of  no 
practical  value  if  one  continues  repeating  the 
offense.  The  recognition  of  the  right  and  the 
true  brings  no  profit  to  me  until  I  act  as  if  the 
right  and  the  true  were  a  desirable  part  of  action. 
So  in  philosophy  one  has  not  done  his  full  duty 
when  he  has  said  "Good  morning"  to  a  funda- 
mental principle,  if  thereafter  he  proceed  to  act 
as  if  that  fundamental  principle  did  not  hold. 
Consequently,  any  doctrine  of  intuition  must 
reckon  with  the  fact  that  intuition  in  a  human 
being  is  inseparable  from  intelligence.  That 
which  the  individual  brings  to  the  act  of  intui- 

90 


INTUITION  AND  INTELLIGENCE 

tion,  though  it  be  no  conscious  part  of  the  act 
because  it  is  the  acting  self,  is  nevertheless 
present,  and  cannot  be  eliminated  without 
destroying  or  nullifying  the  act.  There  can  be 
no  human  intuition  in  the  strict  sense  of  the 
term  without  intelligence. 

The  dependence  of  intuition  upon  intelli- 
gence is  thus  set  forth  by  Henri  Poincare: 

The  majority  of  men  do  not  like  thinking,  and  this  is 
perhaps  a  good  thing,  since  instinct  guides  them,  and  very 
often  better  than  reason  would  guide  a  pure  intelligence, 
at  least  when  they  are  pursuing  an  end  that  is  imme- 
diate and  always  the  same.  But  instinct  is  routine,  and 
if  it  were  not  fertilized  by  thought,  it  would  advance  no 
further  with  man  than  with  the  bee  and  the  ant.' 

The  discrepancy  becomes  further  apparent 
when  we  try  to  think  what  intuition  would 
mean  apart  from  intelligence.  What  would 
be  the  nature  of  any  knowledge  of  the  outside 
world  which  was  not  intelligible?  Begging  the 
indulgence  of  the  reader  for  mentioning  any- 
thing so  simple,  it  would  appear  that  unintel- 
ligible intuition  in  a  human  being  would  possess 
no  meaning  at  all.  How  the  mind  could  grasp 
knowledge  which  is  other  than  intelligence,  and 
what  sort  of  mental  possession  it  would  be  when 
grasped,  is  a  deeper  mystery  than  all  the  sciences 
and  philosophies  would  seem  adequate  to  ex- 

» Science  and  Method,  pp.  16,  17. 
91 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

plain.  The  reason  would  be  that  in  dealing 
with  that  particular  kind  of  intuition  we  should 
be  beyond  the  realm  of  thought  and  intelligence 
altogether. 

Bergson  himself  states  the  fact  no  less  plainly 
when  he  says,  "All  concrete  instinct  is  mingled 
with  intelligence,  as  all  real  intelligence  is 
penetrated  by  instinct."^ 

The  difficulty  here  lies  in  the  conclusion. 
It  is  one  thing  to  announce  that  the  two  means 
of  knowledge,  instinct  and  intelligence,  can 
never  be  separated;  it  is  quite  another  thing  to 
draw  conclusions  which  are  dependent  upon 
their  contrast  and  isolation,  as,  for  instance, 
that  their  isolation  has  led  to  the  contrasting 
evolution  of  man,  the  animals  and  the  plants, 
and  that  one  (intelligence)  is  inferior  to  the  other 
in  all  vital  or  practical  matters.  A  careful 
examination  will  impress  the  reader  with  the 
fact  that  instinct  in  the  philosophy  of  change 
does  service  by  reason  of  its  identity  with  intel- 
ligence. But  while  we  may  make  intelligence 
the  inseparable  companion  of  instinct,  we  pro- 
ceed with  rashness  when  we  ascribe  intelligence 
to  the  so-called  instinct  of  plants. 

The  discussion  has,  we  believe,  been  suffi- 
ciently extended  to  show  that  instinct  in  plants, 
and  even  in  animals,  possesses  a  different  content 

*  Creative  Evolution,  p.  137. 
9S 


INTUITION  AND  INTELLIGENCE 

from  instinct  in  man.  This  separating  gulf 
cannot  be  spanned  with  a  word  without  giving 
it  two  distinct  meanings.  So  far  as  we  can 
know,  instinct  in  man  is  inseparable  from 
intelligence,  while  so  far  as  the  plants  are  con- 
cerned, if  they  have  instinct,  it  cannot  be 
attended  by  intelligence  in  them.  The  only 
intelligence  which  could  be  posited  would  lie 
outside  the  plant.  It  is  not  instinct  which 
leads  the  blackberry  to  cross-breed  with  the 
raspberry  to  produce  the  loganberry,  but  the 
external  determining  intelligence  of  a  Burbank. 
What  passes  for  instinct  in  plants  might  be  the 
sign  of  a  supreme  directing  Intelligence,  but 
such  a  suggestion  will  be  a  scandal  to  many 
philosophers. 

Intuition  as  a  Practical  Guide  in 

Life 

Like  considerations  will  appear  as  necessary 

limitations  to  the  theory  that  intuition  unaided 

by  intelligence  is  a  sure  or  a  superior  guide  in 

the  practical  affairs  of  life. 

We  are  told  that  "Intuition  ...  is  a  lamp 
almost  extinguished,  which  only  glimmers  now 
and  then,  for  a  few  moments  at  most.  But  it 
glimmers  wherever  a  vital  interest  is  at  stake. 
On  our  personality,  on  our  liberty,  on  the  place 
we  occupy  in  the  whole  of  nature,  on  our  origin 
93 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

and  perhaps  also  on  our  destiny,  it  throws  a 
light  feeble  and  vacillating  but  which  none  the 
less  pierces  the  darkness  of  the  night  in  which 
the  intellect  leaves  us."^ 

The  cases  of  intuition  which  are  cited  in  the 
Creative  Evolution^  while  much  disputed  seem 
on  reflection  to  display  an  ineptness  for  fur- 
thering the  claim  of  superiority  of  intuition 
over  intelligence.  The  action  of  the  Sitaris 
and  of  the  Sphex,  as  a  recent  writer  has  pointed 
out^,  is  wonderful  only  as  the  highest  reach  of 
unreasoning  instinct.  Considered  as  the  best 
that  might  be  done  by  a  surgeon,  the  bungling 
and  ofttimes  unsuccessful  attempt  to  paralyze 
the  nerves  of  its  victim  by  the  Sphex  would  be 
a  poor  performance  indeed.  Wonder  is  created 
not  that  instinct  is  a  surer  guide  than  intelli- 
gence, but  that  in  such  matters  it  is  any  guide 
at  all.  When  we  come  to  a  knowledge  of  vital 
action  in  other  forms  of  life,  it  is  not  intuition 
which  tells  us  the  most,  but  hard,  patient,  and 
scientific  analysis.  We  have,  then,  to  admit 
that  the  rendering  of  the  verdict  for  intuition 
as   a   superior   guide   where   matters   of   vital 


6  Creative  Evolution,  pp.  267,  268. 
6  Ibid.,  pp.  146,  147;  p.  172. 

'  McKellar  Stewart,   A   Critical   Exposition  of  Bergson's 
Philosophy,  pp.  181,  182. 

94 


INTUITION  AND  INTELLIGENCE 

interest  were  at  stake  calls  for  further  exami- 
nation. 

The  moth,  following  the  instinct  of  habit, 
flies  directly  into  the  flame  of  the  candle  and 
perishes.  Here  it  must  be  admitted  there  is 
"a  vital  interest  at  stake,"  and  we  also  think 
that  power  to  reason  would  have  been  a  valu- 
able asset  in  arriving  at  the  nature  of  things. 
In  fact,  lack  of  intelligence  will  in  this  case  be 
seen  to  limit  rather  than  increase  the  surviving 
powers.  Instinct  may  prove  very  good  for  a 
static  world  of  routine  and  habit,  but  certainly 
will  be  found  a  poor  substitute  for  intelligence 
in  a  world  of  change.  Intelligence  has  an 
adaptability  to  new  forms  of  environment  upon 
which  instinct  breaks  the  individual  as  ruth- 
lessly as  rocks  dash  to  foam  the  waves  of  the  sea. 
The  animal  world  shows  a  lack  of  adaptability 
under  new  conditions,  such  as  an  unseasonable 
snowstorm,  the  coming  of  unaccustomed  con- 
ditions of  cold  or  heat,  which  is  characterized 
chiefly  by  its  helplessness.  If  the  condition  be 
unusual  and  suddenly  brought  on,  animals 
perish  hopelessly  in  sight  of  shelter.  The  sheep 
in  the  storm  knows  the  habitual  refuge  of  the 
nightly  fold,  but  his  instinct  does  not  lead  him 
to  find  an  unaccustomed  refuge.  The  power 
of  adaptability  in  instinct  is  very,  very  small, 
and  largely  dependent  upon  habit. 
95 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

Mr.  Bergson  seems  to  have  this  deeper  inter- 
pretation of  instinct  in  mind  when  he  says; 
"It  is  to  the  very  inwardness  of  life  that  intui- 
tion leads  us — by  intuition  I  mean  instinct  that 
has  become  disinterested,  self-conscious,  capa- 
ble of  reflecting  on  its  object  and  of  enlarging 
upon  it  indefinitely."^  But  it  is  necessary  only  to 
call  attention  to  the  fact  that  instinct  which  has 
become  disinterested,  self-conscious,  capable  of 
reflection,  and  of  indefinite  enlargement  of  its 
knowledge  is  exactly  intuition  as  Mr.  Bergson 
primarily  defines  it,  with  this  addition,  that  it 
is  infilled  with  intelligence.  This,  as  we  have 
pointed  out,  is  the  fundamental  condition  of 
the  appearance  of  intuition  in  a  human  being. 
The  only  critical  difference  that  we  can  see 
between  this  definition  of  intuition  and  the 
definition  of  intelligence  is  that  the  one  is  knowl- 
edge in  the  moment  of  action  and  the  other  is 
knowledge  in  the  moment  of  reflection. 

Implications  of  Such  a  Doctrine  as  to 
THE  Nature  of  Truth 

It  is  important  that  we  should  in  any  such 
doctrine  of  intuition  consider  its  implication 
regarding  the  nature  of  truth.  Apparently,  if 
intelligence  cannot  give  us  a  true  report  of  real- 
ity, and  intuition  can,  truth  must  be  intuitional 

«  Creative  Evolution,  p.  176. 
96 


INTUITION  AND  INTELLIGENCE 

rather  than  conceptual  or  rational.  Now,  if 
we  mean  by  this  that  pragmatic  nature  which 
implies  that  truth  must  ever  be  brought  from 
the  realm  of  reflection  to  the  realm  of  action, 
it  will  be  easy  to  concede  the  point.  Such  an 
assumption  will  not  raise  further  difficulties. 
But  if  we  mean  to  vitiate  the  reality  and  force 
of  those  general  conceptions  which  bear  a  scien- 
tific, a  logical,  or  a  moral  mandate,  for  all  time, 
we  pay  too  great  a  price. 

We  must  not  ignore  the  fact  of  general  truths 
in  the  realm  of  morals  which  spring  out  of  the 
very  nature  of  man  as  a  moral  being,  and  which 
will  be  binding  and  real  so  long  as  man  and 
society  remain  what  they  are.  In  a  like  manner 
there  are  logical  truths  which  are  innate  in  the 
mental  constitution  of  man,  whose  force  and 
reality  not  only  cannot  be  denied  but  contrary 
to  which  one  cannot  go  and  gain  credence 
among  men.  In  the  physical  world  there  are 
courses  of  action,  relations  between  things, 
that  exist  in  their  very  nature,  which  are  true 
forever  in  a  world  as  at  present  constituted. 
These  uniformities  have  an  inexorableness  and 
a  finality  utterly  disregardful  of  individual 
preferences,  and  we  call  them  laws.  Why, 
when  we  bring  the  experience  of  the  passing 
moment  into  relation  with  these  wider  realities, 
we  should  consider  ourselves  getting  away  from 
97 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

reality  is  hard  for  some  of  us  to  see.  Unless 
those  rationalizations  or  intellectualizations  do 
give  us  some  knowledge  of  reality,  no  credible 
science  is  possible.  We  ought,  therefore,  if 
we  are  to  hold  a  distinction  between  intuition 
and  intelligence,  to  recognize  the  inseparable 
factors  in  the  case,  and  to  move  forward  to  a 
ground  that  would  not  invalidate  the  one  at 
the  expense  of  the  other. 

On  the  basis  taken  in  the  philosophy  of 
change  it  seems  difficult  for  intuition  to  enter 
the  field  of  knowledge  at  all,  for  knowledge 
that  cannot  be  mentally  grasped,  knowledge 
that  cannot  be  thought,  scarcely  deserves  the 
name.  The  modern  teacher  even  assumes  that 
the  pupil  does  not  really  know,  until  he  is  able 
to  express  that  which  he  knows. 

Unless  we  can  establish  some  general  ground 
on  which  truth  can  have  a  common  validity 
for  all  normal  minds,  we  fall  into  a  fatal  solip- 
sism which  haunts  us  at  every  step  of  the  way. 
The  perception  of  the  moment  being  the  only 
glimpse  of  reality,  the  past  becomes  but  a 
shadow  of  the  real,  in  spite  of  the  theory  of 
duration  put  forward  to  sustain  it.  Only 
that  will  be  strictly  true  which  I  am  experienc- 
ing at  the  present  moment,  and  it  will  be  true 
only  for  me.  I  have  nothing  to  bind  the  fleeting 
experiences  of  my  own  life  into  the  unity  of 

98 


INTUITION  AND  INTELLIGENCE 

reality.  And,  if  change  itself  is  the  real,  there 
is  no  certainty  whatever  that  any  truth  of  to- 
day will  be  true  to-morrow,  nor  that  any  reality 
is  more  than  the  passing  phantasm  of  an  indi- 
vidual experience.  The  weakness  in  such  a 
standpoint  lies  in  its  inability  to  pass  from  the 
validity  of  individual  experience  to  the  validity 
of  the  common- to-all.  Even  this  consideration 
will  prove  insufficient  for  any  system  which  does 
not  assume  a  back-lying  Creative  Intelligence 
according  to  which  all  things  move  in  a  world 
of  reality,  and  which  makes  this  reality  true 
and  binding  upon  all  the  members  of  the  system. 

The  Theory  of  Intuition  as  an  Aid 
TO  Religious  Ideas 

Because  the  philosophy  of  change  has  seemed 
to  lend  itself  in  an  unusual  way  to  the  support 
of  familiar  religious  ideas,  and  because  an 
uncritical  acceptance  of  such  support  may  be 
attended  by  disastrous  consequences,  it  is  desir- 
able that  we  should  consider  the  possible  bear- 
ing of  the  doctrine  of  intuition  upon  religious 
problems. 

At  first  glance  one  is  quite  likely  to  jump  to 
the  conclusion  that  here  is  an  easy  solution  of 
the  difficulties  that  surround  the  problem  of 
revelation.  If  intuition  is  in  closest  touch  with 
reality,  it  appears  quite  foolish  to  waste  much 

99 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

time  in  intellectualizing,  as  that  is  sure  to  land 
one  in  the  ditch  of  unreaHty.  One  needs  only 
to  listen  to  the  "inner  voice."  Hence  it  becomes 
easy  to  accoimt  for  those  strange  abnormalities 
of  genius,  the  Shakespeares,  the  Beethovens, 
and  others,  who  from  no  adequate  foundation 
either  of  birth  or  of  culture  became  the  world's 
prophets  and  seers,  writing  literature  and  har- 
monies which  transcend  the  accomplishments 
of  their  own  age  and  are  eternally  commanding. 
The  idea  is  most  fascinating,  one  must  admit, 
and  thoroughly  in  keeping  with  the  prevailing 
realism  and  romanticism  of  the  age.  Espe- 
cially does  it  seem  to  commend  itself  to  the 
explanation  of  religious  genius,  springing  at 
times  in  ignorant  unlettered  men.  Before  we 
give  complete  place  to  our  impulse  we  ought, 
however,  to  ask  after  the  meaning  and  tests  of 
inspiration  and  revelation. 

What  is  the  test  of  revelation?  Is  it  declared 
by  the  abnormality  of  its  appearance?  It  is 
often  so  conceived.  Abnormality  is  to  some 
the  very  mark  of  revelation.  Is  the  strange 
and  inexplicable  character  of  its  coming  a  part 
of  the  proof  of  its  genuineness  and  of  its  inspi- 
ration? It  is  certain  that  if  in  the  end  we 
depend  upon  such  tests,  anything  inexplicable, 
claiming  to  be  revelation,  must  be  accepted, 
and  we  are  forced  to  inherit  a  great  brood  of 
100 


INTUITION  AND  INTEM:,IiGEN.CE-;, 

superstitions.  Unless  the  test  of  revelation  is 
in  the  end  a  moral  one  it  will  follow  that  reve- 
lation has  no  moral  or  spiritual  value.  In  such 
a  case  nothing  can  save  us  from  theological 
shipwreck.  We  must,  then,  in  order  to  give 
moral  validity  to  revelation,  judge  it,  not  by 
its  appearance  in  the  unlettered,  nor  by  its 
intuitional  character,  but  by  its  ability  to  stand 
the  concrete  tests  of  experience  and  life.  Reve- 
lation is  disclosed  not  by  any  fortuitous  circum- 
stances in  which  it  comes  clothed,  nor  by  the 
claims  it  advances  for  itself,  but,  rather,  in  its 
power  to  make  men  better,  to  enlarge  the 
spiritual  and  moral  horizons,  to  exalt  the  stand- 
ards and  ideals  of  actual  life,  and  to  make  a 
universal  appeal  to  the  moral  and  spiritual 
nature  of  man  everywhere. 

The  theory  of  the  superiority  of  intuition  to 
grasp  the  realities  of  religion  moves  upon  the 
assumption  that  it  is  easier  for  God  to  reveal 
himseK  through  the  impulses  than  through 
the  intelligence.  Entirely  aside  from  the  dis- 
credit which  such  a  theory  throws  upon  a  crea- 
tive Wisdom  which  is  as  responsible  for  mental 
as  for  intuitional  powers,  such  a  condition  of 
things  does  not  appear  in  the  ordinary  phases 
of  life.  The  great  prophets  and  spiritual  leaders 
of  the  world  have  not  been  in  any  case  notably 
ignorant.  Sometimes  untrained  in  the  for- 
101 


ftEtfG^SON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

malities  of  the  schools  they  have  been,  but  with 
a  keenness  of  intellectual  grasp  which  has  gone 
to  the  fundamentals  of  the  problems  with  which 
they  have  dealt.  And  this  fact  too  is  a  reason- 
able one,  because  the  lower  and  wider  appeal 
must  fail  if  it  is  out  of  line  with  man's  intel- 
ligence. 

Intuition  and  intelligence  are  not,  then,  to  be 
separated  in  normal  personalities.  Intuition 
without  intelligence  is  no  more  than  the  mean- 
ingless or  equivocal  raging  of  the  sibyl.  Intel- 
ligence without  some  measure  of  intuition  is 
impossible. 

Neither  should  we  unthinkingly  assume  that 
the  philosophy  of  change  by  its  denial  of  purpose 
makes  way  for  the  acceptance  of  the  miracu- 
lous without  an  act  of  faith.  The  apparent 
freedom  of  the  philosophy  of  change  is  won 
not  only  by  the  negation  of  determinism,  but 
while  it  is  expelling  the  demon  of  materialism 
it  is  allowed  to  banish  also  an  angel  of  light  by 
the  further  negation  of  purposive  determination. 
In  this  scheme,  in  which  change  is  original,  the 
fundamentally  real,  if  there  were  to  be  a  God 
at  all,  he  could  neither  know  nor  determine 
what  would  happen  the  next  minute,  being 
himself  as  blind  and  helpless  as  the  blinding 
storm  of  atoms  which  he  also  is.  This  being 
the  case,  it  occurs  to  us  to  ask  what  would  be  the 
102 


INTUITION  AND  INTELLIGENCE 

value  of  a  purposeless  miracle  if  we  had  one? 
It  would  obviously  possess  no  value.  If  a 
miracle  does  not  indicate  a  divine  purpose;  if  it 
is  simply  the  blind  drive  of  an  unrestrained, 
undirected  freedom,  it  is  no  miracle  but  only  an 
accident.  Once  allow  miracle  to  be  true  to 
its  nature  as  an  evidence  of  Divine  Personal 
direction,  and  you  erect  that  very  determinism 
which  it  is  Bergson's  purpose  to  avoid. 

What  bearing  might  the  doctrine  of  intuition 
as  closest  to  reality  have  upon  the  question  of 
the  essence  of  religion.?  Are  not  the  intuitive 
feelings  in  religion  the  safest  to  follow?  Is  it 
not  true  that  intellectualism  is  the  bane  of  reh- 
gion,  and  has  there  not  existed  between  them 
the  distrust  of  long  ages?  It  is  certain  that 
much  of  popular  feeling  is  in  strict  accord  with 
this  idea.  Intellectualism  has  many  times  been 
set  forth  as  the  foe  of  religion.  Do  not  such 
popular  convictions  usually  find  a  basis  in  psy- 
chological reality?  We  cannot  approach  the 
solution  of  this  problem  directly,  but  here 
again  we  must  begin  by  laying  down  a  propo- 
sition and  asking  a  question.  If  intuition  gets 
closest  to  reality  in  religion,  then  the  more 
intuitional  religion  becomes,  the  purer  and 
truer  it  should  be.  How  does  this  proposition 
test  out  in  life?  The  most  intuitive  religions 
we  have  are  those  of  savage  tribes.  In  utter 
103 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

and  unreflecting  devotion  to  religious  intui- 
tions they  cannot  be  surpassed.  Are  they  not 
the  most  religious  of  all  people?  It  is  not 
necessary  to  answer  the  question.  The  reason 
the  savage  is  not  the  most  religious  man  is 
because  religion  runs  deepest,  strikes  longest 
roots  into  reality,  when  it  adds  intelligence  to 
intuition.  No  ignorant  and  unconsidering  cre- 
dulity can  ever  represent  the  highest  type  of 
religion.  High  intelligence  linked  with  faith, 
intuition  tested  by  reason  and  life — this  repre- 
sents the  best  that  we  know.  The  highest 
type  of  saint  is  also  the  highest  type  of  man. 

In  What  Sense  can  Intuition  be  Said 
TO  Bring  Us  Nearer  Reality  .^^ 

Attention  already  has  been  called  to  the  fact 
that  however  simple  may  have  been  the  defi- 
nition of  intuition  when  it  is  convenient  to  use 
that  term  of  plants  and  animals,  when  we  come 
to  apply  it  to  man  we  bring  into  it  an  altogether 
new  content,  the  element  of  intellectual  judg- 
ment which  is  inseparable  from  the  human  per- 
sonality. If,  now,  we  will  proceed  on  this 
understanding  and  assume  that  intuition  is  the 
personality  in  action,  while  intelligence  is  the 
personality  in  the  act  of  reflection,  we  shall 
come  upon  what  I  deem  the  deep  truth  and 
purpose  of  Bergson's  doctrine.  Intuition  does 
104 


INTUITION  AND  INTELLIGENCE 

partake  of  this  inseparable  intellectual  element, 
but  frequent  repetition  of  an  act  serves  to  put 
the  intellectual  element  in  the  background  and 
to  make  the  action  as  we  say  instinctive  and 
automatic.  The  place  for  intellectualization  in 
riding  a  bicycle  is  when  one  is  first  learning. 
Soon  the  movements  become  automatic  and 
unconscious  so  that  without  anxious  thought 
one  meets  the  various  crises  of  riding.  This  is 
the  kind  of  intuition  which  can  be  truly  said 
to  be  nearest  life,  for  it  is  at  the  point  where  the 
personality  does  lay  closest  hold  on  the  external 
world.  It  comes,  however,  not  before  but 
after  intellect  has  done  its  work,  and  reason 
and  choice  have  settled  into  unconscious  habit. 
Let  us  consider  the  bearing  of  this  truth  in  the 
realm  of  religious  ideas.  Here,  as  elsewhere, 
action  has  not  come  to  represent  the  most  inti- 
mate life  until  it  has  passed  out  of  the  region  of 
willed  action  into  that  of  instinctive  action. 
Just  as  the  artist  has  not  become  really  creative 
until  the  manipulation  of  brush  and  color  has 
become  unconscious,  and  as  the  musician  cannot 
really  enter  into  the  expression  of  music  so  long 
as  he  must  think  about  the  manipulation  of 
the  keys  of  his  instrument,  so  there  is  a  sense 
in  which  religion  becomes  the  deepest  expression 
of  character  only  when  by  long  habit  and  many 
repetitions  the  moral  and  religious  action  has 
105 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

become  mstinetive.  But  it  must  ever  be 
remembered  that  this  does  not  take  place,  these 
habits  are  not  laid  down  without  effort  or 
thought  in  the  beginning.  Moral  intuitions 
depend  on  formed  habits,  training,  and  dis- 
cipline, and  our  consciences  are  far  more  under 
the  mastery  of  the  usual  way  of  looking  at 
things,  the  things  that  we  have  been  taught, 
than  we  would  ordinarily  be  willing  to  admit. 
In  religious  living  what  one  does  with  effort 
counts,  but  those  courses  of  action  that  have  so 
written  themselves  into  life  that  one  does  the 
good  unconsciously,  indicate  far  more  than  the 
occasional  action  the  moving  forces  of  life. 
It  is  equally  possible  for  the  individual  to  school 
himself  in  irreligion  and  evil  so  that  his  instinc- 
tive action  becomes  evil.  This  existence  of  good 
and  bad  motives  arises  from  the  struggle  of 
elements  that  have  been  given  place  in  the  per- 
sonality by  free  choices,  will,  and  action.  Do 
these  contrasting  intuitions  spring  in  common 
from  the  "vital  elan,"  or  from  the  Divine  Per- 
sonality? They  are,  rather,  the  condition 
under  which  voluntary  goodness  or  character 
can  be  attained,  and  they  go  no  farther  back 
than  the  choosing  individual.  The  individual 
must  come  to  that  point  of  choosing  the  good 
which  characterizes  the  Eternal  Goodness,  and 
this  victory  can  be  won  only  when  habitual 
106 


INTUITION  AND  INTELLIGENCE 

willing  has  made  goodness  and  righteousness 
intuitive  and  unconscious. 

Some  one  may  take  issue  with  this  view  of  the 
origin  of  evil.  If  so,  it  is  a  comfort  to  remember 
that  the  origin  of  evil  is  not  so  important  a 
matter  as  its  presence.  The  origin  of  evil  may 
be  an  interesting  ethical  problem,  but  the  prac- 
tical problem  is  concerned  with  the  presence 
of  evil  in  our  world  and  the  steps  that  may  be 
taken  for  its  banishment.  It  is  not  necessary 
to  load  the  presence  of  evil  upon  the  Divine 
Being  or  to  make  him  responsible  for  its  exist- 
ence. The  assumption  that  evil  came  into  the 
world  as  some  independent  absolute  entity  is 
quite  unnecessary.  The  possibility  of  evil 
lies  in  the  nature  of  free  will  in  process  of  devel- 
opment. The  future  of  evil  is  determined  not 
by  the  Divine  Being  but  by  the  moral  agents 
he  has  created  for  this  task.  It  has  no  external 
permanence  apart  from  the  willing  of  individuals 
and  will  disappear  from  the  universal  scheme  as 
soon  as  all  moral  beings  come  to  an  intuitional 
or  rational  obedience  to  the  divine  will.  It  is 
our  task  as  moral  beings  to  banish  evil  from 
our  own  hearts,  and  also,  in  so  far  as  we  can, 
from  our  world. 


107 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  THEORIES  OF  SPACE  AND  TIME 

Bergson  holds  to  the  homogeneity  of  space^ 
because  thereby  he  feels  able  to  harmonize  the 

'  "Suppose  that  homogeneous  space  concerns  our  action 
and  only  our  action,  being  like  an  infinitely  fine  network 
which  we  stretch  beneath  material  continuity  in  order  to 
make  ourselves  masters  of  it,  to  decompose  it  according  to 
the  plan  of  our  activities  and  our  needs.  Then  not  only  has 
our  hypothesis  the  advantage  of  bringing  us  into  harmony 
with  science,  which  shows  us  each  thing  exercising  an  influ- 
ence on  all  the  others  and  consequently  occupying,  in  a  certain 
sense,  the  whole  of  the  extended.  .  .  .  Not  only  has  it  the 
advantage,  in  metaphysic,  of  suppressing  or  lessening  the 
contradictions  raised  by  divisibility  in  space,  contradictions 
which  always  arise,  as  we  have  shown,  from  our  failure  to 
dissociate  the  two  points  of  view,  that  of  action  from  that  of 
knowledge.  It  has,  above  all,  the  advantage  of  overthrowing 
the  insurmountable  barriers  raised  by  realism  between  the 
extended  world  and  our  perception  of  it.  For,  whereas  this 
doctrine  assumes  on  the  one  hand  an  external  reality  which  is 
multiplied  and  divided,  and  on  the  other  sensations  alien  from 
extensity  and  without  possible  contact  with  it,  we  find  that 
concrete  extensity  is  not  divided  any  more  than  immediate 
perception  is  in  truth  unextended.  Starting  from  realism  we 
come  back  to  the  point  to  which  idealism  had  led  us;  we 
replace  perception  in  things.  And  we  see  realism  and  idealism 
ready  to  come  to  an  understanding  when  we  set  aside  the 
postulate,  uncritically  accepted  by  both,  which  served  them 
as  a  common  frontier"  (Matter  and  Memory,  pp.  308,  309). 
108 


THEORIES  OF  SPACE  AND  TIME 

conflict  raised  by  science  against  idealism. 
Space  being  homogeneous,  anything  may  be 
assumed  to  occupy,  so  far  as  its  influence  goes, 
the  whole  of  the  extended  world  ajud  our  per- 
ception of  it.  When  this  boundary  is  set 
aside  realism  and  idealism  are  prepared  to  come 
together. 

Space,  he  declares,  is  that  which  enables  us 
to  distinguish  identical  and  simultaneous  sen- 
sations from  one  another.^  Space,  being  homo- 
geneous, discretion  is  had  by  a  process  of  unfold- 
ing in  space,  so  there  is  in  space  neither  dura- 
tion nor  succession.  Experiences  which  reach 
us  under  the  form  of  time  are  distinguished 
from  each  other  by  setting  them  out  one  by 
one  under  the  form  of  space.  Thus  space 
becomes  identical  with  homogeneous  time  or 
time  may  be  called  a  bastard  form  of  space.^ 

2  "Space  is  what  enables  us  to  distinguish  a  number  of 
identical  and  simultaneous  sensations  from  one  another;  it 
is  thus  a  principle  of  differentiation  other  than  that  of  quali- 
tative differentiation,  and  consequently  it  is  a  reality  with 
no  quality"  (Time  and  Free  Will,  p.  95). 

3  "Space  alone  is  homogeneous,  that  objects  in  space  form 
a  discreet  multiplicity  is  got  by  a  process  of  unfolding  in  space. 
It  also  follows  that  there  is  neither  duration  nor  even  suc- 
cession in  space,  if  we  give  to  these  words  the  meaning  in 
which  the  consciousness  takes  them:  each  of  the  so-called 
successive  states  exists  alone;  their  multiplicity  is  real  only 
for  a  consciousness  that  can  first  retain  them  and  then  set 
them  side  by  side  by  externalizing  them  in  relation  to  one 

109 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

In  this  scheme  perception  and  matter  tend  to 
become  identical^  as  we  divest  ourselves  of  the 
prejudices  of  action.  Thus  Bergson  hopes  to 
solve  the  ancient  difficulties  that  hover  over  the 
definitions  of  time  and  space. 

Space  as  a  Qualityless,  Homogeneous 
Medium 

With  the  term  "homogeneous,"  which,  in  the 
philosophy  of  change,  is  applied  to  space,  and  by 
means  of  which  the  transition  is  made  to  time, 
there  is  sure  to  be  objection  because  a  quality- 
less,  homogeneous  space  could  have  no  "here" 

another.  If  it  retains  them,  it  is  because  these  distinct  states  of 
the  external  world  give  rise  to  states  of  consciousness  which 
permeate  one  another,  imperceptibly  organize  themselves 
into  a  whole,  and  bind  the  past  to  the  present  by  this  very 
process  of  connection.  If  it  externalizes  them  in  relation  to 
one  another,  the  reason  is,  that  thinking  of  their  radical 
distinctness  (the  one  having  ceased  to  be  when  the  other 
arrives  on  the  scene),  it  perceives  them  under  the  form  of  a 
discreet  multiplicity,  which  amounts  to  setting  them  out  in 
line,  in  the  space  in  which  each  of  them  existed  separately. 
The  space  employed  for  this  purpose  is  just  that  which  is 
called  homogeneous  time"  (Time  and  Free  Will,  p.  121). 

*  "These  two  terms,  'perception*  and  'matter,'  approach 
each  other  in  the  measure  that  we  divest  ourselves  of  what 
may  be  called  the  prejudices  of  action:  sensation  recovers 
extensity,  the  concrete  extended  recovers  its  natural  conti- 
nuity and  indivisibility,  and  homogeneous  space,  which 
stood  between  the  two  terms  like  an  insurmountable  barrier, 
is  then  seen  to  have  no  other  reality  than  that  of  a  diagram 
or  a  symbol"  (Matter  and  Memory,  p.  293). 

110 


THEORIES  OF  SPACE  AND  TIME 

nor  "there,"  no  independent  existence;  in  fact, 
no  existence  apart  from  individual  perception. 
A  study  of  this  attempt  to  avoid  the  pitfalls 
of  the  realism  which,  on  the  one  hand,  erects 
space  into  an  independent  reality,  and  the 
idealism  which  on  the  other  would  make  it 
wholly  subjective,  reveals  the  fact  that  what 
Bergson  arrives  at  is  really  the  existence  of 
space  and  time  as  means  by  which  the  per- 
ceiving subject  relates  simultaneously  existing 
things  and  successive  events  to  himself.  This 
fundamentally  correct  attitude  regarding  the 
nature  of  space  furnishes  the  ground  of  recon- 
ciliation in  the  long  dispute  between  realism 
and  idealism.  To  make  it  effective  it  needs  to 
be  safeguarded  by  further  affirmations.  It  will 
never  do  to  make  space  or  time  the  possession  of 
the  individual  alone.  Some  basis  must  be  laid 
for  a  common  order  of  time.  Space  is  not 
sufficiently  removed  from  the  realm  of  abstract 
ideas  by  affirming  that  it  exists  only  in  the 
concrete  act  of  perception.  Even  having  come 
thus  far  from  the  absolutist  conception  of  space, 
we  should  have  space  as  a  solipsistic  experience, 
whereas  it  possesses  much  the  same  content 
and  reahty  for  all  of  us.  My  space  is  practically 
your  space,  and  the  miles  that  stretch  between 
friends  have  a  similarity  for  both  that  is  not 
altogether  made  by  their  desire  to  be  together 
111 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

but  has  a  validity  for  all  men  as  well  as  for  them. 
In  order  to  reach  this  common  validity  and  to 
escape  the  realm  of  subjectivism,  we  must 
assume  that  space  as  well  as  time  has  some 
meaning  for  the  creative  power  behind  all. 
And,  because  they  are  a  portion  of  the  mental 
equipment  of  man  they  are  as  much  a  part  of 
reality  as  any  other  of  his  possessions.  Space 
has  a  reality  for  animals,  and  even  for  plants, 
though  neither  are  conscious  of  it. 

The  Idea  of  Time  as  a  Form  of  Space 
Such  an  assumption  in  regard  to  the  nature 
of  space  would  make  unnecessary  the  definition 
of  time  as  "bastard  space,"  and  would  save 
considerable  confusion,  as  we  do  not  in  our 
thought  ordinarily  identify  the  relating  of  the 
two  systems  to  ourselves,  the  one  of  things 
which  may  be  simultaneous,  the  other  of  events 
which  are  successive.  Bergson's  idea  seems  to 
be  that  successions  of  events  which  do  not 
enter  into  individual  experience  and  thus 
become  a  part  of  "pure"  memory  exist  only  in 
a  time  whose  homogeneity  is  in  nowise  distinct 
from  the  homogeneity  of  space.  The  one 
instance  in  which  time  is  not  homogeneous  is 
when  we  consider  it  under  the  form  of  duration. 
Duration  is  just  the  successive  experiences 
which  have  made   the  individual   experience, 

in 


THEORIES  OF  SPACE  AND  TIME 

and  which  the  individual  in  time-transcending 
way  always  brings  to  bear  upon  the  present 
moment  of  experience.  Time  flown  is  homo- 
geneous with  space,  but  not  time  flowing.^ 
Thus  Bergson  lays  a  foundation  for  freedom. 
This  time-experience  that  he  knows  first  hand 
is  a  part  of  him,  is  his  life,  and  so,  strictly  speak- 
ing, is  duration.  That  other  time-experience 
by  which  he  thinks  over  the  events  of  his  own 
past,  reflecting,  rationalizing,  and  relating  them 
to  each  other  and  to  the  present  self,  that 
process  by  which  he  relates  the  events  of  history 
to  his  present  situation  in  the  world  of  time, 
is  a  purely  conceptual  quality  which  we  must 
call  homogeneous.  We  set  the  events  of  history 
or  of  past  life  out  in  their  order  as  a  succession 
of  relations.  This  act  we  believe  Mr.  Bergson 
would  say  is  in  no  way  different  from  the  act  by 
which  we  posit  things  as  existing  in  relation  to 
each  other  in  homogeneous  space.  Outside  of 
the  concrete  act  of  individual  experience,  time 
is  but  a  bastard  space,  a  device  for  dividing, 
classifying,  and  relating  events.  This  view, 
which  would  be  obnoxious  to  some  because  of 
its  divergence  from  the  popular  view  of  common 
sense,  is  chargeable  with  a  real  difficulty.  I  do 
not  think  of  space  between  yesterday  and  to- 
day  in  the  same  sense  as  that  which  I  use  in 

'  Time  and  Free  Will,  p.  221;  also  ibid.,  pp.  vii-viii. 
113 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

thinking  of  the  distance  that  separates  me  from 
my  home.  This  distinction  is  a  fundamental 
one  for  thought  and  cannot  be  overcome.  In 
spite  of  any  attempt  to  evade  the  issue,  time 
is  the  form  under  which  one  relates  events  to 
himself.  Realism  notwithstanding,  the  two 
orders  are  not  absolutely  coincident  and  never 
can  be.  This  fact  compels  the  philosophy  of 
change  to  attempt  its  salvation  by  a  doctrine 
of  duration. 

In  speaking  of  the  child's  acquirement  of 
mathematics  by  passing  from  the  pictured 
barlls  in  his  arithmetic  to  abstract  number, 
Bergson  says: 

As  soon  as  we  wish  to  picture  number  to  ourselves, 
and  not  merely  figures  or  words,  we  are  compelled  to  have 
recourse  to  an  extended  image.  What  leads  to  misunder- 
standing on  this  point  seems  to  be  the  habit  we  have 
fallen  into  of  counting  in  time  rather  than  in  space.  In 
order  to  imagine  the  number  50,  for  example,  we  repeat 
all  the  numbers  starting  from  unity,  and  when  we  have 
arrived  at  the  fiftieth,  we  believe  we  have  built  up  the 
number  in  duration  and  in  duration  only.  And  there  is 
no  doubt  that  in  this  way  we  have  counted  moments  in 
duration  rather  than  points  in  space;  but  the  question  is 
whether  we  have  not  counted  the  moments  of  duration 
by  means  of  points  in  space.  It  is  certainly  possible  to 
perceive  in  time,  and  in  time  only,  a  succession  which  is 
nothing  but  a  succession,  but  not  an  addition,  i.  e.,  a 
succession  which  culminates  in  a  sum.  For  though  we 
reach  a  sum  by  taking  into  account  a  succession  of  different 
114 


THEORIES  OF  SPACE  AND  TIME 

terms,  yet  it  is  necessary  that  each  of  these  terms  should 
remain  when  we  pass  to  the  following,  and  should  wait, 
so  to  speak,  to  be  added  to  the  others:  how  could  it  wait 
if  it  were  nothing  but  an  instant  of  duration?  And  where 
could  it  wait  if  we  did  not  localize  it  in  space?  We  invol- 
untarily fix  at  a  point  in  space  each  of  the  moments  which 
we  count,  and  it  is  only  on  this  condition  that  the  abstract 
units  come  to  form  a  sum.^ 

If  we  reflect  on  these  words,  two  things  will 
become  apparent.  First,  we  shall  see,  relative 
to  the  thinking  of  number,  that  it  is  a  law  of 
the  mind  that  it  cannot  think  of  the  existence 
of  objective  things  without  thinking  of  them  in 
spatial  relations.  Second,  it  appears  to  make 
a  difference  whether  I  aim  thinking  in  the 
general  terms  of  abstract  number  or  of  specific 
objects.  It  makes  a  difference  whether  my 
"fifty"  is  a  mathematical  symbol  representing 
fifty  units,  or  whether  I  am  thinking  of  fifty 
sheep,  for  instance.  In  the  latter  case  I  must 
spatialize;  in  the  former  case  there  is  nothing 
to  spatialize,  I  only  enumerate.  This  contra- 
diction springs  from  a  question  which  appears 
in  the  quotation  last  cited,  when,  after  affirming 
that  the  terms  of  enumeration  must  wait  about 
until  the  enumeration  is  finished,  he  asks, 
"Where  could  it  wait  if  we  did  not  locaHze  it 
in  space  .'^"     The  assumption  would  seem  to  be 


«  Time  and  Free  Will,  pp.  78.  79. 
115 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

that  ideas  need  to  have  space  in  which  to  wait 
around,  whereas  it  is  merely  a  question  of  how 
much  the  mind  is  able  to  grasp  at  the  same 
time.  The  real  reason  for  the  appearance  of 
illustrations  in  the  child's  arithmetic  is  to 
teach  him  the  difficult  art  of  abstraction,  that 
is,  to  pass  from  the  concrete  instances  to  the 
symbol  under  which  a  thousand  diverse  things 
may  be  generalized. 

Why  should  we  be  compelled  to  assume 
spatiality  as  necessary  to  abstract  number  .^^ 
Is  not  such  assumption  due  to  the  fact  that 
for  a  moment  I  have  forgotten  what  is  the 
nature  of  space?  Is  not  spatiality  the  assign- 
ment of  concrete  things  to  their  true  relation- 
ship of  distance  from  each  other  and  from  my- 
self.'^ One  does  not  think  of  the  units  of  an 
abstract  number  in  terms  of  space  so  much 
as  in  terms  of  distinctness,  of  individuality. 
In  this  sense  one's  own  thoughts  might  be 
numbered,  not  by  distance  but  by  distinctness. 
It  is  their  distinctness  and  independence  of 
each  other  that  enables  me  to  number  them. 
The  idea  of  infinite  divisibility,  even,  is  limited 
in  its  apphcation  by  the  idea  of  essential  unity. 
A  horse  cut  into  a  thousand  pieces  does  not 
become  thereby  a  thousand  horses  but  only  a 
thousand  pieces  of  horse  flesh.  That  I  can 
think  of  a  thousand  shreds  of  horse  flesh  does 
116 


THEORIES  OF  SPACE  AND  TIME 

not  imply  a  space  to  put  them  in,  but  that  there 
is  a  law  of  the  mind  by  which  I  cannot  think 
of  separate  units  as  identical,  or  as  occupying 
identical  space  at  the  same  time.  In  other 
words,  I  cannot  think  in  contradictory  terms. 

Time  as  Contracted  Experience 
In  addition  to  the  thought  of  time  as  a  sort 
of  "bastard"  space,  the  philosophy  of  change 
sets  forward  a  theory  of  time  as  contracted 
experience. 

Would  not  the  whole  of  history  be  contained  in  a  very 
short  time  for  a  consciousness  at  a  higher  degree  of  tension 
than  our  own,  which  should  watch  the  development  of 
humanity  while  contracting  it,  so  to  speak,  into  the  great 
phases  of  its  evolution?  In  short,  then,  to  perceive 
consists  in  condensing  enormous  periods  of  an  infinitely 
diluted  existence  into  a  few  more  diflferentiated  moments 
of  an  intenser  life,  and  in  thus  summing  up  a  very  long 
history.^ 

This  brilliant  idea  is  introduced  as  the  sequel 
to  a  consideration  of  the  movements  of  the 
slowest  rays  of  light,  the  vibrations  of  which 
for  one  second  would  require  at  the  highest 
point  at  which  the  human  being  is  conscious  of 
vibration,  twenty-five  thousand  years  to  count. 
Thus,  to  a  being  with  a  higher  rate  of  percep- 
tion, time  would  slip  away  into  infinitesimal 
reaches  beyond  our  comprehension.     As  form- 

'  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  275. 

117 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

ing  an  illustration  of  what  might  be  the  meaning 
to  a  Divine  Mind  of  time,  which  to  us  would 
have  the  meaning  of  infinity  because  of  our 
limited  human  comprehension,  the  suggestion 
is  startling  and  fascinating.  Applied  to  finite 
and  human  conditions  it  has  no  such  wings 
with  which  to  fly,  but  is  set  about  by  mysteries 
and  diflSculties.  Time  viewed  as  contracted 
experience  would  vary  for  different  individuals 
according  to  the  intensity  of  their  lives.  Of 
course  there  is  a  sense  in  which  the  measure  of 
time  is  arbitrary  and  artificial.  The  moments 
of  intense  mental  occupation  leave  one  with  no 
sense  of  time  flown,  so  that  one  is  surprised  at 
the  story  which  the  clock  records.  Moments 
spent  in  the  communion  of  friendship  and  of 
joy  seem  not  to  need  the  arbitrary  strokes  of 
the  bell  to  measure  them.  Hours  sometimes 
concentrate  in  power  and  meaning  more  than 
years.  Periods  of  difficulty,  labor,  anguish  and 
waiting,  though  short  by  the  clock,  drag  out  to  a 
seeming  eternity.  But  these  are  the  exceptional 
moments  of  life  when  time  seems  to  fluctuate, 
either  because  our  minds  are  removed  from  a 
consideration  of  its  passage  or  in  unusual  meas- 
ure bent  upon  it.  In  the  end  we  have  to  adapt 
ourselves  to  the  clock,  and  only  by  thus  adapting 
ourselves  can  we  manage  to  get  along  in  a  world 
of  men.  Moreover,  these  clock  hours,  in  spite  of 
118 


THEORIES  OF  SPACE  AND  TIME 

any  mental  preoccupation  whatever,  write  their 
inevitable  trail  across  both  bodies  and  minds. 
The  hours  of  life  may  be  so  intense  that  our 
three  score  years  and  ten  seem  as  a  day  to  that 
consciousness  of  time  through  which  some 
unfortunate,  invalided,  or  suffering  brother 
creeps  from  the  cradle  to  the  grave.  But  that 
fact  does  not  extend  the  hours  of  human  life. 
His  days  and  ours  are  eventually  measured  by 
the  clock.  It  is  evident,  then,  that  there  is  a 
common  element  of  validity  in  our  idea  of  time, 
which  is  not  accounted  for  by  explaining  it  as 
contracted  experience.  Time,  with  all  its  arbi- 
trariness and  in  spite  of  seeming  caprice,  has 
been  written  into  the  nature  of  mundane  things. 
However  it  might  be  with  an  Infinite  Being,  it 
surely  needs  some  further  definition  when  we 
speak  of  it  as  applied  to  the  finite  individual. 
Here  too  it  might  be  that  a  creative  power 
which  is  itself  above  time  has  been  willing  to 
set  a  period  to  human  sorrows  and  labors.  It 
must  be  something  better  than  the  average  of 
our  human  weakness.  It  is  a  law  of  our  thought 
but  it  is  also  fundamental  to  the  constitution 
of  things  as  we  are  able  to  know  them.  It  is 
not  merely  subjective  but  has  within  it  a  reality 
that  permeates  our  world  with  a  common 
validity. 

The  question  remains  as  to  which  is  the 
119 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

important  matter  here,  time,  its  contraction, 
the  experience  of  time,  or  the  contractor  of 
time.^  Bergson  argues  that  time  is  reahzed 
only  by  holding  two  points,  the  "before"  and 
the  "after,'*  simultaneously,  and  thus  that  the 
injection  of  the  space  idea  is  artificial  and  unreal. 
How,  then,  would  this  be  in  actually  consider- 
ing space?  Because  I  think  of  two  points,  one 
where  I  am  and  the  other  a  thousand  miles 
away,  do  I  behold  them  simultaneously?  Is  it 
not,  rather,  a  matter  of  relativity  in  both  cases? 
I  apprehend  the  extent  of  years  by  the  expe- 
riences intervening.  Some  experiences  are  more 
remote  than  others,  and  this  interval  is  what  I 
think  of  in  affirming  lapse  of  time,  just  as  my 
thought  of  space  is  a  relating  of  objects  to  each 
other  or  to  myself.  In  what  true  sense  may 
experiences  be  said  to  coexist?  While  one  is 
now  being  experienced,  another  is  known  only 
through  memory  as  having  existed.  They 
certainly  exist  nowhere  outside  of  personal 
consciousness  either  human  or  infinite. 

Time  as  Duration 

Thus  are  we  brought  to  a  consideration  of 

Bergson's   doctrine   of   duration.     He   touches 

upon  the  real  difficulty  when  he  tells  us  that 

it  is  difficult  to  think  of  duration  in  its  original 

8  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  281. 

120 


THEORIES  OF  SPACE  AND  TIME 

purity  because  duration  applies  not  only  to 
ourselves  but  to  things.^  Yet  duration  in 
things  and  in  consciousness,  seeming  to  be 
homogeneous  and  measurable,  is  not.  Time, 
he  says,  is  a  relative  matter^^  coinciding  with 


*  "We  find  it  extraordinarily  diflScuIt  to  think  of  duration 
in  its  original  purity;  this  is  due,  no  doubt,  to  the  fact  that  we 
do  not  endure  alone;  external  objects,  it  seems,  endure  as  we 
do,  and  time  regarded  from  this  point  of  view  has  every 
appearance  of  a  homogeneous  medium.  Not  only  do  the 
moments  of  this  duration  seem  to  be  external  to  one  another, 
like  bodies  in  space,  but  the  movement  perceived  by  our 
senses  is  the,  so  to  speak,  palpable  sign  of  a  homogeneous 
and  measurable  duration.  Nay,  more — time  enters  into  the 
formulae  of  mechanics,  into  the  calculations  of  the  astronomer, 
and  even  of  the  physicist,  under  the  form  of  a  quantity.  .  .  . 
Granted  that  inner  duration,  perceived  by  consciousness,  is 
nothing  else  but  the  melting  of  states  of  consciousness  into 
one  another,  and  the  gradual  growth  of  the  ego,  it  will  be  said, 
notwithstanding,  that  the  time  which  the  astronomer  intro- 
duces into  his  formulae,  the  time  which  our  clocks  divide  into 
equal  portions — this  time,  at  least,  is  something  different: 
it  must  be  a  measurable  and  therefore  a  homogeneous  mag- 
nitude. It  is  nothing  of  the  sort,  however,  and  a  close  exam- 
ination will  dispel  the  illusion"  (Time  and  Free  Will,  p.  107). 

10  "Succession  is  an  undeniable  fact,  even  in  the  material 
world.  Though  our  reasoning  on  isolated  systems  may  imply 
that  their  history,  past,  present,  and  future,  might  be  instan- 
taneously unfurled  like  a  fan,  this  history,  in  point  of  fact, 
unfolds  itself  gradually,  as  if  it  occupied  a  duration  like  our 
own.  If  I  want  to  mix  a  glass  of  sugar  and  water,  I  must, 
willy-nilly,  wait  until  the  sugar  melts.  This  little  fact  is 
big  with  meaning.  For  here  the  time  I  have  to  wait  is  not 
that  mathematical  time  which  would  apply  equally  well  to 
tb§  entire  history  of  the  material  world,  even  if  that  history 
121 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

my  impatience  while  I  wait  for  the  sugar  to 
melt  in  my  glass.  Time  is  a  completion  of  the 
uncompleted. 

Over  the  body  there  is  an  arbitrary  time 
with  which  the  soul  does  not  reckon. ^^  "Wher- 
ever anything  lives,  there  is  open  somewhere  a 
register  in  which  time  is  being  inscribed." 

The  inorganic  world,  on  the  other  hand,  he 
concludes,  is  incapable  of  duration.  It  is  some- 
thing which  dies  and  is  reborn  at  every  instant; 


were  spread  out  instantaneously  in  space.  It  coincides  with 
my  impatience,  that  is  to  say,  with  a  certain  portion  of  my 
own  duration,  which  I  cannot  protract  or  contract  as  I  like. 
It  is  no  longer  something  thought,  it  is  something  lived.  It  is 
no  longer  a  relation,  it  is  an  absolute.  .  .  .  The  universe 
endures.  The  more  we  study  the  nature  of  time,  the  more  ws 
shall  comprehend  that  duration  means  invention,  the  creation 
of  forms,  the  continual  elaboration  of  the  absolutely  new" 
(Creative  Evolution,  pp.  9-11). 

"  "Like  the  universe  as  a  whole,  like  each  conscious  being 
taken  separately,  the  organism  which  lives  is  a  thing  that 
endures.  Its  past,  in  its  entirety,  is  prolonged  into  its  present 
and  abides  there  actual  and  acting.  How  otherwise  could 
we  understand  that  it  passes  through  distinct  and  well-marked 
phases,  that  it  changes  its  age — in  short,  that  it  has  a  history? 
If  I  consider  my  body  in  particular,  I  find  that,  like  my 
consciousness,  it  matures  little  by  little  from  infancy  to  old 
age;  like  myself,  it  grows  old.  Indeed,  maturity  and  old  age 
are,  properly  speaking,  attributes  only  of  my  body;  it  is  only 
metaphysically  that  I  apply  the  same  names  to  the  corre- 
sponding changes  of  my  conscious  self.  .  .  .  Wherever  anything 
lives,  there  is  open  somewhere  a  register  in  which  time  is  be^ 
ing  inscribed"  (Creative  Evolution,  pp.  15»  16). 

122 


THEORIES  OF  SPACE  AND  TIME 

but  all  life,  like  conscious  activity,  shares  in 
duration.^2 

When  duration  is  looked  upon  as  a  succession 
of  states  in  consciousness  it  may  be  termed 
"pure"  duration. ^^  Duration  may  also  be  re- 
garded from  the  standpoint  of  succession  in 
phenomena.  ^^     This    distinction  enables  us   to 

^  "In  short,  the  world  that  the  mathematician  deals  with  is 
a  world  that  dies  and  is  reborn  at  every  instant — the  world 
which  Descartes  was  thinking  of  when  he  spoke  of  continued 
creation.  But  in  time  thus  conceived,  how  could  evolution, 
which  is  the  very  essence  of  life,  ever  take  place?  Evolution 
implies  a  real  existence  of  the  past  in  the  present,  a  duration 
which  is,  as  it  were,  a  hyphen,  a  connecting  link.  In  other 
words,  to  know  a  living  being  or  natural  system  is  to  get  at 
the  very  interval  of  duration.  .  .  . 

"Continuity  of  change,  preservation  of  the  past  in  the 
present,  real  duration — the  living  being  seems,  then,  to  share 
these  attributes  with  consciousness.  Can  we  go  further  and 
say  that  life,  like  conscious  activity,  is  invention,  is  unceasing 
creation?"     (Creative  Evolution,  pp.  15-16.) 

13  "Pure  duration  is  the  form  which  the  succession  of  our 
conscious  states  assumes  when  our  ego  lets  itself  live,  when  it 
refrains  from  separating  its  present  state  from  its  former 
states"  (Creative  Evolution,  pp.  22-23). 

1*  "The  principle  of  causality  involves  two  contradictory 
conceptions  of  duration,  two  mutually  exclusive  ways  of 
prefiguring  the  future  in  ]the  present.  Sometimes  all  phenom- 
ena, physical  or  psychical,  are  pictured  as  enduring  in  the 
same  way,  and  therefore  in  the  way  that  we  do:  in  this  case 
the  future  will  exist  in  the  present  only  as  an  idea,  and  the 
passing  from  the  present  to  the  future  will  take  the  form  of  an 
effort  which  does  not  always  lead  to  the  realization  of  the 
idea  conceived.  Sometimes,  on  the  other  hand,  duration  is 
regarded  as  the  characteristic  form  of  conscious  states;  in 
123 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

look  upon  the  self  as  free.  Thus  Bergson  intro- 
duces the  needed  time-transcending  element 
into  personality.  He  arrives  at  the  conclusion 
that  succession  is  a  reality  only  for  intelligence.^^ 
In  life,  he  declares,  duration  seems  to  act 
like  a  cause,  that  is,  it  possesses  a  validity  which 
goes  outside  of  the  individual  experience.     We 


this  case  things  are  no  longer  supposed  to  endure  as  we  do, 
and  a  mathematical  preexistence  of  their  future  in  their 
present  is  admitted.  Now,  each  of  these  two  hypotheses, 
when  taken  by  itself,  safeguards  human  freedom;  for  the 
first  would  lead  to  the  result  that  even  the  phenomena  of 
nature  were  contingent,  and  the  second  by  attributing  the 
necessary  determination  of  the  phenomena  to  the  fact  that 
things  do  not  endure  as  we  do,  invites  us  to  regard  the  self 
which  is  subject  to  duration  as  a  free  force"  (Time  and  Free 
Will,  pp.  215,  216). 

"  "What  duration  is  there  existing  outside  us?  The 
present  only,  or,  if  we  prefer  the  expression,  simultaneity. 
No  doubt  external  things  change,  but  their  moments  do  not 
succeed  one  another,  if  we  retain  the  ordinary  meaning  of  the 
word,  except  for  a  consciousness  which  keeps  them  in  mind. 
We  observe  outside  us  at  a  given  moment  a  whole  system  of 
simultaneous  positions;  of  the  simultaneities  which  have 
preceded  them  nothing  remains.  To  put  duration  in  space 
is  really  to  contradict  one's  self  and  place  succession  within 
simultaneity.  Hence  we  must  not  say  that  external  things 
endure,  but  rather  that  there  is  in  them  some  inexpressible 
reason  in  virtue  of  which  we  cannot  examine  them  at  successive 
moments  of  their  own  duration  without  observing  that  they 
have  changed.  But  this  change  does  not  involve  succession 
unless  the  word  is  taken  in  a  new  meaning:  on  this  point  we 
have  noted  the  agreement  of  science  and  common  sense." 
Time  and  Free  Will,  p.  227. 

124 


THEORIES  OF  SPACE  AND  TIME 

cannot  reverse  the  order  of  time  flown  to  bring 
back  the  state  or  condition  that  has  been  borne 
away.^^ 

These  words  (Time  and  Free  Will,  quoted 
above,  pp.  215,  216,  227)  indicate  two  points 
of  difficulty  in  the  doctrine  of  duration,  for  which 
the  philosophy  of  change  oiffers  no  adequate 
solution. 

The  first  difficulty  connects  itself  with  the 
relation  to  time  of  the  material  world,  the 
other  with  duration  as  the  source  of  causal 
efficiency.  We  may,  with  Bergson,  confine 
our  definition  of  duration  to  the  human  or 
conscious  experience  of  succession  in  events. 
Duration  is  that  mysterious  gathering  of  all 
the  past  of  an  individual  and  its  concentration 
on  the  point  of  the  present  with  a  view  to  the 

-8  "Here  [in  life  as  contrasted  with  matter]  duration  certainly 
seems  to  act  like  a  cause,  and  the  idea  of  putting  things  back 
in  their  place  at  the  end  of  a  certain  time  involves  a  kind  of 
absurdity,  since  such  a  turning  backward  has  never  been 
accomplished  in  the  case  of  a  living  being.  ...  In  short, 
while  the  material  point,  as  mechanics  understands  it,  remains 
in  an  eternal  present,  the  past  is  a  reality  perhaps  for  living 
bodies,  and  certainly  for  conscious  beings.  While  past  time 
is  neither  a  gain  nor  a  loss  for  a  system  assumed  to  be  conserv- 
ative, it  may  be  a  gain  for  a  living  being,  and  it  is  indisputably 
one  for  the  conscious  being.  Such  being  the  case,  is  there  not 
much  to  be  said  for  the  hypothesis  of  a  conscious  force  or  free 
will,  which,  subject  to  the  action  of  time  and  storing  up 
duration,  may  thereby  escape  the  law  of  the  conservation  of 
energy?"  (Time  and  Free  Will,  pp.  153,  154.) 
125 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

future.  It  is  obvious,  then,  that  by  duration 
we  refer  to  what  we  ordinarily  term  self-con- 
sciousness. Duration  is  thus  bound  up  with 
concrete  experiences  and  action,  and  so  is  kept 
from  flying  off  into  the  abstractions  of  absolute 
idealism.  This  is  an  end  devoutly  to  be  desired. 
But  duration  left  as  a  concrete  individual 
experience  becomes  solipsistic  and  subjective. 
It  will  not  do  to  neglect  or  leave  out  of  consider- 
ation this  which  Bergson  mentions  as  the 
"seeming"  duration  of  material  things.  Though 
matter  be  but  a  constantly  repeated  movement, 
and  without  duration  in  the  psychological  sense 
we  have  employed,  it  does  have  some  relation 
to  time  which  passes  out  beyond  the  experience 
of  individuals.  The  waters  run  to  the  sea,  and 
their  rise  in  the  hills  is  not  simultaneous  with 
their  absorption  in  the  vastness  of  the  deep. 
Even  the  mountains  depart,  as  under  the  in- 
fluence of  innumerable  frosts,  seasons,  freshets, 
they  take  their  places  in  the  lowliness  of  the 
plain,  or  contribute  of  their  substance  to  the 
treacherous  sand-bar  which  prevents  the  des- 
perate sailor  from  reaching  his  harbor  when 
the  storm  is  on  the  sea.  We  cannot  assume 
duration  in  the  mountains  because  we  cannot 
think  of  them  as  conscious  of  purpose  in  sinking 
to  the  level  of  the  plain,  or  in  contributing  to 
the  shallowness  of  the  sea.  But  it  is  certain 
126 


THEORIES  OF  SPACE  AND  TIME 

that  we  see  here  the  existence  of  a  temporal 
reaHty  which  does  not  depend  upon  us  nor  upon 
our  perception  of  it.  Lucy  Larcom,  the  Lowell 
mill-girl,  had  but  a  glimpse  of  the  sea  through 
her  attic  window,  but  it  was  her  one  hold  upon 
the  reality  of  a  world  that  stretched  out  far 
beyond  her  knowledge,  and  mingled  in  her 
dreams.  Yet  her  "strip  of  blue"  was  enough, 
for  in  it  she  found  God's  sweeping  garment- 
fold. 

"The  sails,  like  flakes  of  roseate  pearl. 

Float  in  upon  the  mist; 
The   waves   are   broken   precious   stones — 

Sapphire  and  amethyst 
Washed  from  celestial  basement  walls, 

By  suns  unsetting  kissed. 
Out  through  the  utmost  gates  of  space. 

Past  where  the  gray  stars  drift. 
To  the  widening  Infinite,  my  soul 

Glides  on,  a  vessel  swift. 
Yet  loses  not  her  anchorage 

In  yonder  azure  drift." 

Because  this  temporal  mark  upon  the  world 
goes  out  beyond  us  we  must  argue  that  it  has 
some  meaning  for  a  creative  intelligence  which 
persists  behind  it  all. 

Until  we  reach  up  to  a  conclusion  of  this 

order  we  shall  be  at  loss  to  explain  the  seeming 

duration  of  the  physical  world.     We  shall  find, 

in  the  last  analysis,  as  suggested  by  a  well-known 

127 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

thinker,^^  that  both  time  and  freedom  derive 
their  meaning  from  the  unfinished  character 
of  the  world.  However,  this  world  must  have 
an  identity  which  the  work  of  finishing  does 
not  destroy  or  efface.  "Unlimited  cooperation 
with  God  in  world-making  we  have;  not, 
however,  in  ultimate  God-making.  The  reli- 
gious object  offers  that  identity  without  which 
creative  freedom  itself  would  lack  for  us  all 
meaning.  ^^ 

Which  is  to  say  that  if  there  be  such  a  thing 
as  progress  or  evolution,  an  unfinished  world 
in  state  of  completion,  there  must  be  some 
abiding  identity.  If  the  only  abiding  identity 
be  the  material  world,  all  thinking  and  philoso- 
phizing collapses  as  unimportant.  If  this  is  so, 
matter  is  the  only  eternal  and  worth  while. 
We  can  save  ourselves  only  by  passing  through 
a  pantheistic  immanence  to  a  controlling, 
creative  personality  which  is  the  uncaused 
Cause.  Familiarity  with  the  fact  of  uncaused 
causation  in  our  own  experience  ought  to  pre- 
pare us  for  its  acceptance  in  a  supreme  creative 
power.  It  is  no  such  preposterous  jump  as  some 
would  have  us  believe.  It  may  be  an  analogy, 
but  it  is  an  analogy  with  every  evidence  of  fact, 

"  Hocking,  The  Meaning  of  God  in  Human  Experience,  p. 
xvi. 

"  Ibid.,  p.  xvii. 

1^8 


THEORIES  OF  SPACE  AND  TIME 

and  surely  as  sound  as  any  of  the  analogies  upon 
which  science  acts. 

Let  us  turn  our  attention  to  the  other  diflScul- 
ty,  duration  as  the  source  of  causal  eflSciency. 
Duration  is  ultimately  the  only  causal  eflSciency 
with  which  we  are  acquainted  that  escapes  the 
meshes  of  necessity  woven  by  the  law  of  the 
conservation  of  energy.  In  this  admission  or 
discovery  we  have  come  upon  a  fact  of  far- 
reaching  importance  for  our  philosophy.  Un- 
heralded by  trumpets,  and  unannounced,  it  is 
in  reality  the  high  point  of  attainment  in  the 
philosophy  of  change.  In  it  we  have  a  means 
of  escape  from  mechanism  on  the  one  hand, 
and  perhaps  from  determinism  on  the  other. 
In  plain  words,  it  means  that  personality  con- 
tains the  only  grounds  we  know  of  unique 
eflficient  cause  or  of  uncaused  causality.  The 
mechanists  have  been  laboring  for  years  to 
determine  the  exact  correspondence  between 
calories  of  food  and  expended  energy  of  thought, 
without  a  sufficient  sense  of  humor  to  under- 
stand that  they  were  not  touching  the  question 
of  how  food  energy  could  become  thought 
energy,  and  that  the  very  crux  of  their  problem 
lay  not  in  showing  how  the  heat  calories  in  the 
philosopher's  cabbage  correspond  with  energy 
units  spent  in  the  philosopher's  brain,  but, 
rather  in  that  strange  transmutation  by  which 
129 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

cabbage  energy  becomes  thought  energy.  What 
we  have  here  in  Bergson  is  the  recognition  of 
the  transcendence  of  mechanistic  law  by  the 
human  personality.  It  is  not  what  the  artist 
eats  that  determines  the  worth  of  his  picture. 
The  number  of  calories  of  food  does  not  fix 
the  profundity  nor  beauty  of  the  musician's 
score.  The  prophets  and  thinkers  of  the  world, 
the  children  of  light,  have  accomplished  more 
on  a  diet  of  crusts  than  the  children  of  this 
world  who  have  fared  sumptuously  every  day. 
Man's  greatest  glory  is  his  power  to  originate 
action,  to  be  himself  a  creator,  and  if  we  are 
to  escape  the  pitiless  and  relentless  tyrannies 
of  mechanism,  we  cannot  do  it  by  pursuing  a 
dance  of  atoms  far  beyond  powers  of  human 
investigation  and  experience  in  an  Unknow- 
able. We  can  at  least  have  the  comfort  of 
analogy  which  in  any  other  scheme  is  entirely 
wanting.  We  can  assume  that  personality  is 
the  one  source  of  unique  action  in  the  universe, 
the  uncaused  cause,  and  we  cannot  be  contro- 
verted by  any  known  facts. 

Objections  to  this  conclusion  will  be  raised 
because  we  often  so  unthinkingly  assume  the 
correctness  of  the  perfectly  wooden  hypothesis 
of  personal  automatism.  According  to  this 
hypothesis,  we  are  what  we  are  by  the  trans- 
mission of  hereditary  traits,  and  whatever  is 
130 


THEORIES  OF  SPACE  AND  TIME 

in  us  can  be  traced  back  to  sufficient  and  well- 
defined  causes.  Yet  no  genius  has  written 
himself  upon  the  pages  of  history  who  could 
by  any  possibility  be  altogether  accounted  for 
by  parentage,  training,  or  the  influences  of  the 
age.  Who  wrote  the  sonatas  in  Beethoven's 
souLf*  or  what  human  parents  gave  to  Dante  the 
voice  of  "ten  silent  centuries"?  or  what  age  is 
able  to  account  for  the  undying  insight  into 
character  and  the  amazing  power  of  literary 
expression  to  be  found  in  Shakespeare?  All 
creative  work  in  the  world  is  exactly  of  this 
inexplicable  character.  It  is  the  distinctive 
mark  of  personality.  We  have  within  our- 
selves the  key  to  the  mystery  of  life. 

Viewed  in  this  light,  the  doctrine  of  duration 
can  be  considered  the  high  point  in  the  philos- 
ophy of  change,  and  the  one  destined  to  cast 
a  flood  of  light  upon  the  deepest  problems  of 
thought. 


131 


CHAPTER  V 
FREEDOM  AND  CAUSATION 

Let  us  come  to  a  consideration  of  the  doc- 
trine of  freedom  and  causation  as  set  forth  in 
the  philosophy  of  change.  We  find  freedom 
of  personal  choice  described  in  these  words : 

All  seems  to  take  place  as  if  in  this  aggregate  of  images 
which  I  call  the  universe  nothing  new  could  really  happen 
except  through  the  medium  of  certain  particular  images, 
the  type  of  which  is  furnished  me  by  my  body.^ 

Bergson  declares  that  freedom  is  the  relation 
of  the  concrete  self  to  its  acts.  It  is  an  unde- 
finable  relation  because  to  describe  it  is  to  turn 
it  into  something  past,  no  longer  contingent,  or 
else  to  make  it  determined  and  so  not  free.^ 


1  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  3. 

*  "We  can  now  formulate  our  conception  of  freedom. 
Freedom  is  the  relation  of  the  concrete  self  to  the  act  which 
it  performs.  This  relation  is  indefinable  just  because  we 
are  free,  for  we  can  analyze  a  thing,  but  not  a  process;  we  can 
break  up  extensity,  but  not  duration.  Or,  if  we  persist  in 
analyzing  it,  we  unconsciously  transform  the  process  into  a 
thing  and  duration  into  extensity.  By  the  very  fact  of 
breaking  up  concrete  time  we  set  out  its  moments  in  homo- 
geneous space;  in  place  of  the  doing  we  put  the  already  done; 
132 


FREEDOM  AND  CAUSATION 

So  every  problem  of  freedom  comes  back 
eventually  to  a  matter  of  definition  or  descrip- 
tion. But  freedom  has  no  past;  it  is  something 
only  in  the  moment  of  action.^ 

The  Conception  of  Freedom  in  the 
Philosophy  of  Change 
We  have  seen  at  different  times  during  the 
discussion  the  anxiety  which  Bergson  has 
shown  to  escape  the  necessity  of  mechanical 
causation.  Here  he  sees  clearly  that  such 
necessity  not  only  removes  the  possibility  of 
freedom,  but  the  possibility  of  explanation  as 
well  and  lands  one  in  the  infinite  regress.  He 
is  equally  determined  to  escape  from  the  meshes 

and  as  we  have  begun  by,  so  to  speak,  stereotyping  the  activity 
of  the  self  we  see  spontaneity  settle  down  into  inertia,  and 
freedom  into  necessity.  Thus  any  positive  definition  of  free- 
dom will  insure  the  victory  of  determinism"  (Time  and  Free 
Will,  pp.  219-220). 

3  "To  sum  up,  every  demand  for  freedom  comes  back, 
without  our  suspecting  it,  to  the  following  question:  *Can 
time  be  adequately  represented  by  space?'  To  which  we 
answer.  Yes,  if  you  are  dealing  with  time  flown;  No,  if  you 
speak  of  time  flowing.  Now,  the  free  act  takes  place  in  time 
which  is  flowing  and  not  in  time  which  has  already  flown. 
Freedom  is  therefore  a  fact,  and  among  the  facts  which  we 
observe  there  is  none  clearer.  All  the  difficulties  of  the  prob- 
lem and  the  problem  itself  arise  from  the  desire  to  endow  du- 
ration with  the  same  attributes  as  extensity,  to  interpret  a 
succession  by  a  simultaneity,  and  to  express  the  idea  of  free- 
dom in  a  language  into  which  it  is  obviously  untranslatable" 
(Time  and  Free  Will,  p.  221). 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

of  an  absolutist  determinism,  wherein  all 
things  appear  by  the  fiat  of  an  Absolute  will 
which  becomes  so  identified  with  its  world  that 
the  possibility  of  moral  action  is  removed  from 
man  along  with  the  desired  freedom.  Bergson 
sees  that  one  of  the  things  of  which  we  may  be 
most  certain  is  the  fact  of  freedom  in  human 
experience.  This  we  cannot  deny  without 
upsetting  all  codes  both  intellectual  and  moral. 
He  comes  at  the  point  desired  by  setting  forth 
his  doctrine  of  duration.  As  we  have  seen 
above,  "pure"  duration  is  identical  with  the 
self.  Self  gathers  up  all  its  past,  is  all  its  past 
focused  on  the  one  point  of  the  present  with  a 
view  to  possible  future  action.  Because  this 
freedom  is  real  and  not  seeming,  the  self  can 
choose  between  courses  of  action. 

Bergson  is  right  when  he  confines  the  only 
element  of  freedom  we  know  in  the  universe 
to  a  connection  with  personality.  This  per- 
sonality, acting  and  choosing,  is  plainly  the  very 
essence  of  pure  duration.  It  is  easy  to  follow 
this  definition  where  it  applies  to  rational 
beings;  it  is  quite  inadequate,  considered  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  ongoing  of  the  nonrational 
and  material  world;  for  the  duration  which  we 
have  in  things  is  not  only  of  another  order,  as 
Bergson  himself  declares,  but  the  difference 
between  it  and  the  defined  duration  of  person- 

134 


FREEDOM  AND  CAUSATION 

ality  is  so  great  that  such  duration  as  we  can 
find  in  material  things  of  and  from  themselves 
is  utterly  incapable  of  explaining  freedom. 
While  stating  the  impossibility  of  pure  duration 
in  things,  he  does  yet  unconsciously  carry  over 
into  the  changes  of  the  material  world  the  same 
idea  that  he  applies  to  duration  in  persons. 
The  material  world  is  assumed  to  gather  up 
its  past  into  its  present,  and  though  this  memory 
is  unconscious,  t  is  supposed  as  somehow  writ- 
ten into  the  living  organism  so  that  the  uncon- 
scious, or  unrationalizing  cell  of  the  lowest  order 
of  plant  or  animal  life  is  reckoned  as  making  a 
free  choice,  as  if  it  did  decide  between  possible 
courses  of  action.  The  plausibility  of  such  a 
conception  is  quite  evident  as  are  the  troubling 
questions  of  science  and  metaphysics  which  it 
seems  to  meet,  and  the  apparent  foolishness  of 
any  effort  to  refute  it.  Somewhere  we  are 
told  of  the  exercise  of  this  freedom  by  the  ten- 
drils of  living  vines  which  reach  out  toward 
supports  and  which  climb  toward  the  sun.  Now 
the  only  difficulty  here  is  the  discrepancy 
between  the  facts  and  the  existence  of  freedom. 
If  we  call  such  action  freedom,  we  must  call 
choice  as  it  appears  in  rationalizing  beings  some- 
thing vastly  more  than  freedom,  for  the  action 
in  the  two  cases  is  not  analogous.  It  may, 
indeed,  be  true  that  the  reaching  of  the  tendrils 
135 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

is  due  to  the  presence  of  light  or  warmth,  or 
the  presence  of  possible  support,  and  that  the 
organism  responds  to  such  presence.  Where 
freedom  escapes  us  in  the  case  is  that  we  cannot 
find  any  instances  where  the  plant  has  made 
any  choice  at  all  between  possibilities;  for 
instance,  between  the  possibility  of  growing 
toward  or  away  from  the  sun.  It  has  in  every 
case  responded  to  the  law  of  its  nature,  and  it 
apparently  has  no  power  to  act  in  any  other 
way.  Changes  of  structure  and  adaptation 
may  come  about  through  climatic  or  other 
catastrophe.  The  potato  growing  in  the  dark- 
ness of  the  cellar  may  seem  quite  other  than  the 
one  planted  in  the  field,  but  that  is  due  not  to 
its  own  choice  but  to  a  determined  environment. 
If  this  be  dignified  with  the  name  of  freedom, 
the  only  kinship  with  it  in  the  rationalizing 
human  being  is  to  be  found  in  the  merely 
physical  processes  which  are  quite  beyond  our 
power  of  determination.  It  is  like  the  freedom 
we  might  be  assumed  as  exercising  when  we 
are  born,  or  when  our  hearts  beat,  or  our  lungs 
expand  to  the  inrushing  air,  or  the  choice  of 
starving  when  there  is  no  food  and  none  to  be 
obtained.  Surely,  freedom  in  the  real  meaning 
of  the  term  is  not  exercised  in  the  ongoing  of 
such  physical  activities.  Instead,  then,  of  the 
solution  of  the  problem  in  unconscious  action, 
136 


FREEDOM  AND  CAUSATION 

we  have  been  led  only  into  ever-deepening 
difficulties.  The  reason  is  clearly  because  the 
existence  of  purpose  in  a  creative  being  seems 
(and  quite  unnecessarily)  to  imply  an  estab- 
lished determinism  in  the  world  outside  of  man. 

The  Value  and  Possibility  of  a 
Purposeless  Freedom 
If  pure  duration  is  necessary  to  freedom, 
and  if  pure  duration  is  wanting  from  all  life, 
except  from  rationalizing,  and  strictly  speak- 
ing, freely  choosing  life,  the  only  kind  of  free- 
dom left  in  the  ongoing  of  a  changing  and 
evolving  physical  world  is  a  lawless  kind  of 
freedom  which  is  not  a  matter  of  choice,  but 
a  mere  possibility  of  being  one  thing  or  some- 
thing else.  If  we  no  longer  have  a  freedom  of 
purpose — and  that  is  denied  by  our  previous 
assumption — we  are  shut  up  to  a  freedom  of 
accident.  In  a  world  of  such  a  freedom  any- 
thing might  happen,  and  foreseeability  on  the 
part  of  man  in  the  chemical,  physical,  or  bio- 
logical worlds  would  be  absolutely  impossible. 
One  might  plant  potatoes  and  get  grapes,  or 
the  vineyard  might  overnight  have  decided  to 
produce  thistles.  One  might  extend  indefi- 
nitely examples  to  show  the  preposterous 
nature  of  any  claim  to  rule  purpose  out  of  the 
freedom  of  the  material  world.  A  purposeless 
137 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

world  would  be  an  entirely  unintelligible  world. 
It  is  not  hard  to  believe  that  things  do  happen 
as  if  there  were  a  purpose  acting  somewhere, 
and  yet  if  we  look  ever  so  hard  we  cannot 
discover  purpose  being  exercised  within  the 
realm  of  unconscious  hfe.  Such  choice  or 
freedom  as  there  may  seem  to  be  is  merely 
the  choice  of  responding  to  conditions  after 
certain  fixed  laws,  or  of  ceasing  to  live.  It  is 
evident  that  unless  we  introduce  some  more 
efficient  term  into  our  definition  it  is  impossible 
to  speak  in  an  intelligent  way  of  freedom  in  the 
world  outside  of  man.  This  problem  we  must 
leave  for  later  consideration.  But  before  leav- 
ing the  matter  under  discussion  it  will  be  well 
to  consider  a  related  matter. 

Some  of  the  theologians  believe  that  in  this 
doctrine  of  a  purposeless  freedom  there  has 
been  brought  to  their  aid  a  new  and  astounding 
confirmation  of  the  doctrine  of  miracles.  Such 
help,  we  will  be  compelled  by  reflection  to  de- 
cide, is  more  apparent  than  real.  It  is  argued 
that  in  such  a  world  of  freedom,  in  which  even 
God  cannot  know  what  is  about  to  happen, 
reserving  all  his  consciousness  to  the  present 
moment  (because  foreknowledge  and  purpose 
would  reintroduce  that  reign  of  determinism 
from  which  we  are  escaping),  anything  might 
happen.  If  anything  can  happen  irrespective 
138 


FREEDOM  AND  CAUSATION 

of  natural  laws,  then  there  is  place  for  miracle. 
When  this  "anything"  happens  in  contradic- 
tion to  common  expectations  or  the  ordinary 
course  of  events,  we  have  a  miracle.  Such  a 
confirmation  of  the  doctrine  of  miracles  is  too 
easy  to  be  satisfying  or  adequate.  The  slightest 
reflection  upon  the  nature  of  miracle  shows  us 
that  a  miracle  which  was  not  the  result  of  di- 
vine foreknowledge,  purpose,  or  determination, 
would  be  nothing  more  than  an  accident.  So 
far  as  its  being  a  revelation  of  any  connection 
in  relationship  between  God  and  man,  it  would 
be  valueless.  Thus  it  appears  that  in  the 
realm  of  religious  faith,  as  well  as  in  the  realm 
of  science,  a  lawless,  accidental,  or  purposeless 
order  of  freedom  raises  many  more  difficulties 
than  it  can  settle. 

Let  us  go  back  now  to  the  thought  to  which 
we  were  led  in  the  beginning  of  this  section, 
which  is  that  freedom  apart  from  "pure"  dura- 
tion is  meaningless.  Let  us  inquire  what  the 
true  implications  of  such  a  theory  might  be. 
We  have  abundant  evidence  that  up  to  this 
point  we  are  at  one  with  the  philosophy  of 
change.^  We  believe  it  is  clear  that  we  cannot 
stop  here  and  find  any  adequate  solution  of  the 
problem  of  freedom.  As  we  have  already 
pointed   out,    "pure"   duration  is   merely   the 

4  Time  and  Free  Will,  pp.  216,  217. 
139 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

term  which  Bergson  chooses  to  name  that 
which  we  ordinarily  understand  as  personaHty, 
or  self.  If  this  is  true,  and  if  it  further  be  true 
that  "pure"  duration  cannot  be  posited  of  uncon- 
scious life  (as  we  believe  it  cannot  be),  it  follows 
that  freedom  is  inseparable  from  personality. 
If  we  are  to  achieve  any  evolution  or  progress 
in  the  material  world,  any  uniqueness,  any 
going  beyond  the  rigid  system  of  necessity  to 
obtain  new  genera  or  types,  we  must  assume 
purpose  and  personality  in  the  creative  "elan," 
or  power.  In  spite  of  this  fact,  which  is  tre- 
mendous with  meaning,  there  are  passages  in 
the  Creative  Evolution  which  seem  to  imply 
that  the  animal  and  the  plant,  acting  by  pure 
intuition,  and  thus  being  nearer  the  center  of 
life,  are  freer  than  man,  who  is  forever  intro- 
ducing his  wearisome  slavery  to  ideas,  which 
in  rationalizing  divorce  him  from  life,  freedom, 
and  reality. 

It  is  worth  our  while  to  consider  for  a  moment 
the  aspects  of  such  an  intuitional  freedom. 
Looked  into  deeply,  it  appears  that  with  growing 
powers  of  reflection  come  growing  powers  of 
choice.  Improved  powers  of  rationalization 
bring  improved  powers  of  self-determination. 
In  fact,  investigation  makes  clear  that  the  more 
intuitive  and  unconscious  a;n  act  is,  even  in 
man,  the  less  likely  is  it  to  represent  anything 
140 


FREEDOM  AND  CAUSATION 

of  what  we  mean  by  choice,  leaving  out  of 
account  those  actions  which  conscious  willing 
and  repetition  have  hardened  into  habit.  Our 
direct  impulses  are  less  likely  to  spring  from 
choosing  than  they  are  to  be  unconscious,  and 
therefore  physically  determined  response  to 
external  stimuli.  Freedom  appears  in  greatest 
measure,  not  in  those  primal  and  intuitive 
moments  when  our  action  is  most  unconscious, 
but  in  those  moments  when  both  intelligence 
and  rationalizing  are  at  the  greatest  swing  of 
the  arc.  The  larger  our  knowledge  of  the 
situation,  of  the  attendant  and  hidden  circum- 
stances, of  the  laws  of  action  and  reaction,  of  the 
possible  choices  of  action,  the  greater  seems  to 
be  our  freedom.  The  only  example  of  perfect 
freedom,  then,  would  be  found  not  in  the  least 
rationalizing,  and  least  conscious  living  being, 
but  in  the  most  conscious  and  most  rationalizing 
being.  If  the  Creative  Being  be  assumed  as 
the  most  intelligent,  then  to  him  it  is  both 
reasonable  and  scientific  to  accord  the  only 
example  of  perfect  freedom. 

This  fact  is  not  only  in  line  with  the  deepest 
religious  intuitions  of  man,  it  is  also  in  keeping 
with  his  highest  intelligence,  and  with  his  most 
scientific  knowledge.  When  Saint  Augustine 
uttered  that  prayer  which  still  stirs  the  heart 
of  men  across  the  ages,  bespeaking  a  "service 
141 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

which  alone  is  perfect  freedom,"  he  was  true  to 
philosophy,  to  science,  and  to  life.  The  most 
perfect  freedom  comes  with  the  most  intelli- 
gent devotion  of  the  full  powers  of  manhood 
to  the  noblest  ideals,  and  not  with  a  devotion 
which  is  the  most  impulsive  and  unthinking. 

We  must  remember,  however,  that  it  is  to  no 
such  conclusion  that  the  philosophy  of  change 
has  led  us.  Such  conclusions  are  sure  to  be 
vitiated  by  any  faulty  or  incomplete  definition 
of  the  self.  When  the  self  is  depersonalized 
into  a  bundle  of  conscious  states,  and  "pure" 
duration  as  a  sort  of  impersonal  momentum 
which  of  itself  does  the  choosing,  apart  from  an 
abiding  and  unchanging  self-identity,  we  are 
on  the  high  road  to  skepticism.  A  human  self 
which  is  mostly  a  collection  of  conscious  states, 
and  a  creative  "elan,"  which  impersonally 
mixes  "in  Being's  flood  and  Action's  storm," 
weaving  at  the  garment  of  God,  may  be  splen- 
didly poetic  in  conception,  but  as  touching  the 
fundamentals  of  concrete  living,  it  will  be  found 
as  abstract  as  it  is  untrue. 

Of  Causation  as  Freed  from  Deter- 
minism 
It  remains  briefly  to  consider  the  merits  of  a 
causation  thus  freed  from  the  limits  of  deter- 
minism by  assuming  that  duration  in  things  is 
142 


FREEDOM  AND  CAUSATION 

different  from  duration  in  ourselves,  and  a  theory 
which  fails  to  make  the  necessary  distinction 
between  phenomenal  and  efficient  causation. 

Bergson  declares  that  causation  cannot  take 
the  form  of  a  necessary  principle  as  binding  the 
future  to  the  present.  Seeing  this,  Descartes 
attributed  the  regularity  of  physical  phenomena 
to  the  constantly  renewed  grace  of  Providence 
and  thus  built  up  a  sort  of  instantaneous  meta- 
physics. For  Spinoza  the  apparent  relation  of 
causahty  between  phenomena  melted  away 
into  a  relation  of  identity  in  the  Absolute.^ 

Bergson's  position  relative  to  causation  in 

^  **The  principle  of  causality,  in  so  far  as  it  is  supposed  to 
bind  the  future  to  the  present,  could  never  take  the  form  of 
a  necessary  principle;  for  the  successive  moments  of  real 
time  are  not  bound  up  with  one  another,  and  no  effort  of 
logic  will  succeed  in  proving  that  what  has  been  will  be,  or 
will  continue  to  be,  that  the  same  antecedents  will  always 
give  rise  to  identical  consequents.  Descartes  understood  this 
so  well  that  he  attributed  the  regularity  of  the  physical  world 
and  the  continuation  of  the  same  effects  to  the  constantly 
renewed  giace  of  Providence:  he  built  up  as  it  were  an 
instantaneous  physics,  intended  for  a  universe,  the  whole 
duration  of  which  might  as  well  be  confined  to  the  present 
moment.  And  Spinoza  maintained  that  the  indefinite  series 
of  phenomena  which  takes  for  us  the  form  of  a  succession  in 
time,  was  equivalent  in  the  absolute  to  the  divine  unity: 
he  thus  assumed,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  apparent  relation 
of  causality  between  phenomena  melted  away  into  a  relation 
of  identity  in  the  absolute,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the 
indefinite  duration  of  things  was  all  contained  in  a  single 
moment,  which  is  eternity"  (Time  and  Free  Will,  p.  208). 
143 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

things  seems  in  many  points  analogous  to  that 
of  Descartes.  Its  vulnerability  lies  in  its 
failure  to  trace  succession  in  phenomena  to 
personal  causation.  Bergson  attributes  the 
distinction  in  causation  to  the  existence  of  two 
types  of  causality,  personal,  or  efficient,  and 
phenomenal,  which  is  the  ordered  succession  in 
phenomena;  that  is,  causation  in  ourselves  is 
different  from  causation  in  things.  Let  us 
reflect  if  this  assumption  alone  is  a  sufficient 
safeguard  of  freedom  or  adequate  explanation 
of  causation.^ 

•  "It  follows  .  .  .  that  the  principle  of  causality  involves  two 
contrary  conceptions  of  duration,  two  mutually  exclusive 
ways  of  prefiguring  the  future  in  the  present.  Sometimes  all 
phenomena,  physical  or  psychical,  are  pictured  as  enduring  in 
the  same  way  and  therefore  in  the  way  that  we  do:  in  this  case 
the  future  will  exist  in  the  present  only  as  an  idea,  and  the 
passing  from  the  present  to  the  future  will  take  the  form  of  an 
effort  which  does  not  always  lead  to  the  realization  of  the 
idea  conceived.  Sometimes,  on  the  other  hand,  duration  is 
regarded  as  the  characteristic  form  of  conscious  states;  in 
this  case  things  are  no  longer  supposed  to  endure  as  we  do,  and 
a  mathematical  preexistence  of  their  future  in  the  present  is 
admitted.  Now,  each  of  these  two  hypotheses,  when  taken 
by  itself,  safeguards  human  freedom;  for  the  first  would  lead 
to  the  result  that  even  the  phenomena  of  nature  were  contin 
gent,  and  the  second,  by  attributing  the  necessary  deter- 
mination of  physical  phenomena  to  the  fact  that  things  do 
not  endure  as  we  do,  invites  us  to  regard  the  self  which  is 
subject  to  duration  as  a  free  force.  Therefore,  every  clear 
conception  of  causality,  wiiere  we  know  our  own  meaning, 
leads  to  the  idea  of  human  freedom  as  a  natural  consequence" 
(Time  and  Free  Will,  pp.  215,  216). 
144 


FREEDOM  AND  CAUSATION 

(a)  Duration  in  Things  as  Different  from  Dura^ 
tion  in  Self. 

The  whole  doctrine  of  freedom  in  the  philoso- 
phy of  change  is  made  to  hinge  upon  the  doctrine 
of  pure  duration,  and  yet  there  must  be  a  sense 
in  which  duration  in  things  must  find  perfect 
agreement  with  duration  in  persons,  if  the  sys- 
tem of  freedom  is  to  be  extended  to  the  uncon- 
scious and  material  worlds.  Whether  it  is 
possible  to  maintain  two  orders  of  duration, 
without  similarity  of  meaning,  and  still  to  keep 
freedom  as  we  are  compelled  to  think,  and  to 
define  it,  is  the  question  which  next  claims  our 
attention.  If  duration  in  things  is  essentially 
different  from  duration  in  ourselves,  we  must 
try  to  determine  what  this  difference  would 
be.  If  we  find  entering  into  it  exactly  the  same 
elements  of  which  we  are  aware  in  personal 
duration,  we  may  have  to  acknowledge  a  rela- 
tionship between  the  two  which  is  not  ade- 
quately represented  by  merely  saying  that  they 
are  different. 

Let  us  assume,  now,  that  the  "elan"  as 
creative  activity  is  in  being,  in  contrast  to 
the  creative  activity  of  the  self.  One  of 
the  most  obvious  elements  of  personal  crea- 
tive activity  is  the  element  of  time.  While 
there  is  a  sense  in  which  the  self  is  timeless  as 
retaining  its  unity  through  the  succession  of 
145 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

events,  yet,  it  will  be  found  acting  according 
to  a  well-defined  order  of  succession,  that  is,  of 
time.  In  this  order  effect  follows  cause,  and  it  is 
unthinkable  that  the  order  should  be  reversed. 
But  might  not  this  description  be  equally  well 
applied  to  the  "elan  vitale"?  So  far  as  we  have 
any  means  of  knowing,  the  "elan"  acts  according 
to  the  order  of  succession,  that  is,  progressively 
and  not  simultaneously.  If  it  did  not,  the 
term  "evolution"  would  have  no  meaning  in 
reality,  but  would  be  a  mere  panoramic  ap- 
pearance spread  out  before  us  to  deceive  us. 
It  is  clear  that  the  "elan,"  whatever  it  may  be 
taken  to  be,  acts  in  accordance  with  a  time 
order.  To  deny  this  is  to  deny  the  possibility  of 
knowledge. 

Furthermore,  if  there  is  to  be  real  progress  or 
evolution,  the  "elan"  must,  like  the  creative 
energy  in  ourselves,  act  not  only  in  accordance 
with  its  past,  but  with  prevision  for  the  future. 
Of  course  this  means  to  introduce  that  element 
of  purpose  in  evolution  which  has  already  been 
drummed  out  of  camp;  but  if  we  are  to  save 
ourselves  to  ways  of  intelligence,  we  must  get 
it  back  even  if  it  be  under  disguise.  If  the 
"elan"  has  no  prevision  for  the  future,  if  it  acts 
only  in  accordance  with  the  past,  then,  in  spite 
of  ourselves,  we  are  committed  to  the  ways  of 
necessity.  In  such  a  case  we  have  in  the  past 
146 


FREEDOM  AND  CAUSATION 

of  the  "elan"  only  what  there  always  has  been, 
and  we  cannot  drag  forth  that  uniqueness  of 
creative  energy  which  is  necessary  to  intelligible 
progress,  or  evolution,  and  is  not  a  series  of 
unrelated  accidents. 

We  are  thus  brought  to  the  crossing  of  the 
ways.  Either  this  evolution  of  which  we  talk 
is  merely  phenomenal,  exists  as  a  mere  mental 
state,  and  so  vanishes  from  reality,  or  it  is  a 
correct  description  of  something  that  actually 
takes  place  in  the  material  world.  If  the  first 
consideration  be  a  true  one,  evolution  is  a  mere 
phenomenalism  about  which  it  is  futile  to  talk 
or  conjecture.  But  if  it  does  represent  a  reality, 
then  duration  in  things,  in  so  far  as  purpose 
and  prevision  are  necessary  to  their  orderly 
existence,  is  in  no  sense  that  we  can  determine 
radically  different  from  duration  in  ourselves. 
In  fact,  this  whole  argument  for  the  "elan 
vitale"  gets  its  power  by  the  importation  into 
it  of  those  forces  of  which  we  are  aware  in  our 
own  creative  willing  and  choosing. 

(6)  The  Only  Free  Causation  is  Personal. 

We  are  thus  naturally  led  to  what  seems,  so 
far  as  human  knowledge  can  go,  a  fundamental 
assumption  that  all  free  causation  is  personal 
and  all  evolution  is  in  some  manner  purposive. 
The  reason  for  the  apparent  impasse  between 
147 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

duration  in  things  and  duration  in  ourselves 
springs  from  the  failure  to  discriminate  between 
efficient  and  phenomenal  causation.  If  we  make 
this  distinction,  the  contradiction  is  ended. 
So  far  as  our  personal  experience  is  concerned, 
we  have  abundant  knowledge  of  efficient  cau- 
sation in  ourselves.  In  the  external  world  we 
reason  not  by  knowledge  but  by  analogy.  We 
witness  an  order  of  succession  in  phenomena. 
The  earlier  term  of  the  succession  we  name 
cause  and  the  succeeding  term  we  call  the  effect. 
If  this  were  the  whole  of  the  reality,  we  should 
have  a  closed  system,  an  interminable  series  of 
infinite  regress,  the  future  wholly  contained  in 
the  present,  and  therefore  not  distinguishable 
from  it.  All  evolution  would  be  at  an  end. 
Likewise,  all  freedom  would  vanish  save  that 
of  the  individual.  We  should  arrive  at  a  philos- 
ophy which  was  not  in  keeping  with  the  facts. 
The  trouble  is  thatwe  cannot,  except  by  analogy, 
go  outside  of  our  personal  world  to  watch  the 
creative  process.  We  can  only  partially  discern 
it  in  ourselves.  But  it  is  there,  and  we  are 
conscious  of  the  exercise  of  freedom,  those 
choices  by  which  we  are  building  our  world 
into  something  better  and  greater,  and  distinctly 
different  from  that  of  the  present.  In  our- 
selves we  know  it  as  efficient  causality.  In 
others  we  behold  it  as  a  succession  of  events, 
148 


FREEDOM  AND  CAUSATION 

and,  reasoning  by  analogy,  we  assume  that  they 
possess  the  same  creative  efficiency  and  freedom 
that  we  do.  But  the  argument  does  not  stop 
here.  We  trace  the  acts  of  our  fellow  men  to 
free  choices,  and  account  for  the  appearance  of 
the  unique  by  the  action  of  their  purpose;  so 
when  in  the  world  around  us  we  witness  effects 
that  are  not  commensurate  with  their  apparent 
causes  we  have  a  right  to  assume  that  here  too 
an  intelligent  purpose  is  the  active  energy 
introducing  the  elements  of  progress.  Such  a 
conclusion,  though  profound  for  religion,  is  not 
essentially  a  religious  conclusion.  It  is  as 
necessary  for  philosophy  as  it  is  for  theology. 
Without  it  we  can  make  no  progress  in  the 
explanation  of  the  relation  of  God  to  his  world, 
and  without  it  all  scientific  explanation  of  evo- 
lution is  impossible. 

All  free  causation  is  personal,  and  if  there  be 
such  a  thing  as  evolution,  it  must  be  that  there 
stands  behind  the  shadows  of  this  mortal  life 
and  this  limiting  order  of  time  One  who  keepeth 
watch  over  a  world  which  in  its  essential 
features  is  his  own. 


149 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  NATURE  OF  CREATIVE  BEING  IN 
THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CHANGE 

In  speaking  of  the  nature  of  reality  or  being, 
Bergson  describes  it  as  the  center  from  which 
things  are  shooting  out.  This  center  is  not  a 
thing  but  an  activity  which  he  seems  to  identify 
with  God.  The  analogue  of  this  creative  ac- 
tivity we  experience  in  ourselves  in  every  free 
action.  The  explanation  of  each  increment  of 
progress  in  evolution  is  beyond  our  power,  but 
we  cannot  deny  that  this  increment  is  a  fact.^ 

1  "It  is  natural  for  our  intellect,  whose  function  is  essen- 
tially practical,  made  to  present  to  us  things  and  states  rather 
than  changes  and  acts.  But  things  and  states  are  only- 
views  taken  by  our  mind,  of  becoming.  There  are  no  things, 
there  are  only  actions.  ...  If  the  same  kind  of  action  is 
going  on  everywhere,  whether  it  is  that  which  is  unmaking 
itself  or  whether  it  is  that  which  is  striving  to  remake  itself, 
I  simply  express  this  probable  similitude  when  I  speak  of  a 
center  from  which  worlds  shoot  out  like  rockets  in  a  fireworks 
display — provided,  however,  that  I  do  not  present  this  center 
as  a  thing,  but  as  a  continuity  of  shooting  out.  God,  thus 
defined,  has  nothing  of  the  already  made;  he  is  unceasing  life, 
action,  freedom.  Creation  so  conceived  is  not  a  mystery; 
we  experience  it  ourselves  when  we  act  freely.  That  new 
things  can  join  things  already  existing  is  absurd,  no  doubt, 
150 


NATURE  OF  CREATIVE  BEING 

He  declares  that  if  philosophy  yields  to  the 
metaphysics  of  science,  that  is  the  law  of  mech- 
anistic cause  and  effect  alone,  it  can  end  only 
in  metaphysical  skepticism.  Perhaps  he  had 
in  mind  at  this  point  such  a  skepticism  as  that 
in  which  Spencer  landed  by  his  doctrine  that 
in  its  essence  first  cause  is  Unknowable.  Pan- 
theistic deity,  eternal  matter  or  a  pure  Form  or 
Absolute,  end  in  the  same  result,  he  says,  treat- 
ing the  living  and  the  inert  on  the  same  basis. 
That  which  we  would  desire  at  this  point  would 
be  the  recognition  of  the  strangely  unaccount- 
able force  in  which  action  arises,  and  which  in 
ultimate  analysis  must  be  a  concrete  intelligent 
purpose.^ 


since  the  thing  results  from  a  solidification  performed  by  our 
understanding,  and  there  are  never  any  things  other  than 
those  that  the  understanding  has  thus  constituted.  To 
speak  of  things  creating  themselves  would  therefore  amount 
to  saying  that  the  understanding  presents  to  itself  more  than 
it  presents  to  itself — a  self  contradictory  aflSrmation,  an  empty 
and  vain  idea.  But  that  action  increases  as  it  goes  on,  that 
it  creates  in  the  measure  of  its  advance,  is  what  each  of  us 
finds  when  he  watches  himself  act"  (Creative  Evolution,  pp. 
248,  249). 

2  "What  must  the  result  be  if  it  (philosophy)  leave  bio- 
logical and  psychological  facts  to  science  alone,  as  it  has  left, 
and  rightly  left,  physical  facts?  It  will  accept  a  priori  a 
mechanistic  conception  of  all  nature,  a  conception  unreflected, 
and  even  unconscious,  the  outcome  of  the  material  need. 
It  will  a  priori  accept  the  doctrine  of  the  simple  unity  of 
knowledge  and  of  the  abstract  unity  of  nature, 
151 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

Of  Kant  he  says: 

True,  when  he  speaks  of  the  human  intellect,  he  means 
neither  yours  nor  mine:  the  unity  of  nature  comes  indeed 
from  the  human  understanding  that  unifies,  but  the  uni- 
fying function  that  operates  here  is  impersonal.  It 
imparts  itself  to  our  individual  consciousness,  but  it  tran- 
scends them.  It  is  much  less  than  a  substantial  God;  it  is, 
however,  a  little  more  than  the  isolated  work  of  a  man,  or 
even  the  collective  work  of  humanity.  It  does  not  exactly 
lie  within  man;  rather  man  lies  within  it,  as  within  an 
atmosphere  of  intellectuality  which  his  consciousness 
breathes.' 

The  Implications  of  Impersonalism  as 

TO  Ground  of  Being 
In  his  just  criticism  of   Kant's  doctrine  of 

"The  moment  it  does  so  its  fate  is  sealed.  The  philosopher 
has  no  longer  any  choice,  save  between  a  metaphysical  dogma- 
tism and  a  metaphysical  skepticism,  both  of  which  rest  at 
bottom  on  the  same  postulate,  and  neither  of  which  adds 
anything  to  positive  science.  He  may  hypostasize  the  unity 
of  nature,  or,  what  comes  to  the  same  thing,  the  unity  of 
science,  in  a  being  who  is  nothing  since  he  does  nothing,  an 
ineffectual  God  who  simply  sums  up  in  himself  all  the  given; 
or  in  an  eternal  Matter  from  whose  womb  have  been  poured 
out  the  properties  of  things  and  the  laws  of  nature;  or,  again, 
in  a  pure  form  which  endeavors  to  seize  an  unseizable  multi- 
plicity, and  which  is  as  we  will,  the  form  of  nature  or  the 
form  of  thought.  All  these  philosophies  tell  us,  in  their 
different  languages,  that  science  is  right  to  treat  the  living  as 
the  inert,  and  that  there  is  no  difference  of  value,  no  distinc- 
tion to  be  made  between  the  results  which  intellect  arrives  at 
in  applying  its  categories,  whether  it  rests  on  inert  matter  or 
attecks  life"  (Creative  Evolution,  196,  197). 

*  Creative  Evolution,  p.  357. 
152 


NATURE  OF  CREATIVE  BEING 

God,  Bergson  attacks  a  point  at  which  his  own 
system  is  open  to  criticism,  namely,  where  it 
touches  upon  the  nature  of  the  World-Ground. 
It  is  evident  that  he  recognizes  the  untena- 
bility  of  any  system  which  regards  the  World- 
Ground  as  impersonal.  One  would  hardly  be 
justified  in  criticizing  a  man  for  not  adding  the 
arts  of  the  theologian  to  those  of  the  philoso- 
pher, and  yet  this  element  of  which  he  speaks 
is  of  such  importance  to  an  enduring  meta- 
physics that  it  demands  further  development 
than  he  has  seen  fit  to  give  it.  There  are 
passages  in  the  Creative  Evolution  and  in  the 
Metaphysics  in  which  this  fundamental  appears 
to  have  been  forgotten.  When  we  further  find 
statements  depending  for  their  plausibility  upon 
the  impersonal  standpoint  we  can  of  right 
require  that  the  whole  matter  be  clearly  defined. 
A  case  in  point  will  be  noted  when  we  consider 
the  definition  of  God  as  activity,  change,  and 
with  it  the  statement  that  change  is  original. 
This  definition  is  characterized  by  the  utmost 
vagueness  of  impersonality  and  does  service  by 
reason  of  its  indefiniteness.  The  trouble  comes 
with  the  previous  definitions.  We  have  al- 
ready been  told  that  life  is  the  coming  together 
of  two  independent  streams  of  reality,  matter 
and  spirit.  It  is  clear,  then,  that  we  have  a 
double  meaning  for  the  term  "life,"  and  cannot 
153 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

use  it  as  synonymous  with  the  term  "God," 
or  "activity,"  unless,  in  the  first  place  our  con- 
ception of  God  is  the  impersonal  one,  or,  in  the 
second  place,  we  make  God  dependent  upon 
matter.  If  "God,"  being  synonymous  with 
life,  is  the  result  of  the  intersection  of  the  two 
streams,  it  is  evident  that  were  the  two  streams 
not  to  coincide,  or  were  matter  absent,  there 
would  be  no  God.  The  very  existence  of  God 
becomes  thus  dependent  upon  matter.  If 
matter  were  to  dissolve,  the  Divine  Being  would 
have  to  go  too.  We  find  ourselves  caught 
inextricably  in  the  toils  of  materialism.  Neither 
would  the  result  be  more  happy  if  we  should 
consider  God  in  an  impersonal  way  as  the  pure 
spirit  which  is  continually  opposing  itseK  to 
matter,  out  of  which  opposition  rises  life.  Such 
a  scheme  introduces  that  ceaseless  conflict  of 
dualism  which  makes  God  not  supreme  in  his 
world,  but  only  able  to  carry  on  an  indecisive 
conflict  with  matter  and  with  evil — in  which 
case  we  should  be,  like  Christophorus,  so  beset 
with  the  rival  claims  of  good  and  evil  that  it 
would  behoove  us  to  set  out  in  search  of  another 
and  mightier  God,  one  who  would  be  more 
worthy  of  our  devotion. 

An  added  argument  against  an  impersonal 
character  for  the  Divine  Being  remains  in  the 
fact  that  such  a  Being  would  be  wanting  in  all 
154 


NATURE  OF  CREATIVE  BEING 

moral  characteristics.  This  might  not,  at 
first  glance,  seem  a  serious  matter  for  philos- 
ophy. But  if  we  are  to  assume  that  we  live 
in  a  moral  universe,  or  that  morality  is  a  vital 
element  in  the  interpretation  of  life,  we  shall 
see  that  any  impersonal  assumption  regarding 
God  makes  impossible  the  maintenance  of  a  con- 
sistent doctrine  of  the  World-Ground.  It  is 
quite  true  that  by  ignoring  the  fact  of  personal- 
ity in  the  Creative  Being  we  can  rid  ourselves 
at  a  stroke  of  a  whole  brood  of  troublesome 
questions  that  cluster  about  the  problems  of 
evil  and  error.  But  by  so  doing  we  admit 
other  questions  of  far  graver  import.  In  a 
moral  universe  to  remove  from  the  conception 
of  God  the  presumption  of  all  moral  qualities 
is  to  get  rid  of  the  conception  of  God  and  to 
leave  all  to  a  blind,  unthinking  demiurge. 
We  shall  have  lost  our  metaphysical  loaf  of 
bread,  and  in  its  place  shall  have  been  given  a 
stone,  for,  after  all,  the  highest  distinction  in 
man  is  not  intelligence — though  many  would 
have  it  that  way — but  morality.  Evidences 
abound  that  man  does  not  rise  to  the  supreme 
heights  of  his  nature,  the  climax  of  his  being, 
until  he  has  morally  attained.  If  moral  achieve- 
ment is  the  highest  point  of  life  in  man,  it  is 
inconceivable  that  the  Creative  Life  itself  from 
which  all  life  flows  should  be  so  much  less  than 
155 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

its  creation  as  to  be  without  all  moral  qualities. 
If  there  be  no  morality  in  God,  then  man  be- 
comes the  highest  God  we  know,  a  creator 
beside  whom  a  mere  demiurge,  vital  "elan," 
or  what  not,  becomes  relatively  unimportant 
and  outclassed.  The  greatest  creations  which 
the  world  has  to  show  are  not  those  of  blind 
forces,  but  of  moral,  spiritual,  and  aesthetic 
excellence,  than  which  nothing  earthly  can  be 
greater. 

The  Meaning  of  Duration  and  Change 
IN  THE  Creative  Being 

Perhaps  the  need  for  definition  of  the  relation 
of  the  supreme  creative  activity  to  a  changing 
world  has  already  been  made  sufficiently  clear. 
But  let  us  inquire  into  the  necessary  character 
of  that  relationship. 

We  have  seen  how  great  a  place  Bergson 
makes  for  his  doctrine  of  duration  as  the  founda- 
tion stone  of  freedom.  If  there  is  to  be  freedom 
in  the  original  creative  process,  it  is  evident 
that  there  must  be  duration  there  also.  In- 
asmuch as  there  cannot  be  duration  in  things 
in  the  sense  of  creative  freedom,  it  follows  that 
we  must  posit  duration  in  the  Creative  Being, 
or  God.  If,  now,  change  is  original,  and  the 
"elan  vitale"  is  the  continuously  acting  "push" 
on  which  all  life  depends,  it  is  obvious  that, 
156 


NATURE  OF  CREATIVE  BEING 

whatever  we  name  it,  it  must  include  a  back- 
lying,  intelligent  purpose.  The  reason  for  this 
is  that  neither  change  nor  impulse  can  continue 
to  exist  and  to  act  as  an  abstraction.  Is  change 
a  law?  Then  it  must  spring  from  the  unwritten 
constitution  of  the  forces  of  nature,  and  there 
must  lie  back  of  them  some  force  sufficient  to 
do  the  in-writing.  Otherwise  these  multi- 
plied forces  and  atoms  must  themselves  contain 
the  purpose,  in  which  the  wonder  is  their  unity 
and  cooperation  in  a  pluralistic  world.  Or  do 
we  have  in  the  "elan"  simply  an  original  impulse? 
Then  we  must  account  for  its  continuance  as 
such.  In  order  to  have  it  hold  for  the  present 
it  must  have  been  not  a  single  impulse,  but  a 
continuous  succession  of  impulses.  If  we  are  to 
hold  to  the  continued  identity  of  the  original 
impulse,  we  simply  reerect  the  materialistic 
system  of  necessity.  "Vital  impulse"  cannot 
possess  duration  in  the  sense  in  which  Bergson 
intends  that  we  shall  understand  it,  unless  it 
possesses  consciousness,  and,  in  the  moment  of 
action  at  least,  intelligent  purpose.  Thus,  if 
we  affirm  "change"  or  "vital  impulse"  as  origi- 
nal, we  are  driven  to  go  behind  them  to  that 
intelligent  and  enduring  unity  which  abides 
through  all  processes  of  change.  Just  as  in  the 
human  example  of  duration,  there  can  be  no 
"pure"  duration,  apart  from  the  self-identi- 
157 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

fying  personality,  so  also  it  is  impossible  to 
affirm  duration  in  the  "elan"  without  similar 
assumptions  of  selfconsciousness. 

Must  we,  then,  affirm  change  in  the  Divine 
Being?  It  is  evident  that  we  must  do  so  or 
else  break  completely  with  the  philosophy  of 
change.  This  is  where  many  an  earnest  soul 
and  many  a  clear  thinker  will  find  it  impossible 
to  remain  longer  in  Bergson's  following.  Never- 
theless, before  making  the  final  break,  it  may 
not  be  unprofitable  to  inquire  how  far  the 
necessities  of  the  system  demand  us  to  insist 
upon  change  as  one  of  the  divine  attributes. 

One  thing  is  clear:  that  if  this  philosophy 
requires  absolute  change  in  the  Divine  Being, 
it  must  break  of  its  own  weight.  Every  philos- 
ophy of  change,  if  it  is  to  account  for  progress 
and  assume  the  truth  of  evolution,  must  for 
the  sake  of  its  own  salvation  assume  somewhere 
a  self-identity,  abiding  above  change,  in  order 
to  make  possible  any  assertion  of  progress  what- 
ever. The  successive  states  of  change  cannot 
themselves  be  aware  of  succession  unless  they 
contain  some  element  of  identity  that  survives 
the  change.  It  is  evident  that  a  mere  vital 
"elan"  which  changes  altogether  from  moment 
to  moment  could  in  no  sense  be  said  to  endure, 
nor  continuously  to  repeat  itself  according  to 
Bergson's  law  of  duration  as  applied  to  things. 
158 


NATURE  OF  CREATIVE  BEING 

A  vital  "elan,"  original  change,  or  formidable 
thrust,  which  is  to  account  for  the  continuance 
and  ongoing  of  the  world  and  yet  escape  both 
the  mechanism  of  materialism  and  the  deter- 
minism of  idealism,  cannot  be  held  as  altogether 
subject  to  change. 

This  view  of  change  involves  also  the  doctrine 
of  duration  as  applied  to  finite  personalities.  Any 
view  of  change  which  overlooks  the  enduring 
element  in  personality  defeats  its  own  object. 
It  is  this  abiding  self-identity  which  makes 
possible  the  summoning  of  all  the  past  to  bear 
its  weight  upon  the  decision  of  the  present 
moment,  and  which  has  a  mind  to  what  its 
existence  may  be  in  the  moments  to  follow. 
This  self-identity  lies  at  the  heart  of  the  problem 
of  freedom.  Without  it  both  freedom  and 
personality  are  meaningless. 

We  have  seen  how,  in  order  to  hold  to  the 
reality  of  human  personality,  we  must  aflSrm  in 
it  an  abiding  element  not  subject  to  change. 
However  subject  to  change  it  may  be,  it  cannot 
be  held  to  change  through  and  through.  Its 
existence  as  personality  is  due  to  the  unchanging 
elements  in  it,  its  triumph  over  time,  its  survival 
of  successive  states  of  consciousness,  in  a  world 
of  change.  In  the  same  manner,  any  God, 
"vitale  elan,"  duration,  or  push  which  did  not 
consciously  survive  the  succession  of  its  states 
159 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

could  in  no  sense  creatively  account  for  the  on- 
going of  the  world.  If  we  are  to  follow  the 
philosophy  of  change,  what  ideas  of  God  might 
be  consistently  allowed  or  retained ! 

It  will  pay  to  tread  softly  and  to  walk  humbly 
at  this  point,  realizing  that  the  relation  of  the 
Creative  Being  to  the  spatial  and  temporal 
order  is  the  great  mystery.  We  cannot  start 
into  such  a  problem  with  the  hope  of  solving 
offhand  that  which  has  for  ages  been  the  despair 
of  philosophers.  If  we  think  to  do  it,  we  shall 
but  give  another  exhibition  of  that  vanity 
which  goes  before  a  fall.  It  may  be  permissible, 
however,  to  offer  some  suggestions  that  will 
make  our  position  more  endurable,  and  which 
may  indicate  the  possible  directions  of  the  solu- 
tion of  the  problem  raised  by  the  thought  of  the 
relation  of  God  to  a  changing  world. 

It  will  appear  at  the  very  beginning  impos- 
sible to  describe  the  multitude  of  acts,  dispo- 
sitions, moods,  choices,  and  tempers  of  the  most 
earthly  of  human  beings,  except  in  the  most 
general  terms.  We  may  call  him  rich,  or  happy, 
and  these  may  be  predominating  characteristics 
of  his  life.  But  in  most  lives  these  would  be 
found  to  be  relative  terms,  which  do  not  shut 
out  the  possibility  of  moments  of  sorrow,  nor 
make  unnecessary  the  definition.  We  do  not 
know  much  about  the  individual  until  we 
160 


NATURE  OF  CREATIVE  BEING 

know  the  instances  of  his  reaction  upon  Hfe. 
Just  as  it  is  impossible  to  arrive  at  the  estimate 
of  a  living  person  except  in  most  general  terms, 
so  likewise  it  will  surely  be  not  less  difficult  to 
speak  of  a  Divine  Personality  except  in  the  most 
general  way. 

First  of  all,  if  the  idea  of  God  is  to  retain  any 
meaning,  it  must  include  as  a  foremost  affir- 
mation the  abiding  unity  of  self-consciousness. 
This  is  the  heart  of  what  the  Christian  means 
when  he  declares  that  God  does  not  change, 
but  abides  the  same  yesterday,  to-day,  and 
forever.  If  we  cannot  hold  to  this,  we  cannot 
retain  the  idea  of  God  in  any  vital  way.  The 
changelessness  of  the  divine  self-identity  is  the 
bed  rock  of  any  true  conception  of  the  divine. 
Any  Being  which  cannot  erect  itself  above  the 
flux  of  succession  and  change  would  become 
only  an  element  in  the  process,  destined  to  pass 
away.  Any  system  which  fails  to  note  this  fact 
of  identity  in  change  is  destined  to  confusion. 
As  previously  noted,  "duration,"  in  the  sense 
in  which  Bergson  uses  that  term,  would  be 
possible  only  to  such  self-conscious  and  abiding 
Being.  Perfect  self-consciousness  would  then 
be  the  foremost  affirmation  concerning  the 
Divine  Being  that  we  would  need  to  make. 
But  this  affirmation  instead  of  being  contrary 
to  a  tenable  philosophy  of  change,  would  be 
161 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

necessary  to  it  if  we  are  to  assume  the  possibility 
of  evolution  or  progress.  If  the  philosophy  of 
change  denies  this,  it  denies  the  foundations 
of  its  own  theories,  because  change  which 
changes  everything  completely  cannot  be  con- 
scious of  change.  The  affirmation  of  change  is 
impossible  unless  something  is  assumed  to  abide. 
In  the  second  place,  if  we  are  to  move  out 
from  analogies  in  finite  personal  experience 
we  find  that  it  is  possible  not  only  for  a  finite 
self-consciousness  to  survive  the  flux  of  time 
and  change,  but  that  it  is  possible  for  it  to 
retain  certain  fundamentals  of  moral  and 
spiritual  purpose  unchanged  by  the  lapse  of 
time.  The  love  of  a  mother  is  not  of  a  different 
nature,  nor  is  it  less  perfect  when  her  child  is  a 
babe  than  when  he  is  a  grown-up  man.  The 
content  of  her  love  may  be  richer  through 
experience;  change  has  entered  into  it,  and  yet 
it  has  continued  changeless.  So  also  it  may 
be  with  other  moral  and  spiritual  qualities. 
A  man  may  be  perfectly  honest  to-day,  and  yet 
in  the  breadth  of  its  exercise  that  term  may 
to-morrow  imply  in  his  case  a  much  richer 
content  of  experience.  The  honesty  of  to-day 
may  never  have  had  opportunities  of  deep 
testing,  while  to-morrow  he  will  have  come  to 
the  setting  of  the  sun  equally  honest  but  mean- 
time tried  by  the  hot  fires  of  experience.     Yet 

162 


NATURE  OF  CREATIVE  BEING 

he  cannot  be  said  to  be  less  honest  at  one  time 
than  at  the  other.  To  be  honest  or  faithful 
in  a  few  things  (if  they  be  all  that  is  given) 
does  not  differ  in  perfection  from  being  honest 
or  faithful  in  many  things.  If  we  think  of  God 
as  a  living,  conscious  Being,  it  might  be  that 
the  divine  perfection  is  of  some  such  order, 
forever  perfect  in  self-consciousness,  in  moral 
purpose  and  attainment,  and  yet  possessing  a 
constantly  enriching  experience  through  the 
contribution  of  the  temporal  order. 

God  must  find  new  occasion  for  the  exercise 
of  his  faculties  in  the  ongoing  of  the  world  if 
you  and  I  as  individuals  are  to  mean  anything 
particular  or  personal  to  him. 

The  voices  of  two  parties  are  sure  to  be  heard 
at  this  point,  and  we  must  turn  aside  to  listen 
to  that  which  they  have  to  say.  One  will 
protest  that  such  a  God  could  not  be  a  changing 
God.  The  other  will  say  that  such  a  God 
becomes  subject  to  the  temporal  order,  and 
therefore  is  no  God. 

The  difficulties  in  answering  these  two  objec- 
tions are  very  great  and  may  indeed  be  insur- 
mountable. Nevertheless,  let  us  go  on  in  our 
reflection  as  far  as  we  can. 

The  first  party  must  be  warned  to  retrace 
his  steps  a  little  in  order  to  consider  the  following 
facts:  that  the  only  example  of  identity  in 
163 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISK 

change  of  which  we  know  anything  is  in  self- 
conscious  personahty;  that  in  the  human  per- 
sonaHty  we  do  have  a  first-hand  example  of  the 
possibility  of  identity  in  change,  both  changing 
and  transcending  change.  If,  therefore,  we 
are  to  have  anything  but  unmeaning  and  unin- 
telligible flux  which  bears  away  upon  its  surface 
all  identity  and  all  permanence,  we  must  posit 
a  Creative  Being  or  Process  with  at  least  that 
amount  of  identity  and  permanence. 

The  second  party  presents  the  greater  prob- 
lem. In  our  theistic  thinking  we  first  of  all 
demand  a  God  who  cannot  be  made  by  his 
world,  and  we  know  this  to  be  a  fundamental 
necessity.  Some  have  gone  farther  and  demand 
a  God  whose  life  is  not  influenced  by  his  creation, 
or  whose  creation  is  no  part  of  his  life.  The 
first  half  of  this  demand  is  important  and 
needful,  for  otherwise  God  becomes  subject  to 
his  world,  and  the  "go"  of  all  things  is  nothing 
better  than  senseless  matter.  That  way  we 
cannot  escape  a  gross  materialism  and  an  event- 
ual skepticism. 

The  second  half  of  this  demand  compels 
further  study.  If  God  is  to  be  held  to  take  an 
interest  in  the  moral  affairs  of  man,  if  there  is 
truth  in  the  doctrine  of  a  human  incarnation 
of  God  in  the  person  of  Jesus  Christ,  if  the 
moral  and  spiritual  achievements  of  man  are 
164 


NATURE  OF  CREATIVE  BEING 

to  be  felt  by  the  Divine  Life  so  that  they  are 
of  any  real  moment  to  him,  then  he  must  be 
something  more  than  an  eternally  static  God, 
self-contained  and  self-contemplative.  If  it  be 
true  that  the  Divine  does  note  the  fall  of  a  spar- 
row, there  must  be  avenues  of  sympathy  and 
contingency  which  would  make  the  conduct 
of  the  world  a  thing  of  vital  interest.  The 
burden  of  proof  is  certainly  upon  this  second 
party  to  maintain  what  would  be  the  meaning 
of  human  life  to  an  absolutely  changeless 
Absolute,  to  whom  there  is  no  contingency  of 
human  action  but  only  an  eternal  now.  It  will 
be  found  that  if  we  decide  to  grant  the  claim 
of  the  second  party  to  this  controversy  we  shall 
have  to  deny  that  any  real  relation  exists 
between  God  and  his  world,  and  that  an  incar- 
nation is  no  more  than  a  play  of  words,  a  dumb 
drama  set  upon  the  stage  of  life,  but  without 
vital  meaning.  If  we  are  to  keep  to  a  God  to 
whom  this  changing  world  is  of  living  interest 
he  must  be  a  God  whose  experience  is  taking  on 
ever-growing  and  enriching  content  from  his 
experiences  with  his  creation,  and  at  the  same 
time  he  must  be  held  as  changeless  in  his  moral 
perfection  and  purpose. 

But  another  question  even  more  troublesome 
than  this  confronts  us,  which  is  the  possibility 
of  any  real  relation  of  the  Divine  Being  to  the 
165 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

temporal  order.  If  we  could  settle  this,  the 
previous  questions  would  vanish  of  themselves. 
Here  we  must  be  satisfied  to  walk  rather  by 
faith  than  by  sight,  because  in  matters  relating 
to  the  Divine  Personality  it  is  unreasonable  to 
expect  fullness  of  understanding,  and  we  must 
be  content  to  abide  by  some  darkness  of  mys- 
tery. Just  what  may  be  the  relation  of  the 
Divine  Being  to  the  temporal  order,  who  can 
announce  himself  competent  to  declare?  It 
appears,  however,  that  the  creation  is  subject 
to  a  time  order  and  something  of  what  that 
order  means  to  us  we  can  tell.  What  it  would 
mean  to  him  we  have  no  means  of  knowing. 
If,  however,  he  is  thought  of  as  transcending 
the  order  of  time,  the  questions  that  have 
vexed  us  in  regard  to  the  content  of  the  divine 
experience  would  vanish.  The  problem  of  a 
growing  or  changing  God  would  then  be  seen 
to  hinge  upon  the  meaning  and  reality  of  this 
time  experience.  It  has  meaning  for  us;  we 
believe  that  it  must  have  some  meaning  for  him, 
because  it  is  a  part  of  his  order,  but  we  are 
unable  to  declare  just  what  the  meaning  of 
time  might  be  to  an  Infinite  Being.  If  we  fall 
exhausted  on  the  altar  stairs  of  such  reflections, 
it  is  because  we  have  reached  the  point  where 
reflection  must  give  way  to  faith. 

The  problem  of  the  transcendence  of  time 
166 


NATURE  OF  CREATIVE  BEING 

may  become  less  harassing  if  we  turn  our  atten- 
tion to  the  fact  of  the  practical  transcendence 
of  time  to  be  witnessed  in  the  creative  action 
of  finite  personality.  The  individual,  it  is 
true,  is  not  freed  from  obedience  to  the  temporal 
order,  but  in  all  purposive  and  creative  action 
he  must  rise  measurably  above  the  temporal 
order.  Just  as  abiding  self -identity  is  necessary 
to  give  consciousness  of  change,  so  the  timeless 
element  in  personality  is  necessary  to  give 
consciousness  of  succession.  By  reason  of  this 
transcendence  the  person  is  enabled  to  gather 
his  past  into  the  moment  of  action,  and  to 
foresee  the  result  of  his  willing.  In  a  very 
real  sense  his  act  is  timeless,  or  time  transcend- 
ing, for  past,  present,  and  future  are  seen  as 
one.  In  so  far  also  as  the  individual  acts 
upon  that  which  is  out  of  sight,  as  a  state  or 
condition  across  seas,  or  at  the  receiving  end 
of  a  wireless  station,  he  is  transcending  the 
spatial  order  as  well.  We  have,  then,  in  finite 
personality  an  example  in  limited  scale  of  a 
time  and  space-transcending  being,  acting  after 
a  temporal  and  spatial  order.  This  furnishes 
a  suggestion — though  it  is  not  more  than  a  sug- 
gestion— of  the  possibility  of  a  Creative  Being, 
who,  timeless  and  spaceless,^  in  the  sense  of  not 


*  Bosanquet,   The  Principle  of  Individuality  and  Value, 
pp.  394,  395. 

167 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

being  dependent  upon  the  temporal  and  spatial 
order,  for  either  self -identity  or  moral  perfection, 
might  find  a  reality,  a  purpose  and  a  pleasure 
in  the  creations  of  such  an  order.  Especially 
might  this  hold  true  if  space  and  time  were 
necessary  to  such  individual  self-consciousness 
as  is  demanded  for  the  creation  of  moral  and 
spiritual  beings  of  his  own  order. 

It  is  plain  that,  however  much  of  pain  there 
may  have  been  in  the  process,  some  definition 
of  God  that  will  leave  him  something  else  than 
forever  static,  forever  self-contained,  at  infinite 
remove  from  the  actualities  of  his  world,  is 
necessary  to  a  very  living  and  practical  belief 
in  him.  We  might  by  psychological  analysis 
determine  the  general  terms  under  which  to 
describe  God.  We  might  decide  on  these  neces- 
sary general  attributes,  and  yet  it  is  apparent 
that  we  should  be  no  farther  toward  the  posses- 
sion of  him  in  fact.  For  he  must  be  held  as 
something  more  than  a  succession  or  even  a 
combination  of  psychical  states  if  he  is  to  be 
thought  of  as  possessing  personality,  or  entering 
with  any  reality  into  our  earthly  and  changing 
lives. 

The  conception  presented  here  may  when 

developed    be    not    altogether   inadequate   for 

faith,  because  out  demand  for  changelessness 

in  the  Divine  Being  depends,  not  upon  a  hving 

168 


NATURE  OF  CREATIVE  BEING 

experience  in  him,  but,  rather,  in  those  moral 
verities  that  do  not  pass  nor  change.  At  this 
point  such  a  demand  is  just,  for  a  God  whose 
purpose,  whose  morahty,  or  whose  self-identity 
was  subject  to  change  would  be  entirely  in- 
adequate for  the  religious  needs  of  men. 

The  philosophy  of  change  has  not,  however, 
cleared  our  way  to  this  happy  conclusion  and 
never  can  so  long  as  it  erects  change,  the  process, 
into  the  place  which  can  rightly  be  taken  only 
by  creative  personality,  the  Ground  of  all 
Being. 

A  True  World-Ground  Must  be  Self- 
Creative 

It  should  have  been  made  clear  by  the  fore- 
going discussion  that  if  we  are  to  apply  the 
doctrine  of  duration  to  the  world  outside  the 
narrow  limits  of  human  action,  we  must  think 
of  the  Divine  Being  or  "vital"  impulse  as  self- 
creative.  Unless  we  do  so  we  become  involved 
in  the  infinite  regress  of  the  mechanist  and  there 
is  no  place  to  stop  short  of  the  shadowy  vague- 
ness of  the  Unknowable.  This  might  not  be  so 
dire  a  catastrophe  if  we  could  comfortably  rest 
in  such  a  skepticism.  Even  if  we  were  to 
assume  an  Unknowable,  it  would  become 
necessary  for  us,  as  it  was  for  Spencer,  to  bring 
forward  abundant  assertions  of  knowledge  to 
169 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

meet  the  simplest  explanations  of  metaphysics. 
Arguing  on  the  empirical  plane  of  cause  and 
effect,  it  will  appear  impossible  to  understand 
the  possibility  of  self-creation  in  God  or  in 
anything  else.  At  any  rate,  we  could  suffer  no 
more  distressing  fate  at  the  hands  of  any  theory 
than  that  which  has  come  upon  us  by  following 
the  ways  of  empiricism. 

Bergson  was  very  conscious  of  this  fact  when 
he  criticized  the  Spencerian  method  of  cutting 
reality  up  into  little  bits  like  the  parts  of  a 
picture  puzzle,  in  order  that  one  might  have  the 
pleasure  of  setting  them  together  again  in  their 
due  order  and  then  fondly  dreaming  that  he  had 
accounted  for  all  progress.  But  if  the  idea  of 
self -creativity  be  difficult  here,  let  us  go  again 
to  the  one  immediate  example  of  creative 
activity  which  we  have  in  human  personality. 
We  find  the  individual  not  only  producing 
that  which  cannot  be  accounted  for  on  any 
rigid  system  of  material  cause  and  effect,  but 
we  find  that  in  such  creative  activity  he  is 
bringing  into  being  new  powers  within  himself. 
It  is  possible  for  a  man,  acting  in  line  with  pre- 
conceived purpose,  to  increase  mental  and  phy- 
sical powers  so  that  he  does  actually  become  a 
new  man  in  relation  to  his  world.  The  exercise 
of  his  creative  activity  not  only  brings  to  pass 
new  things  in  the  world  around  him;  there  is  a 
170 


NATURE  OF  CREATIVE  BEING 

sense  in  which  the  greater  and  more  mysterious 
result  is  not  without  him  but  within.  This 
power  is  the  peculiar  possession  of  personality. 
If,  then,  we  can  find  a  real  sense  in  which  human 
personality  is  self-creative,  it  is  not  so  difiicult 
to  see  that  the  Creative  Being  might  through 
the  very  changes  which  he  brings  to  pass  in  a 
changing  world  be  realizing  his  own  personality. 
He  might  be  creating  himself  endlessly  and  yet 
transcending  that  world  of  change  through 
which  he  realizes  himself.  In  such  a  case  it 
might  appear  that  a  changing  world  is  necessary 
to  a  conception  of  a  living,  self-realizing  God. 
Instead  of  needing  to  affirm  a  God  of  Change, 
in  order  to  meet  the  serious  problems  of  meta- 
physics, we  really  need  no  more  radical  affir- 
mation than  that  of  the  ancient  Hebrews  who 
conceived  of  God  as  a  living  God.  The  more 
we  analyze  this  conception  of  a  living  God  the 
more  are  we  likely  to  be  impressed  with  its 
adequateness  and  satisfactoriness.  Reflection 
as  well  as  revelation  may  show,  too,  that  such  a 
living  and  self-realizing  God  is  necessary  as  a 
fundamental  assumption  of  any  philosophy  of 
change  that  shall  be  able  to  survive. 

Such  a  conclusion  would  be  of  a  startling  and 
profound  importance  in  the  bearing  it  would 
have  upon  the  possibility  of  a  Divine  incarna- 
tion.    It  would  go  far  toward  revolutionizing 
171 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

many  current  theories  regarding  the  relation 
of  God  to  the  world.  We  trust  that  some 
future  day  or  some  future  work  may  see  this 
truth  scientifically  drawn  out  and  developed. 
It  might  then  be  seen  that  the  idea  of  a  growing 
God,  instead  of  being  repugnant  to  the  religious 
sense,  might  become  the  greatest  aid  to  faith 
and  theism.  It  might  be  seen  that  the  richness 
and  content  of  the  divine  life  demands  for  its 
increase  and  fulfillment  a  revelation  and  a 
realization  of  its  relationship  to  its  creation 
which  could  be  expressed  only  in  an  incarna- 
tion. Thus  might  be  abolished  at  a  stroke 
objections  to  the  incarnation  which  on  the  old 
basis  are  difficult  of  solution. 

If  we  stop  to  consider  the  commonly  assigned 
attributes  of  the  Divine  Being,  we  shall  find 
them  falling  into  two  general  groups.  The 
first  are  those  that  spring  out  of  moral  character, 
and  the  second  are  those  that  spring  out  of  the 
relation  of  an  Infinite  God  to  a  temporal  and 
spatial  world.  It  is  unnecessary  to  do  more 
than  briefly  mention  them.  In  the  first  group 
are  the  metaphysical  and  moral  qualities, 
first  cause,  holiness,  personality.  In  the  second 
group  are  omnipresence,  omniscience,  and  omnip- 
otence, which  wholly  concern  the  relation  which 
God  must  bear  to  the  temporal  and  spatial 
order.  They  are,  in  short,  the  necessary 
17^ 


NATURE  OF  CREATIVE  BEING 

affirmations  that  a  man  must  make  that  his 
God  is  not  subject  to  the  spatial  and  temporal 
relations  to  which  he  finds  himself  subject, 
that  he  is  a  time- transcending  Being  who  exer- 
cises power  and  knowledge,  free  from  the 
limitations  of  human  beings.  If  we  are  to 
press  these  general  terms  as  if  they  themselves 
represent  the  fullness  of  the  Divine  character, 
we  shall  be  as  wrong  in  our  estimate  of  God 
as  the  functional  psychologists  are  in  their 
estimate  of  man.  We  cannot  possibly  by  pro- 
ducing these  terms  produce  the  Divine  Person- 
ality. These  are  but  the  beggarly  definitions 
by  which  we  attempt  to  set  off  and  visualize 
for  human  understanding  that  which  is  invisible 
and  unthinkable.  For  that  very  reason  we 
should  hold  more  to  the  fundamental  moral 
qualities  without  which  God  is  unthinkable.  It 
may  be  found  in  the  end  sufficient  for  faith  if  we 
hold  to  the  fact  of  his  moral  personality,  his 
continuous  and  self-creative  power  by  which 
he  is  realizing  himself  in  some  manner  through 
the  change  and  progress  of  the  world  of  men 
and  things. 


173 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  FRAGILE  FLOWER  OF  HUMAN 
PERSONALITY 

The  Impossibility  of  an  Impersonal 
Freedom 
H.  WiLDON  Carr,  one  of  the  most  sympa- 
thetic and  clear-visioned  exponents  of  the 
philosophy  of  change,  closes  a  chapter  entitled 
"God,  Freedom,  and  Immortality"  with  the 
statement  that  so  far  as  the  question  of  per- 
sonality in  God,  which  is  no  affair  of  philosophy, 
is  concerned,  the  system  has  no  contribution  to 
make;  and  that  as  to  what  lies  beyond  us  in  the 
unseen  world  it  has  no  clear  and  confident 
note,  but  that  it  is  reassuring  on  the  supreme 
value,  which  is  freedom.  This  result  will 
hardly  prove  satisfying,  because  if  metaphysics 
can  find  no  ground  for  personality,  for  that 
unique  creative  power  which  is  manifested  in 
personality,  about  which  the  philosophy  of 
change  is  so  largely  written,  unless  the  ultimate 
creative  activity  is  endowed  with  self-creative 
powers,  we  have  only  taken  another  turn  at 
the  weary  treadmill  of  dialectic.  It  is  because 
the  philosophy  of  change  does  not  end  at  this 
174 


HUMAN  PERSONALITY 

point  that  it  gives  encouragement  to  think  that 
another  great  step  has  been  taken  in  philosophy. 
In  so  far  as  we  are  given  the  means  to  escape 
this  ignoble  result,  so  far  does  the  philosophy 
of  change  achieve  success.  For  it  is  readily 
seen  that,  apart  from  personality,  freedom  can 
possess  no  meaning.  In  order  to  lift  itself  above 
the  drift  of  atoms,  and  to  become  anything 
more  than  meaningless  and  accidental  concur- 
rence of  atoms  which  possess  no  power  of  self- 
direction,  freedom  must  have  both  a  forward 
and  a  backward  look,  and  be  the  result  of  intel- 
ligent choice.  Otherwise  things,  persons,  and 
events  are  the  mere  play  of  driving  forces 
behind  and  around  them,  absolutely  predeter- 
mined. Intelligent  choice  is  a  necessary  ele- 
ment in  all  freedom,  and  freedom  cannot  be 
maintained  nor  made  intelligible  without  it. 
The  minute  we  assume  impersonality  in  the 
ground  of  being,  that  minute  we  deny  any 
freedom  outside  of  human  action,  and  the 
freedom  that  we  posit  in  the  material  world 
becomes  but  the  phantom  and  shadow  cast 
by  the  human  mind.  Thus  it  will  appear  that 
when  Carr  admits  that  the  philosophy  of  change 
has  nothing  to  give  us  at  this  point  he  is  indi- 
cating the  element  of  greatest  weakness  in  the 
system.  If  personality  cannot  be  metaphy- 
sically maintained  in  conjunction  with  the 
175 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

common  postulates  of  the  philosophy  of  change, 
the  system  must  be  allowed  to  negate  itself. 

Bergson's  Definition  of  Personality 

It  is  not  at  all  surprising  that  so  close  a  critic 
has  reached  this  conclusion,  for  in  his  definition 
of  personality  Bergson  has  at  no  point  appeared 
to  strive  for  exactness.  In  the  early  pages  of 
Matter  and  Memory  it  is  assumed  that  person- 
ality is  identical  with  "my  body,"  which  is  a 
center  of  action,  one  in  the  midst  of  the  many 
images  that  make  up  the  material  world. ^ 

In  this  shifting  of  the  center  of  interest  from 
"image  among  other  images"  to  "my  body," 
and  in  the  undiscriminating  reference  to  the 
personality,  as  "image"  and  as  "body"  belong- 
ing to  "me,"  he  has  opened  a  whole  world  of 
misunderstanding  in  regard  to  the  meaning  of 
personality.  The  point  may  be  raised  that  the 
meaning  of  personality  is  one  of  the  darkest  of 
all  mysteries,  and  it  must  be  admitted  that 
such  is  the  fact.     Nevertheless,  if  we  can  pre- 

1  "My  body  is  then,  in  the  aggregate  of  the  material  world, 
an  image  which  acts  like  other  images,  receiving  and  giving 
back  movement,  with  perhaps  this  difference  only,  that  my 
body  appears  to  choose  within  certain  limits  the  manner  in 
which  it  shall  restore  what  it  receives.  .  .  .  My  body,  an  object 
destined  to  move  other  objects,  is,  then,  a  center  of  action;  it 
cannot  give  birth  to  a  representation"  (Matter  and  Memory,  pp. 
4.   6). 

176 


HUMAN  PERSONALITY 

serve  a  greater  measure  of  clearness  by  keeping 
to  well-defined  terms,  we  shall  have  made 
advance  over  a  method  which  hides  inconsis- 
tencies under  a  shuffling  of  words  not  synony- 
mous. In  the  above  reference  we  have  the 
personality  referred  to  as  an  "image,"  a  "body," 
an  "object,"  and  an  "I."  It  is  exactly  this 
indefiniteness  which  puts  an  unendurable  burden 
on  clear  thinking.  In  fact,  the  whole  realm  of 
metaphysics  is  involved  in  the  assumptions  of 
this  seemingly  innocent  paragraph.  Questions 
will  arise  whether  the  self  is  more  than  an 
"image";  what  are  the  possible  implications 
arising  out  of  the  definitions  of  the  world 
as  an  "aggregate  of  images"  of  which  the 
personality  is  one.  The  basic  meaning  of  the 
word  "image"  gives  us  an  indefiniteness  sug- 
gestive of  phenomenality  and  subjectiveness. 
Or,  if  we  are  to  prefer  the  terms  "body"  and 
"object"  as  the  sources  of  unique  personal 
energy,  we  must  ask  whether  the  motions 
originate  in  the  muscular  portions  of  the  body, 
whether  decisions  are  made  by  the  lobes  of  the 
brain,  or  whether  behind  all  there  is  a  regnant 
spirit  of  which  the  body  is  but  the  tool  or 
instrument  of  action.  If  the  former  be  true, 
we  are  landed  in  a  materialism  from  which  not 
all  the  king's  horses  and  all  the  king's  men  can 
rescue  us.  If  the  latter  be  true,  it  is  not  ade- 
177 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

quate  to  speak  of  my  body,  which  is  only  the 
seat  of  my  personahty,  as  if  it  were  "I."  To 
do  so  is  to  confuse  the  carpenter  with  his  plane, 
or  the  artist  with  his  brush,  or  the  engineer 
with  his  engine.  True  it  is  that  the  dullness  or 
perfection  of  these  instruments  will  make  pro- 
found difference  with  the  work  accomplished. 
They  may  have  a  reflex  action  on  the  creative- 
ness  of  spirit  in  him  who  uses  them,  but  none 
but  the  stupid  would  dream  that  he  could 
insert  the  terms  "plane,"  "brush,"  and  "engine" 
indifferently  as  exact  synonyms  for  "carpenter," 
"artist,"  and  "engineer."  If  some  one  objects 
that  in  the  matter  of  personality  this  is  insisting 
upon  an  exactness  which  in  the  nature  of  the 
case  is  impossible,  we  should  reply  that  a 
mystery  assumed  as  such  is  quite  endurable 
and  often  necessary,  but  that  a  mystery  which 
makes  pretension  to  scientific  analysis  and  intel- 
ligibility under  equivocal  terms  is  impossible. 
Nor  is  Bergson  more  clear  in  his  description 
of  the  self -identifying  unity  of  personality. 
Here  the  unity  would  seem  to  be  altogether  a 
matter  of  mental  concentration.  He  declares 
that  two  views  are  possible  regarding  the  unity 
or  manifoldness  of  personality.  If  I  declare 
self -consciousness  one,  many  inner  voices,  sensa- 
tions, feelings,  and  ideas  protest.  If  I  declare 
it  manifold,  my  own  consciousness  rebels, 
178 


HUMAN  PERSONALITY 

saying  that  these  sensations,  feelings,  and  ideas 
are  but  effects  or  states  of  the  undivided  self. 
In  fact,  the  manifoldness  is  the  effect  of  the 
impact  of  the  self  on  life.^ 

The  point  that  seems  to  escape  us  in  this 


2  "Is  my  own  person,  at  a  given  moment,  one  or  manifold? 
If  I  declare  it  one,  inner  voices  arise  and  protest — those  of  the 
sensations,  feeling,  ideas  among  which  my  individuality  is 
distributed.  But,  if  I  make  it  distinctly  manifold,  my 
consciousness  rebels  quite  as  strongly;  it  affirms  that  my 
sensations,  my  feeling,  my  thoughts,  are  abstractions,  which 
I  effect  on  my  self,  and  that  each  of  my  states  implies  all  the 
others.  I  am  then  (all  must  adopt  the  language  of  under- 
standing, since  only  the  understanding  has  a  language)  as 
unity  that  is  multiple  and  a  multiplicity  that  is  one;  but  unity 
and  multiplicity  are  only  views  of  my  personality  taken  by 
an  understanding  that  directs  its  categories  at  me;  I  enter 
neither  into  the  one  nor  into  the  other,  nor  into  both  at  once, 
although  both,  united,  may  give  a  fair  imitation  of  mutual 
interpenetration  and  continuity  that  I  find  at  the  base  of  my 
own  self.  Such  is  my  inner  life,  and  such  also  is  life  in  general. 
While,  in  its  contact  with  matter,  life  is  comparable  to  an 
impulsion  or  an  impetus,  regarded  in  itself,  it  is  an  immensity 
of  potentiality,  a  mutual  encroachment  of  thousands  and 
thousands  of  tendencies,  which  nevertheless  are  'thousands 
and  thousands'  only  when  once  regarded  as  outside  of  each 
other,  that  is,  when  spatialized.  Contact  with  matter  is 
what  determines  this  dissociation.  Matter  divides  actually 
what  was  but  potentially  manifold;  and,  in  this  sense,  indi- 
viduation is  in  part  the  work  of  matter,  in  part  the  result  of 
life's  own  inclination.  Thus,  a  distinct  sentiment,  which 
bursts  into  verses,  lines,  and  words,  may  be  said  to  have 
already  contained  this  multiplicity  of  individuated  elements, 
and  yet,  in  fact,  it  is  the  materiality  of  language  that  creates 
it"  (Matter  and  Memory,  pp.  257,  258). 

179 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

discussion  is  the  one  that  is  of  the  most  import- 
ance. While  we  are  analyzing  the  personality 
as  a  multiplicity  of  states,  sensations,  feelings, 
and  ideas,  the  really  important  party  to  the 
transaction  is  the  indivisible  *'me"  that  does  the 
analyzing.  It  is  always  there,  abiding  above 
and  beyond  all  analysis,  and  forever  refusing 
to  be  caught  up  in  the  multiplicity  of  which  it 
thinks.  It  is  this  unanalyzable  self  that  is 
the  reality,  and  we  must  be  satisfied  to  accept 
this  element  of  personal  realism  and  accept  the 
"self"  at  its  face  value.  That  this  fact  is,  under 
better  auspices,  apparent  to  Bergson  himself 
is  to  be  gleaned  from  his  Introduction  to  Meta- 
physics, in  which  he  represents  personality  as 
both  multiplicity  and  unity.  The  important 
question  for  philosophy  is  to  determine  wherein 
the  uniqueness  of  this  unity  in  multiplicity  lies. 
It  is  something  more  than  a  sum  of  sensations, 
feelings,  and  ideas.^ 

3  "That  personality  as  unity  cannot  be  denied;  but  such 
an  affirmation  teaches  one  nothing  about  the  extraordinary 
nature  of  the  particular  unity  presented  by  personality. 
That  our  self  is  multiple,  I  also  agree,  but  then  it  must  be 
understood  that  it  is  a  multiplicity  which  has  nothing  in 
common  with  any  other  multiplicity.  What  really  is  import- 
ant for  philosophy  is  to  know  exactly  what  unity,  what 
multiplicity,  and  what  reality,  superior  both  to  abstract  unity 
and  multiplicity,  the  multiple  unity  of  the  self  actually  is. 
Now,  philosophy  will  know  this  only  when  it  recovers  pos- 
session of  the  simple  intuition  of  the  self  by  the  self.     Then, 

180 


HUMAN  PERSONALITY 

Inasmuch  as  analysis  cannot  give  us  "anything 
that  at  all  resembles  the  self,"  it  would  seem 
that  the  ultimate  mystery,  behind  which  we 
cannot  go,  is  personality  itself.  The  conscious- 
ness of  personality  seems  to  be  gained  by  simple 
intuition  and  not  by  analysis.  This  interior 
reality  is  something  enduring  through  time  and 
surviving  the  multiplied  states  of  consciousness. 
This  enduring  consciousness  is  memory  with 
something  additional,  for  it  is  conscious  of  the 
present  moment  and  brings  all  the  past  to  the 
point  of  action.^ 


according  to  the  direction  it  chooses  for  its  descent  from  this 
summit,  it  will  arrive  at  unity  or  multiplicity,  or  at  any  one 
of  the  concepts  by  which  we  try  to  define  the  moving  life  of  the 
self.  But  no  mingling  of  these  concepts  would  give  any- 
thing which  at  all  resembles  the  self  that  endures"  (Intro- 
duction to  Metaphysics,  pp.  38,  39). 

*  "There  is  one  reality,  at  least,  which  we  all  seize  from 
within,  by  intuition  and  not  by  simple  analysis.  It  is  our 
own  personality  in  its  flowing  through  time — our  self  which 
endures.  .  .  .  When  I  direct  my  attention  inward  to  contem- 
plate my  own  self  (supposed  for  the  moment  to  be  inactive), 
I  perceive,  at  first,  as  a  crust  solidified  on  the  surface,  all  the 
perceptions  which  come  to  it  from  the  material  world.  .  .  . 
Next,  I  notice  the  memories  which  more  or  less  adhere  to 
these  perceptions,  and  which  serve  to  interpret  them.  These 
memories  have  been  detached,  as  it  were,  from  the  depth  of 
my  personality,  drawn  to  the  surface  by  the  perceptions  that 
resemble  them;  they  rest  on  the  surface  of  my  mind  without 
being  absolutely  myself.  Lastly,  I  feel  the  stir  of  tendencies 
and  motor  habits — a  crowd  of  virtual  actions  more  or  less 
firmly  bound  to  these  perceptions  and  memories.     All  these 

181 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

If  the  impossibility  of  pushing  personahty 
to  the  final  analysis  is  recognized,  it  seems 
hardly  necessary  to  maintain  that  it  is  a  matter 

clearly  defined  elements  appear  more  distinct  from  me,  the  more 
distinct  they  are  from  each  other.  Radiating  as  they  do 
from  within  outward,  they  form,  collectively,  the  surface  of 
a  sphere  which  tends  to  grow  larger  and  lose  itself  in  the 
exterior  world.  But  if  I  draw  myself  in  from  the  periphery 
toward  the  center,  if  I  search  in  the  depths  of  my  being  that 
which  is  not  uniformly,  most  consistently,  and  most  enduringly 
myself,  I  find  an  altogether  different  thing. 

"There  is  beneath  these  sharply  cut  crystals  and  this 
frozen  surface  a  continuous  flux  which  is  not  comparable 
to  any  flux  I  have  ever  seen.  There  is  a  succession  of  states, 
each  of  which  announces  that  which  follows,  and  contains  that 
which  precedes  it  ...  .  This  inner  life  may  be  compared  to  the 
unrolling  of  a  coil,  for  there  is  no  living  being  who  does  not 
feel  himself  coming  gradually  to  the  end  of  the  role;  and  to 
live  is  to  grow  old.  But  it  may  just  as  well  be  compared  to  a 
continual  rolling  up,  like  that  of  a  thread  on  a  ball,  for  our 
past  follows  us,  it  swells  incessantly  with  the  present  which 
it  picks  up  on  its  way;  and  consciousness  means  memory. 

"But  actually,  it  is  neither  an  unrolling  nor  a  rolling  up, 
for  these  two  similes  evoke  the  idea  of  lines  and  surfaces 
whose  parts  are  homogeneous  and  superposable  on  one 
another.  Now,  there  are  no  two  identical  moments  in  the 
life  of  the  same  conscious  being.  Take  the  simplest  sensa- 
tion, suppose  it  constant,  absorb  in  it  the  entire  personality; 
the  consciousness  which  will  accompany  this  sensation  cannot 
remain  identical  with  itself  for  two  consecutive  moments, 
because  the  second  moment  always  contains,  over  and  above 
the  first,  the  memory  that  the  first  has  bequeathed  to  it. 
A  consciousness  which  could  experience  two  identical  moments 
would  be  a  consciousness  without  memory.  It  would  die 
and  be  born  again  continually"  (An  Introduction  to  Meta- 
physics, pp.  11,  13). 

182 


HUMAN  PERSONALITY 

of  degree,  as  Bergson  does  when  he  speaks  of  it 
as  a  complete  organism  more  easily  distinguished 
as  such  than  animals  and  plants.  This  ascend- 
ing ease  of  distinction,  he  thinks,  is  due  to 
ascending  degrees  in  individuality.^  The  root 
meaning  of  the  term  "individuality"  is  what 
the  term  implies,  its  distinction  from  other 
individuals.  We  certainly  should  make  no 
progress  in  number  did  we  not  assume  the 
integers  of  our  computation  to  be  distinct  in 
their  own  right.  There  would  be  nothing 
but  confusion  in  attempting  to  count  two  units 
as  if  they  were  one  or  as  if  they  were  partially 
identical.  We  could  not  speak  of  the  first  unit 
as  being  a  unity  only  in  degree  without  at  least 
falling  into  the  abstractions  of  theoretical  math- 


5  "While  the  subdivision  of  matter  into  separate  bodies  is 
relative  to  our  perception,  while  the  building  up  of  closed-off 
systems  of  material  points  is  relative  to  our  science,  the  living 
body  has  been  separated  and  closed  off  by  nature  herself. 
It  is  composed  of  unlike  parts  that  complete  each  other.  It 
performs  diverse  functions  that  involve  each  other.  It  is  an 
individual,  and  of  no  other  object,  not  even  of  the  crystal,  can 
this  be  said,  for  a  crystal  has  neither  difference  of  parts  nor 
diversity  of  functions.  No  doubt  it  is  hard  even  to  decide 
in  the  organized  world  what  is  individual  and  what  is  not. 
The  difficulty  is  great  even  in  the  animal  kingdom;  with 
plants  it  is  almost  insurmountable.  This  difficulty  is,  more- 
over, due  to  profound  causes,  on  which  we  shall  dwell  later. 
We  shall  see  that  individuality  admits  of  any  number  of 
degrees  and  that  it  is  not  fully  realized  anywhere,  even  in 
man"  (Creative  Evolution,  p.  12). 
183 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

ematics.  In  other  words,  there  must  be  estab- 
lished meanings  to  the  terms  we  use.  If  we 
intend  to  use  the  term  "individuaUty"  or 
"personaHty"  with  a  definiteness  that  will 
enable  us  to  make  progress,  we  must  retain  the 
meaning  as  we  have  defined  it  at  least  until  the 
equation  has  been  worked  out.  It  will  not  do 
to  change  the  quantity  of  the  unknown  symbol 
in  the  process  of  finding  its  value. 

Out  of  the  discussion  we  find  emerging  two 
ideas  of  the  self;  one,  the  seK  of  intuition,  of 
action;  the  other,  the  self  of  intelligence,  of 
rationalization.  What  the  self  of  action  and 
intuition  would  be  apart  from  intelligence  it  is 
impossible  to  determine.  One  great  object  of 
the  philosophy  of  change  is  to  end  the  warfare 
between  the  conflicting  ideas  of  mind  as  matter 
and  mind  as  spirit.  It  understands  very 
clearly  the  impossibility  of  explaining  the  facts 
either  by  materialism  alone  or  by  idealism  alone. 
It  sees  that  realism  must  issue  in  denying  the 
reality  of  matter,  and  materialism  must  end  in 
phenomenalism.  What  it  fails  to  see  is  that  the 
rift  it  makes  in  personality  by  the  division  into 
intuition  and  intelligence  is  a  gulf  as  impossible 
to  bridge  as  was  that  of  the  older  dualism.  If 
there  is  one  thing  above  another  that  distin- 
guishes personality,  that  makes  it  what  it  is, 
it  is  the  indivisible  presence  of  intelligence  in 
184 


HUMAN  PERSONALITY 

intuition.  It  may  do  for  the  sake  of  analysis 
to  speak  as  if  at  one  end  of  a  line  it  were  possible 
to  set  a  mark  which  is  pure  perception,  not  dis- 
tinguishable from  matter,  and  at  the  other  end 
a  mark  which  will  represent  pure  memory,  indis- 
tinguishable from  spirit,  but  in  actual  life  these 
points  are  inseparable.  If  we  are  to  get  at  the 
concrete  facts,  we  must  reach  them  by  a  certain 
personal  realism  which  includes  all.  We  be- 
lieve that  there  are  many  evidences  that  this 
is  the  goal  after  which  Bergson  is  striving.  It 
is  no  help  toward  that  goal,  it  is  introducing 
only  confusion  and  unclearness,  to  speak  of  the 
self  as  if  there  were  on  the  one  hand  a  self  of 
action,  and  on  the  other  a  self  of  intelligence. 
Whatever  intelligence  the  self  has  is  brought 
to  bear  from  moment  to  moment,  is  a  part  of 
action,  of  experience  of  duration,  because  any 
concrete  or  real  intelligence  is  related  to  the 
self  at  the  moment  of  action  and  unrelated  intel- 
ligence is  impossible.  We  have  in  the  setting 
forth  of  this  order  of  dualism  a  situation  analo- 
gous to  that  against  which  Bergson  contends. 
This  is  the  situation  of  the  sensationalists  who 
regard  ideas  as  if  they  could  exist  apart  from 
life  and  action,  stored  in  the  brain  as  in  a  ware- 
house, filed  and  ticketed  and  ready  to  come 
forth  on  demand.  While  such  an  explanation 
of  the  relation  may  give  great  comfort  to  the 
185 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

imagination,  may  lead  to  a  semblance  of  prog- 
ress, and  may  promise  the  solution  of  the  deepest 
mysteries  of  the  self,  it  will  be  found  on  examina- 
tion one  of  those  solutions  which  consist  in 
taking  out  what  one  has  already  put  in. 

One  writer^  has  correctly  called  attention  to 
the  fact  appearing  in  this  connection,  that 
individuation,  or  personality  arising  from  im- 
pediments in  the  way  of  the  "elan,"  furnishes 
souls  that  differ  only  as  they  mutilate  the  mes- 
sage which  all  alike  are  trying  to  repeat.  The 
justice  of  this  criticism  will  appear  to  us  the 
moment  we  consider  the  definition  of  funda- 
mental reality  under  the  figure  of  the  rising 
stream  which  continually  resists  the  condensing 
and  falling  drops  of  water  which  itself  creates, 
and  which  correspond  to  matter.  Having 
mentioned  it  in  another  connection,  we  waive 
here  the  right  to  the  criticism  that  this  assump- 
tion places  matter  as  an  element  in  its  own 
genesis,  and  the  attendant  question  of  how  we 
came  by  the  "original"  matter  which  was  before 
creative  spirit  began  to  resist  it.  Let  us  come 
directly  to  the  consideration  of  personality  as 
one  of  the  products  thrown  off  by  the  unceasing 
stream  of  spirit  in  its  eternal  contest.  We  ought 
not  perhaps  to  dwell  much  on  the  startling 
analogy  which  the  illustration  furnishes  of  an 

*  Santayana,  Winds  of  Doctrine,  p.  104. 
186 


HUMAN  PERSONALITY 

identity  in  definition  of  personality  and  matter, 
though  we  cannot  prevent  this  ghost  from 
rising  to  disturb  our  speculation.  The  question 
which  really  annoys  is  a  deeper  one,  and  on  it 
hang  greater  issues.  If  this  is  a  true  description 
of  personality,  we  inquire  whether  the  dis- 
tinguishing feature  of  personality  be  matter  or 
spirit.  If  akinness  to  matter  is  the  mark  of 
personality,  whence  that  unique  creative  energy 
which  we  behold  in  persons  .^^  Instead  of  re- 
ducing personality  to  the  lower  rank  of  matter, 
might  it  not  be  quite  as  reasonable  to  posit  it  as 
the  rising  tide  of  spirit  which  lifts  matter  with 
it  from  the  lower  to  the  higher  order?  Is  per- 
sonality an  impediment  in  the  way  of  the  free 
activity  of  the  vital  "elan,"  or  is  it  not,  rather, 
the  expression  of  that  "elan"  in  its  rising  and 
successful  conflict  with  matter  .^^  One  thing 
is  certain,  at  this  point  we  stand  at  the  very 
crossroads.  It  may  seem  unimportant  which 
way  we  take.  The  signs  on  the  guidepost  may 
not  indicate  the  deeper  significance  in  the  goals 
to  which  they  lead.  But  one  way  leads  directly 
to  the  assumption  of  the  triumph  of  materialism, 
and  the  eventual  conclusion  that  matter  is  the 
fundamental  reality  against  which  the  tides  of 
spirit  exhaust  themselves  in  vain.  Along  this 
road,  all  that  we  discover  leads  us  to  find  reality 
in  the  running  down  of  spirit.  We  pass  through 
187 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

a  grand  continuous  graveyard  in  which  we  can 
see  nothing  until  after  it  is  dead.  If  this  be  the 
case,  it  is  quite  foolish  to  speak  of  evolution, 
for  all  change  must  be  toward  devolution.  To 
use  an  Irishism,  our  only  progress  is  a  retreat. 
On  such  a  basis  we  can  never  know  anything 
about  the  "elan"  except  to  witness  the  melan- 
choly evidences  of  its  failure  before  the  more 
powerful  influences  of  matter.  This  way  we 
have  not  "elan  vitale,"  but  the  deadness  of 
inertia.  This  blind  alley  will  always  misguide 
us  so  long  as  we  consider  matter  the  fundamental 
reality,  or  so  long  as  we  think  of  matter  and 
spirit  as  two  independent  streams  of  reality, 
or  so  long  as  we  adopt  the  standpoint  of  imper- 
sonalism.  It  is  only  as  personality  becomes 
the  source  of  all  things  and  all  lesser  person- 
alities are  measurably  superior  to  matter,  that 
we  can  escape  the  impasse  and  breathe  again 
the  air  of  freedom. 


Disappearance  of  the  Ground  of  Per- 
sonal Immortality 

Another  factor  in  the  treatment  of  the 
problem  of  personality  by  the  philosophy  of 
change  needs  now  to  be  mentioned.  In  the 
definition  of  personality  just  considered  there 
is  no  ground  for  the  positing  of  immortality. 
188 


HUMAN  PERSONALITY 

This  will  to  some  minds  seem  quite  unimportant, 
to  others  it  will  appear  a  grave  defect  in  any 
system  of  philosophy.  Our  own  feeling  is  that, 
aside  from  the  demands  of  religious  faith,  there 
is  a  certain  pragmatic  demand  which  insists  that 
philosophy  shall  at  least  not  be  inimical  to  the 
claims  for  personal  immortality.  Usually,  that 
which  is  a  universal  demand  of  the  human  spirit 
will  be  found  to  reach  root  deeply  into  reality 
and  life.  This  demand  will  increase  if  we 
assume  that  personality  is  necessary  to  all 
duration.  If  there  be  no  personality  in  the 
creative  "elan,"  we  can  have  neither  progress 
nor  intelligibility  in  the  universe,  and  it 
might  be  that  the  preservation  of  those  person- 
alities which  are  the  feebler  and  lesser  lights  of 
itself  would  be  the  supreme  demand  in  its 
experience  of  duration.  If  human  personality 
has  any  light  to  throw  upon  the  problem  it  is 
all  in  this  direction.  The  supreme  interests  of 
our  own  duration  cluster  about  other  person- 
alities which  are  bound  to  us  by  one  tie  or 
another.  Certain  it  is  that  when  these  rela- 
tions are  broken  we  are  filled  with  a  sense  of 
the  futility  and  emptiness  of  life.  The  inten- 
sity of  this  feeling  has  been  profoundly  expressed 
in  the  poem  of  an  Indian  woman.^ 


'  Sarojini  Naidu,  in  "The  Golden  Threshold,"  p.  46. 
189 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

"Lamp  of  my  life,  the  lips  of  Death 
Have  blown  thee  out  with  their  sudden  breath; 
Naught  shall  revive  thy  vanished  spark  .... 
Love,  must  I  dwell  in  the  living  dark? 

"Tree  of  my  life.  Death's  cruel  foot 
Hath  crushed  thee  down  to  thy  hidden  root; 
Naught  shall  restore  thy  glory  fled  .... 
Shall  the  blossom  live  when  the  soul  is  dead? 

"Life  of  my  life.  Death's  bitter  sword 
Hath  severed  us  like  a  broken  word. 
Rent  us  in  twain  who  are  but  one  .... 
Shall  the  flesh  survive  when  the  soul  is  gone?" 

If  our  human  lives  were  to  be  deprived  of  all 
interest  in  other  personalities,  it  is  difficult  to 
tell  what  worth,  beauty,  or  inspiration  would 
be  left  to  us.  Our  religion  takes  form  and 
becomes  of  vital  value  and  comfort  only  as  it 
centers  around  personality.  Not  only  is  it 
difficult  to  extract  much  of  value  from  the 
worship  of  a  Deity  who  is  an  abstract  force, 
but  as  we  are  constituted  it  is  impossible.  The 
anthropomorphizing  tendency  in  man,  though 
it  is  often  abused,  is  also  often  misunderstood 
and  slandered.  The  creative  energy  possesses 
meaning  for  us  only  as  it  is  akin  to  ourselves. 
This  demand  is  as  deep  and  insistent  as  our 
nature  and  cannot  be  denied.  The  demand 
for  an  incarnation  is  not  an  insistence  on  low- 
ering God  to  our  limited  human  state,  but  is, 
190 


HUMAN  PERSONALITY 

rather,  the  insistence  that  the  best  that  is  in 
us  is  identical  with  and  bears  kinship  to  that 
Goodness  which  we  conceive  to  He  at  the  heart 
of  Deity.  Some  day  men  of  greatly  diverse 
beliefs  will  recognize  this  as  the  common 
ground  of  a  larger  faith.  Returning  to  the 
argument,  there  is  this  to  be  considered.  The 
corollary  of  personality  in  the  creative  "elan" 
is  the  continuance  of  personality  or  immor- 
tality in  lesser  intelligences.  If  we  are  to 
consider  the  interests  that  would  attract  the 
mind  of  such  creative  personality,  it  would 
evidently  not  be  the  lesser  and  material  crea- 
tions which  formed  the  steps  of  evolution,  but 
personality  itself.  If  the  scientist  loves  to 
declare  the  indestructibility  of  matter,  it  is 
quite  as  reasonable  to  believe  in  the  indestruct- 
ibility of  that  which  is  the  culmination  of  the 
creative  process.  If  any  portion  of  the  creative 
energy  springs  from  an  endeavor  to  find  itseK, 
to  realize  larger  aspirations  and  purposes,  we 
are  forced  to  believe  that  these  interests  will  be 
centered  in  those  creations  which  are  most  like 
itself,  and  which  represent  its  highest  attain- 
ment. It  certainly  would  be  false  to  all  that 
we  know  of  human  nature  to  cast  to  the  void 
the  self-conscious  products  of  one's  own  love 
and  care.  Such  action  becomes  self -destructive. 
To  acknowledge  the  reality  of  the  soul  and  of  the 
191 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

supreme  human  interests  involves  the  logical 
belief  in  immortality.  For  him  who  denies 
these  higher  realities  we  have  no  argument. 

To  one  who  has  deeply  considered  life  or  who 
has  entered  profoundly  into  its  experiences  it  is 
impossible  to  take  the  trivial  and  fantastic  view 
assumed  by  some  commentators  on  Bergson. 
Immortality  is  a  metaphysical  question  because 
it  is  linked  indissolubly  with  one's  conception 
of  the  World-Ground.  It  is  of  the  very  essence 
of  personality  to  resent  such  a  conclusion 
because  of  the  indignity  cast  upon  the  highest 
human  values.  Not  only  in  moments  of  deepest 
intuition,  but  likewise  in  moments  of  deepest 
insight  and  intelligence  we  feel  the  deeper 
truth  that  personality  lives  beyond  the  fickle 
and  passing  environments  which  close  it  in, 
and  we  catch  the  truth  of  the  picture  drawn  by 
Frederic  Lawrence  Knowles  in  "The  Tenant:"^ 

"This  body  is  my  house — it  is  not  I: 
Herein  I  sojourn  till  in  some  far  sky, 
I  lease  a  fairer  dwelling,  fit  to  last 
Till  all  the  carpentry  of  time  is  past. 
When  from  my  high  place  viewing  this  lone  star. 
What  shall  I  care  where  these  poor  timbers  are? 
What  though  the  crumbling  walls  turn  dust  and  loam — 
I  shall  have  left  them  for  a  larger  home. 
What  though  the  rafters  break,  the  stanchions  rot. 


'  Love  Triumphant,  p.  192. 
192 


HUMAN  PERSONALITY 

When  earth  has  dwindled  to  a  glimmering  spot! 
When  thou,  clay  cottage,  fallest,  I'll  immerse 
My  long  cramp't  spirit  in  the  universe. 
Through  uncomputed  silences  of  space 
I  shall  yearn  upward  to  the  leaning  Face. 
The  ancient  heavens  will  roll  aside  for  me. 
As  Moses  monarched  the  dividing  sea. 
This  body  is  my  house,  it  is  not  I, 
Triumphant  in  this  faith  I  live  and  die." 

A  Doctrine  of  Personality  is  Funda- 
mental TO  Metaphysical  Under- 
standing 

It  has  become  a  truism  in  philosophy  that  the 
reality  of  personality  is  fundamental  to  intelli- 
gence; that  if  we  cannot  believe  in  our  own 
reality,  we  cannot  be  sure  of  any  knowledge 
whatever.  What  is  not  so  generally  recognized 
is  the  fact  that  personality  is  a  metaphysical 
as  well  as  an  epistemological  necessity.  If  the 
second  demand  be  conceded,  the  first  also  must 
be  granted.  Understanding  implies  not  only 
an  intelligent  personality,  it  implies  also  an 
intelligible  world.  An  intelligible  world  can 
proceed  only  from  an  intelligence  which  in 
some  way  measures  up  to  the  meaning  of  per- 
sonality. That  there  should  be  some  mystery 
about  this  creative  personality  is  not  to  be 
wondered  at,  since  the  mystery  of  our  own 
creative  wills  is  the  despair  of  philosophy. 
103 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

The  universe  can  be  seen  and  understood  only 
from  this  personalistic  standpoint.  Whatever 
vaticinations  we  indulge  we  inevitably  circle 
round  to  this  necessary  affirmation,  and  it  is  the 
fundamental  one  in  life.  Any  philosophy, 
therefore,  which  hopes  to  get  along  without 
accounting  for  the  deepest  fact  in  life  can  never 
permanently  satisfy  the  mind  nor  fulfill  the 
demand  that  intelligence  is  sure  to  make. 

Just  as  power  in  the  state  is  measured  by  its 
accord  with  truth,  righteousness,  and  honor, 
and  just  as  failure  at  this  point  introduces 
principles  of  ruin  to  the  state;  just  as  a  structure 
is  no  stronger  than  the  foundations  on  which  it 
is  built,  or  an  army  is  powerful  only  in  keeping 
with  its  food  supply,  so  any  system  of  philosophy 
which  does  not  answer  to  the  deepest  needs  and 
instincts  of  the  human  spirit  cannot  survive. 
Any  theory  which  seeks  to  omit  the  ultimate 
explanation  is  no  explanation  at  all.  It  may 
be  a  valuable  exercise  in  dialectic,  or  an  exhila- 
rating run  about  a  circle,  but  there  has  been  no 
progress  and  no  gain.  So  any  philosophy  which 
is  unclear  in  its  definition  of  personality  and  its 
relation  to  fundamental  being  is  unclear  in  all. 
It  furnishes  an  illustration  in  philosophy  of 
an  analogous  truth  oft  quoted  in  another  realm, 
that  he  who  is  guilty  of  the  breach  of  one  com- 
mandment is  guilty  of  all. 
194 


SECTION  n 
PERSONAL  REALISM 


CHAPTER  Vin 

THE  AIM  AND  METHOD  OF  REALISM 

Realism  in  General 
Mr.  Bertrand  Russell/  referring  to  the 
paradoxes  of  Zeno,  points  out  that  in  the  case 
of  Hercules  overtaking  the  tortoise,  and  in  the 
case  of  the  flying  arrow  at  rest  during  each 
moment  of  flight,  realism  considers  the  reality 
as  a  continuum  rather  than  as  an  infinite  series 
of  jumps.  This  reference  illustrates  the  aim 
of  most  modern  realism  which  wearies  of  an 
unending  dialectic  that  loses  itself  and  its 
reality  in  the  infinite  series  of  mathematical 
calculation.  Realism  has  done  this  service 
for  the  world,  that  it  persists  in  clinging  to  the 
most  obvious,  whatever  else  it  may  have  to 
relinquish.  Just  because  life  itself  is  some- 
thing more  than  definition  or  idea,  because  at 
no  point  can  we  seize  upon  it  in  our  most  vivid 
intellectualizations,  realism  is  given  its  great 
opportunity  in  the  history  of  speculation.  Seen 
at  its  highest  and  best,  it  is  the  formal  effort 

'  Monist,  1913,  p.  484.     For  more  complete  discussion  see 
Russell,  Scientific  Method  in  Philosophy. 
197 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

to  stop  analyzing  away  the  true  nature  of 
being.  In  so  far  as  it  is  a  protest  against  the 
madness  of  a  dry  scholasticism,  it  is  of  unreck- 
oned  value. 

Neo-Realism 

Neo-realism  aims  to  perform  this  service 
for  thought  by  putting  forward  two  funda- 
mental propositions. 

The  first  is  that  the  object  of  perception  is 
absolutely  independent  of  consciousness.  The 
second  is  the  identity  of  the  real  object  with  the 
actual  percept,  which  in  the  case  of  one  school 
of  neo-realism,  leads  to  the  position  that  the 
reality  is  in  the  relation  between  subject  and 
object. 

Now,  if  an  older  form  of  realism  failed  by 
ignoring  the  mental  and  spiritual  facts  in  the 
problem  of  life,  making  matter  the  only  inde- 
pendent reality,  and  if  idealism,  coming  from 
an  opposite  direction,  failed  because  it  ignored 
the  reality  which  exists  independent  of  the 
individual  experience,  it  will  in  like  manner 
probably  be  true  that  neo-realism,  seeking  a 
unity  independent  of  personality,  must  also 
fail.  Our  only  hope  can  be  in  some  system 
which,  whatever  its  troubles,  will  not  overlook 
any  essential  feature  of  the  problem.  Neither 
he  who  considers  thing  at  the  expense  of 
198 


AIM  AND  METHOD  OF  REALISM 

thought,  nor  he  who  considers  thought  at  the 
expense  of  thing,  nor  he  who  considers  thought 
and  thing  under  the  form  of  abstract  relation 
as  the  fundamental  reality,  has  the  elements  of 
the  equation  necessary  for  a  solution  of  the 
problem.  There  is  another  entity  more  abiding 
than  the  fleeting  world,  itself  transcending  the 
passing  perception,  more  than  thought  or  any 
mental  content,  specifically  but  perilously  ig- 
nored, and  it  is  the  self -identifying  person.  The 
unity  gained  by  idealism  is  a  false  unity,  rest- 
ing on  a  partial  world;  the  unity  gained  by 
realism  is  gained  by  assuming  a  partial  world; 
the  unity  gained  by  neo-realism  arises  through 
an  arbitrary  attempt  to  make  one  by  fiat  the 
sundered  sides  of  consciousness. 

But  there  is  a  unity  which  is  neither  the  result 
of  crude  and  unconsidered  sense-thinking,  nor 
of  the  strained  effort  of  abstraction,  nor  of  a 
philosophizing  into  unity  that  which  men 
separate  in  thinking,  namely,  subject  and  object. 
This  indivisible  unity  which  none  can  doubt 
nor  dissever  is  the  unity  which  abides  in  per- 
sonality itself.  Take,  for  instance,  the  matter 
of  perception.  Upon  reflection  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  crux  of  the  problem  of  perception  lies 
in  self-identification  and  not  in  the  absence  of 
self-defining  qualities.  I  do  not  know  things 
because  in  some  Nirvanal  trance  my  perceptions 
199 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

become  identical  with  objects,  nor  because 
objects  become  "me,"  nor  because  I  become 
objects,  "entering  into  them,"  as  Bergson 
declares. 

It  is  the  self-defining  quality  of  the  human 
understanding  that  makes  perception  possible. 
Unless  I  can  relate  a  thing  to  myself  in  the 
spatial  or  temporal  order  it  is  impossible  for  me 
to  perceive  it  at  all.  This  self  or  personality 
is  no  mere  product  of  the  juxtaposition  of  mind 
and  matter,  but  is  self-directive.  It  can  per- 
ceive what  it  will,  and  can  measurably  neglect 
to  perceive  what  it  will.  It  is  greater  than  its 
surroundings,  for  it  has  power  to  transcend  or 
to  overcome  all  of  a  lesser  order  than  itself. 
When  it  comes  to  other  personalities,  if  person- 
ality be  the  fundamental  reality,  it  finds 
itself  working  within  the  orderly  limits  set 
by  a  supreme  personality  which  upholds  the 
world  and  all  lesser  personalities  to  its  own 
transcending  purpose.  The  lesser  personality 
finds  itself  compelled  to  limits  of  a  certain 
moral  and  physical  order.  This  is  the  point 
at  which  the  individual  personality  finds  itself 
impotent  against  the  general  good  which  is 
written  into  the  constitution  of  existing  things. 

Personal  Realism 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  personal  realism  differs 
200 


AIM  AND  METHOD  OF  REALISM 

sharply  from  neo-realism  in  this,  that  neo-real- 
ism  assumes  relation  as  the  fundamental  reality. 
Not  mind  alone,  as  in  idealism,  nor  matter 
alone,  as  in  materialism,  but  the  actual  relation 
of  mind  and  matter  as  joined  in  the  act  of  per- 
ception is  the  neo-realistic  claim  for  the  funda- 
mental reality.  It  will  be  easily  seen  that 
neo-realism  thus  leaves  no  provision  for  con- 
necting these  varied  and  multiform  perceptions 
into  any  series  or  unity.  Each  is  reality 
itself  in  the  moment  of  being.  Each  reality 
arises  like  a  bubble  on  the  waters  of  life  and  is 
immediately  lost  as  its  place  is  taken  by  other 
perceptions.  There  could  be  no  life,  no  self- 
identification,  for  all  would  rise  and  pass  away 
in  the  act  of  perceiving. 

(a)  Personal  Realism  Affirms  Indivisibility  of 
Personality. 

Personal  realism,  on  the  other  hand,  con- 
tends for  the  indivisibility  of  personality  rather 
than  for  that  of  relation.  It  holds  that  the 
relator  rather  than  the  relation  is  the  finality. 
This  claim  for  indivisible  and  unanalyzable 
consciousness  in  perception,  which  is  personality, 
constitutes  the  realistic  element. 

The  question  may  be  asked,  "Why  call  it 
realism  at  all.^"  The  answer  must  be  the 
obvious  kinship  with  the  prevailing  modern 
201 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

type  of  realism.  Personal  realism  will  be 
found,  first  of  all,  holding  to  the  fact  that 
reality  is  a  connection  and  a  relation  which  is 
indivisible,  except  in  the  abstract  analysis  of 
the  psychologist,  an  analysis  which  never  can 
be  identified  with  the  fact,  but  can  only  sym- 
bolize it  in  order  to  understand  it.  So  far,  the 
theory  is  in  strict  agreement  with  both  Bergson 
and  the  neo-realists.  But  personal  realism 
holds  that  we  cannot  stop  here  without 
imminent  peril  to  our  philosophy.  Reality 
never  exists  in  the  abstract,  but  only  in  the 
concrete  instance.  The  relation  of  mind  and 
matter,  then,  to  be  rigorously  realistic,  exists 
only  in  the  specific,  concrete  cases  in  which 
personality  is  involved.  The  essential  reality 
is  in  the  relator  and  not  in  the  relation.  To 
hold  the  relation  as  fundamental  is  to  drop 
into  the  dijQSculties  of  idealism,  if  one  is  to 
pursue  to  the  end  a  course  of  logical  consistency. 
A  system  of  relations  built  of  disconnected 
perceptions  could  yield  nothing  of  knowledge 
or  intelligibility.  We  should  have  a  world  of 
relations  with  no  power  of  interpretation. 
The  experiences  of  the  individual  would  not 
hold  together  from  moment  to  moment,  and 
science  would  be  impossible.  It  is  only  because 
of  the  survival  of  a  self-identifying  element 
which  does  the  relating,  that  either  the  indi- 
202 


AIM  AND  METHOD  OF  REALISM 

vidual  or  the  changing  world  possesses  meaning 
or  value.  What,  then,  is  the  indivisibihty  in  the 
act  of  perception  or  in  the  act  of  life,  if  you  will, 
which  stolidly  refuses  to  be  caught  up  and  fully 
expressed  by  any  rationalization,  or  analysis 
which  the  mind  may  bend  upon  it?  This  indi- 
visible unity  is  a  personality,  the  seK-identi- 
fying  unit  in  the  act  of  perception. 

We  believe  that  in  this  position  we  come 
nearest  the  heart  of  a  consistent  realism.  The 
moment  we  assume  relation  as  the  fundamental 
reality,  that  moment  we  have  begun  that  process 
of  intellectualization  against  which  Bergson 
protests  as  leading  away  from  actual  expe- 
rience. We  cannot  get  to  relation  until  we 
have  gotten  away  from  the  primary  act,  which 
is  life,  to  an  analysis  of  it,  which  is  idealism.^ 

^  "Ce  j'y  decouvre,  c'est  une  iudividualite  concrete  et 
vivante,  une  source  permanente  d'energie.  Sans  doute  je 
generalise  mon  moi,  comme  tout  le  reste;  je  le  depouille  aussi, 
par  une  analyse  mentale,  de  ses  modes  et  de  ses  attributs:  je 
le  mets  a  part  et  rensois  de  cette  maniere  a  le  convertir  en  une 
forme  dessechee,  indeterminee,  impersonelle,  qui  ne  vit  ni 
ne  sent.  Mes  se  produit  Incolore  de  ma  raison,  cet  etat 
derive  du  moi  n'est  pas  plus  le  moi  dont  j'ai  conscience  qu'un 
squelette  n'est  un  homme  ou  qu'un  mappemonde  n'est  la 
terre.  Le  moi,  pris  dans  son  etat  naturel  et  sur  le  vif,  c'est 
cette  energie  toujours  en  travail,  qui  per9oit  et  s'aperyoit, 
qui  induit  et  deduit,  qui  jouit  et  souffre,  qui  se  passionne  de 
haine  et  d'amour,  qui  delibere,  veut  et  meut.  Le  moi  reel, 
c'est  une  force  sans  cesse  agissante  et  reagissante  et  de  mille 
manieres  k  la  fois.     Rien,  evidemment,  ne  ressemble  moins 

203 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

In  this  neo-realism  is  nearer,  much  nearer,  to 
ideaHsm  than  either  the  neo-reahst  or  the 
ideaHst  would  be  wiUing  to  admit.  But  when 
the  neo-reahsts  ask  us  to  consider  the  act  of 
perception  as  a  "putting  of  ourselves  in  things" 
they  are  certainly  asking  after  a  rationalization, 
a  transcendentalization,  if  you  please,  which  is 
nothing  more  than  a  figure  of  speech.  The 
primary  fact  of  perception  is  a  person  who 
relates  the  world  to  himself. 

For  instance.  Perry  claims  to  avoid  the  dual- 
ism of  realism  by  substituting  the  idea  of  rela- 
tion for  that  of  substance.^  But,  with  Perry, 
perception  is  a  relation  of  conscious  subject  to 
environment.  They  are  not  separated  into 
two  spheres.  Their  relation  is  the  fad.  He 
hopes  thus  to  get  over  the  duahsm  between 
subject  and  object.  Error,  he  declares,  is  due 
to  subjectivity.  This  can  mean  simply  that 
whatever  does  the  relating  relates  wrongly, 
draws  the  wrong  conclusion.  So  at  a  stroke 
is  reerected  the  dualism  of  which  he  had  dis- 
posed. He  declares  the  cardinal  principle  of 
neo-realism   to   be   the   "independence  of   the 


k  ces  symboles  amortis  et  inertes  que  rentendement  se  fait 
des  choses  et  qui  n'ont  d' existence  que  pour  lui  et  par  lui: 
rien  ne  ressemble  moins  a  un  etre  logique  que  le  moi"  (Piat, 
La  Personne  Humaine,  p.  381). 

'  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  p.  308. 

S04 


AIM  AND  METHOD  OF  REALISM 

imminent."'*  He  maintains  the  independence 
of  external  objects,  he  now  seems  to  maintain 
the  independence  of  ideas,  because  the  idea  is 
not  the  product  of  immediate  perception  but  of 
perceptions  worked  upon  by  something  which 
holds  supervisory  and  dictatorial  powers,  i.  e., 
by  the  human  personaHty.  Thus  his  impersonal 
realism  vanishes.^ 

I  am  quite  aware  that  the  assumption  that 
the  primary  fact  of  perception  is  a  person  who 
relates  the  world  to  himself  does  not  settle  the 
question  of  metaphysics.  The  difficulty  arising 
from  this  postulate  by  a  demand  for  person- 
ality in  the  Supreme  Being  will  be  discussed  in 
another  connection.  But  this  simple  assump- 
tion concerning  perception  will  at  least  avoid 
the  issues  which  pluralism  immediately  thrusts 
upon  neo-realism  at  this  point. 

Here  it  seems  strange  that  there  should  have 
been  no  deeper  searching  of  heart,  because,  in 
the  very  nature  of  the  case,  the  pluralism  which 
necessarily  follows  the  usual  affirmations  of  neo- 
realism  not  only  negates  the  reality  of  knowl- 
edge of  the  world,  it  denies  to  personality 
any  place  in  its  system.  The  first  point  is 
disclosed  in  this:  that  a  consistently  pluralistic 
universe  could  be  only  an  inexplicable  accident. 

*  Perry,  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  p.  313. 
'^  Compare  Perry,  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  p.  326. 
205 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

For  any  progress  or  any  understanding  there 
must  be  a  certain  unity  of  cooperation.  A  strictly 
pluralistic  universe  is  a  contradiction  of  terms. 
If  there  is  coordination  between  its  various 
elements,  if  there  is  to  be  any  understanding, 
there  must  be  some  unity  or  coherence  in  the 
understanding  subject.  At  least  it  must  be 
granted  that  if  the  subject  of  experience  is 
altogether  involved  in  the  universal  flux,  a 
passing  mood  of  psychical  states  and  varying 
consciousnesses,  all  dissolves  as  surely  into 
nothing  as  if  we  were  to  lose  ourselves  in  the 
Absolute  of  extreme  idealism.  To  repeat  what 
has  already  been  said,  the  two  systems  are 
closer  than  their  advocates  think. 

The  only  unity,  then,  is  not  a  unity  of  things, 
of  absolutes,  nor  of  relations  considered  apart 
from  appearance  in  concrete  personalities.  The 
unity  is  in  personality  itself.  The  only  charter 
which  we  possess  for  community  of  under- 
standing and  interpretation  of  our  world  lies 
in  personality,  finite  and  supreme.  Unless  we 
reach  this  standpoint  the  explanation  of  science, 
of  mathematics,  of  sociology,  of  language  itself 
casts  upon  us  an  intolerable  burden.  We  do 
perceive  the  world  after  an  unaccountable 
similitude;  the  procession  of  cause  and  effect 
does  bear  to  ignorant  and  learned,  to  good,  bad, 
and  indifferent,  very  identical  meanings;  quan- 
206 


AIM  AND  METHOD  OF  REALISM 

tity  and  division  in  mathematics  speak  with 
certain  inevitable  exactnesses  which  the  wildest 
philosophy  cannot  ignore  or  abrogate.  To 
attempt  it  would  land  the  victim  in  the  psycho- 
pathic ward  of  the  hospital.  There  are  social 
relationships  which  bind  all  men  of  good  will 
with  unbroken  bonds,  and  men  of  ill  will  with  an 
inexorable  imperative.  The  individual  cannot 
decide  to  have  a  language  of  his  own,  insisting 
on  his  own  peculiar  meanings  for  the  sounds 
of  speech  without  danger  to  life  and  limb  on  the 
crowded  streets  of  our  cities.  The  cry  of 
"Wolf,"  once  infilled  with  a  meaning  strange 
to  the  generality  of  men,  may  prove  embar- 
rassing to  the  man  who  insists  on  so  using  the 
term.  It  ought  not  to  be  difficult  to  see  in  the 
face  of  multiplying  instances  that  this  unity, 
upon  which  thought,  science,  institutions,  and 
action  in  the  world  are  founded,  is  a  unity  that 
grows  out  of  the  nature  of  personality.  If  it 
be  asked,  further,  how  a  world  of  matter  can 
correspond  to  a  world  of  intelligences,  it  needs 
only  to  affirm  that  the  source  of  things  and 
intelligences  is  a  common  one;  that  both  systems 
exist  by  virtue  of  a  supreme  personality  which 
unceasingly  wills  both  into  being.  In  such  a 
case  the  problem  springs  not  from  the  strange 
yet  familiar  coordination,  the  wonder  arises 
from  any  gaps  or  failure  in  coordination.  As 
207 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

a  matter  of  fact,  the  most  perplexing  questions 
of  life  do  spring  exactly  from  these  sources. 
The  world  is  brought  into  unity,  not  because 
the  diverse  streams  of  reality  spring  from  a 
common,  far-off  push,  but  because  they  exist 
in  time  as  a  part  of  the  continually  exercised 
creative  will.  And  here  at  last  is  freedom, 
for  a  world  of  new  relations  and  truths  might 
at  any  time  come  to  birth  through  the  moral 
growth  of  man  and  a  new  mastery  of  nature 
granted  by  a  Divine  Will.  When  we  look  at 
life,  existence,  perception,  in  this  light,  we 
see  that  in  the  fact  of  personality  perception 
and  reality  coincide.  This  is  what  we  mean 
by  personal  realism.^ 

Perhaps  the  most  serious  objection  to  be 
raised  against  this  conclusion  will  come  from 
the  realm  of  abnormal  psychology.  It  will  be 
held  as  an  argument  against  the  indivisibility 
of  personality  that  there  are  abnormal  instances 
of  so-called  dissociations  of  personality.  In 
this  case  we  should  point  to  the  necessity  of 
carefully  guarding  our  definitions.  We  need 
to    distinguish    between    the    dissociation    of 

•  In  speaking  of  the  realism  of  thought,  Hocking  shows 
the  necessity  of  changing  "cogito  ergo  sum"  to  the  simple 
*I  am/  and  contends  for  the  reality  of  ideas,  because  my  world, 
myself,  and  my  ideas  are  constituent  parts  or  phases  of  the 
same  reality.  (See  Philosophical  Review,  1910,  pp.  316-317, 
article  entitled  "How  Ideas  Reach  Reality.") 

208 


AIM  AND  METHOD  OF  REALISM 

psychic  states  which  is  possible,  and  of  which 
we  have  numerous  instances,  and  that  impos- 
sibiHty  which  would  be  unplied  in  the  term 
dissociation  of  personality.  Dissociation  of 
personality  would,  if  we  use  the  term  "per- 
sonality" in  the  present  sense,  mean  the  destruc- 
tion of  personality.  We  feel  that  the  strictly 
correct  term  to  apply  to  this  phenomenon  of 
abnormal  psychology  is  not  dissociation  of 
personality,  but  dissociation  of  conscious  states. 
A  victim  of  abnormal  psychology  does  not  con- 
sider himself  two  identities  at  the  same  moment, 
for  purposes  of  willing,  or  creative  causation. 
If  one  studies  carefully  the  celebrated  case  of 
Miss  Beauchamp,^  one  discovers  that  the 
source  of  her  recovery  was  the  existence  of  a 
self -identifying  unit  which  survived  the  various 
moods  and  states  under  which  she  at  times  was 
held  subject.  A  mood  or  a  set  of  experiences 
might  for  a  time  occupy  dominantly  the  land- 
scape of  active  consciousness,  but  above  this 
was  the  still  higher  consciousness  that  she 
ought  not  to  allow  "Sally"  or  any  other  "self" 
to  control  her.  Because  she  kept  to  this  true 
identity,  because  her  personality  was  funda- 
mentally indivisible,  she  was  able  in  the  end 
to  command  the  moods  that  had  held  her  and 

7  Compare  Morton  Prince,  The  Dissociation  of  a  Person- 
ality. 

209 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

recover  the  normal  and  rational  consciousness 
of  self.  By  keeping  in  mind  the  abiding  element 
in  self -consciousness  we  escape  the  impasse  which 
these  instances  of  the  abnormal  raise  for  any 
theory  to  which  the  relation  rather  than  the 
relator  is  fundamental.  The  tendency  to  exag- 
gerate this  theoretical  dissociation  is  discussed 
by  a  modern  psychologist^^in  the^f  olio  wing  terms: 

The  facts  of  multiple  personality  do  strongly  suggest 
a  detached  subconsciousness.  Yet  even  here  there  is  no 
such  complete  break  as  is  popularly  supposed.  The  sec- 
ondary personality  depends  upon  and  uses  the  mental 
acquisitions  of  the  primary — uses  its  language,  has  its 
understanding  of  common  sights  and  sounds,  has  its 
memories  as  its  own.  Hence  even  if  the  primary  person- 
ality were  totally  unable  to  recall  experiences  of  the  sec- 
ondary, nevertheless  the  usual  sort  of  psychic  individuality 
is  here  in  large  measure.  But  inability  to  recall  the  sec- 
ondary has  been  exaggerated.  There  are  apparently  all 
degrees  of  memory  lapse,  not  just  one  characteristic  and 
complete  sort.  The  popular  notion  that  hypnotized  sub- 
jects upon  being  wakened  have  no  memory  of  what  has 
occurred  during  hypnosis  is  erroneous.  Sometimes  there 
is  full  recall,  sometimes  partial  recall,  sometimes  appar- 
ently complete  amnesia.  Even  a  subject  who  declares 
that  he  cannot  recall  anything  is  sometimes,  at  least, 
mistaken.  The  sundering,  in  short,  is  best  interpreted 
as  a  phenomenon  of  attention  and  memory.  It  is  a  dis- 
sociated individual  consciousness  with  which  we  are 
dealing,  not  two  individual  consciousnesses  related  by  a 
subconscious  bond." 


8  Coe,  The  Psychology  of  Religion,  pp.  210,  211. 
210 


AIM  AND  METHOD  OF  REALISM 

If  we  apply  Miss  Beauchamp's  case  to  the 
theory  of  neo-realism,  each  of  the  passing  moods 
which  ruled  her  experience  must  be  held  of 
equal  reality  and  validity  with  her  normal 
selfhood.  In  such  a  case  an  insane  moment  is 
charged  with  the  same  reality,  with  the  same 
place  and  value  with  the  sane.  The  whole 
system  of  ethical  and  moral  values  goes  top- 
pling before  the  simple  questions  raised  in 
abnormal  psychology.  It  is  the  aim  of  personal 
realism  to  retain  the  unity  which  is  the  very 
essence  of  life,  which  springs  from  the  indi- 
visibility of  personality,  and  to  keep  it  from 
vanishing  in  the  abstract. 

(6)  Personal  Realism  Aims  an  Advance  Over 
Ordinary  Forms  of  Personal  Idealism. 

With  personal  idealism  the  self-conscious- 
ness is  fundamental  to  all  thinking.  Any 
system  which  would  explain  the  world  without 
reference  to  the  thinker  upon  whose  symbols  and 
terms  knowledge  depends  would  be  considered 
by  the  idealist  as  unworthy  of  notice.  To  the 
personal  idealist,  any  theory  which  would  take 
account  of  the  world  of  life  and  thought  must 
keep  in  mind  its  supreme  fact,  the  nature  of 
personality  itself. 

When  personal  idealism  draws  reality  down 
out  of  the  clouds  of  abstraction  by  insisting 
211 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

that  ideas,  perception,  and  logic  derive  their 
strength  from  a  concrete  existence  in  individual 
persons  rather  than  from  some  vague  generali- 
/  zation  existing  apart  from  life  and  experience, 
it  does  well.  With  this  view  personal  realism 
is  in  entire  agreement. 

Remembering  the  impossibility  of  marking 
an  exact  cleavage  between  individual  adherents 
of  the  schools,  the  points  of  advance  in  general 
are  these:  personal  realism  adds  to  the  thought 
of  personality  as  fundamental  to  understanding 
the  thought  that  it  is  fundamental  to  all  being. 
It  claims  that  the  unity  which  exists  in  per- 
ception is  due  not  only  to  the  common  origin 
of  dual  realms  of  reality  but  to  a  continually 
exercised  and  purposive  intelligence  which  from 
moment  to  moment  maintains  all  orders  of 
reality.  This  supreme  power  is  not  assumed  as 
an  abstraction,  unable  to  identify  itself  with  the 
world  of  its  creation,  nor  as  an  immanent  power 
pantheistically  working  through  atoms  in  such 
a  way  as  to  be  involved  in  its  own  processes, 
but  a  person  to  whom  the  universe  responds 
in  a  perfect  and  infinite  way  as  it  does  in 
imperfect  and  finite  measure  to  human  per- 
sonality. 

The  act  of  perception  yields  reality  because 
in  the  moment  of   perceiving   the  personality 
experiences  and  relates.     This  experience  and 
212 


AIM  AND  METHOD  OF  REALISM 

relation  is  indivisible,  and  in  essence,  unanalyza- 
ble,  the  very  essence  of  life.  Personality  is 
something  more  than  the  source  and  ground  of 
knowledge;  it  is  the  ground  of  being,  and  the 
primal  source  from  which  all  things  flow. 

The  objection  to  the  affirmation  of  personality 
in  the  World-Ground  comes  largely  from  the 
sense  of  limitation  to  which  it  seems  to  submit 
the  supreme  creative  power.  Yet  this  objection 
somewhat  loses  its  force  when  we  contemplate 
that  any  creative  energy  which  is  assumed  as  the 
source  of  life  commits  itself  to  the  dictation  of 
a  world  system,  to  a  uniform  succession  of  cause 
and  effect,  to  a  temporal  and  spatial  order — 
becomes,  in  a  sense,  limited  in  its  operation. 

It  is  no  more  limiting  to  think  of  personality 
in  the  Creative  Being  purposely  lending  himself 
to  the  working  out  of  a  world  of  human  and 
physical  relations  than  to  think  of  an  original 
creative  impulse  yielding  itself  to  the  rigorous 
limitations  of  physical  law,  or  of  a  pantheistic 
creator  shut  up  to  the  movement  of  molecular 
action.  If  the  World-Ground  be  impersonal, 
it  is  impossible  to  explain  the  order  of  progress 
in  evolution.  Impersonalism  on  any  plane, 
whether  of  materialism  or  idealism,  yields 
equivalent  results.  One  is  stranded  on  the 
Scylla  of  mechanism  or  wrecked  on  the  Charyb- 
dis  of  determinism.  The  highest  creative  en- 
213 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

ergy  of  which  we  could  have  any  account,  if 
either  theory  be  assumed,  would  be  that  unique 
and  self -creative  power  which  is  the  limited  pos- 
session of  human  personality  and  which  molds 
a  world  of  things  to  its  own  purposes. 

In  the  final  analysis  the  sense  of  the  limiting 
character  of  personality  in  a  World-Ground  will 
be  seen  to  spring  from  the  uncertain  notions  of 
time  and  space  as  they  might  affect  such  a  being. 
Here  lies  the  distinctive  difference  between 
divine  and  human  personality.  The  one  must 
be  freed  from  the  spatial  and  temporal  order 
that  it  may  fulfill  the  requirements  of  our 
thought;  the  other  we  think  of  as  altogether  the 
slave  of  time  and  space.  The  breach  between 
the  two  seems  impassable  until  we  consider  the 
relative  nature  of  the  temporal  and  spatial 
order.  We  discover  a  sense  in  which  human 
personality,  though  working  under  the  limita- 
tion of  time  and  space,  is  able  to  transcend  them. 
The  abiding  personality  does  not  pass  away 
with  the  order  to  which  it  is  in  such  large 
measure  subject.  Its  highest  and  most  dis- 
tinctive victories  are  won  in  the  very  measure 
in  which  it  is  able  to  transcend  time  and  space, 
to  bring  the  distant  into  the  plan  of  the  present, 
and  to  insure  the  far-off  harvests  of  its  present 
will  and  action.  So  it  will  be  seen  that  the 
perfection  of  personality  might  involve  a 
214 


AIM  AND  METHOD  OF  REALISM 

complete  transcendence  of  space  and  time,  and 
personality  thus  transcendent  would  be  freed 
from  those  limitations  with  which  it  is  commonly 
thought  connected.  The  essence  of  personality 
is  neither  time  nor  space,  but  creative  activity. 
Creative  activity  in  order  to  possess  purpose, 
meaning,  or  to  ground  evolutionary  progress, 
must  possess  the  essential  elements  of  person- 
ality. Thus  personality  takes  on  an  inalienable 
metaphysical  meaning.  It  is  the  only  World- 
Ground,  or  creative  energy,  we  can  affirm 
without  becoming  lost  in  the  agnostic  mazes  of 
the  infinite  regress,  or  in  an  immoral  pantheism 
and  determinism.  It  is  the  only  basis  on  which 
we  can  maintain  any  order  of  freedom. 

Speaking  in  the  language  of  the  old  realism 
of  "things  as  they  are,"  perception  must  be 
taken  to  include  not  a  part  but  all  of  the  factors. 
"Things  as  they  are"  must  mean  not  only  the 
things  of  the  material  world  which  can  be  acted 
upon.  They  must  include  the  perceiving  mind, 
and  the  self -identifying  subject  himself  must  be 
included  as  a  part  of  realism.  This  offers  the 
only  way  of  escape  from  a  static  world.  Because 
in  our  realism  we  include  personality,  a  place  is 
left  for  change  and  freedom.  We  need  to  dwell 
upon  the  meaning  of  this  implication.  The  ex- 
perience of  change  is  absolutely  impossible  to  any 
consciousness,  activity,  or  force  which  is  unable 
215 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

to  survive  the  change.  Anything  changing  abso- 
lutely from  moment  to  moment  cannot  keep  any 
identity  nor  be  aware  of  change.  Neither  could 
the  onlooker  be  aware  of  change,  for  he  would 
witness  only  an  unceasing  and  unrelated  crea- 
tion. Even  the  customary  relation  of  cause 
and  effect  would  be  barred  out.  Any  philoso- 
phy of  change,  then,  that  ignores  the  unchang- 
ing is  contributing  to  its  own  destruction. 

The  second  consideration  upon  the  implica- 
tions of  which  we  should  dwell  is  that,  apart 
from  personality,  freedom  in  the  creative  energy 
or  in  the  world  is  impossible.  Much  may  be 
urged  against  the  static  systems  of  the  past 
which  with  rigorous  logic  denied  the  existence 
of  freedom,  and  bound  the  simplest  acts  of  men 
to  a  materialistic  mechanism,  pretending  to 
check  up  loves  and  hates,  thought  energy  and 
purpose,  by  equivalents  of  food  and  drink. 
With  all  its  impossibiHties  and  lack  of  insight 
such  a  view  possessed  the  virtue  of  consistency. 
But  when  we  endeavor  to  get  a  world  of  freedom 
from  an  impersonal  source,  even  the  philosophic 
child  should  see  that  impersonal  freedom,  seeing 
neither  before  nor  behind,  conscious  only  of  the 
present  and  having  no  conscious  power  of 
choice  and  no  purpose,  would  be  only  an  acci- 
dent. Such  a  world  could  have  neither  order 
nor  meaning  to  a  being  like  man,  who  has  con- 
216 


AIM  AND  METHOD  OF  REALISM 

sciousness  of  purpose,  choice,  and  freedom.  So 
far  as  our  realism  is  shot  through  with  person- 
alism  we  are  freed  from  the  trammels  of  a  static 
world.  "Things  as  they  are,'*  including  person- 
ality, provide  for  both  freedom  and  change. 

(c)  Personal  Realism  Aims  through  a  Doctrine 
of  Personality  to  Unite  the  Oppositions, 
Whatever  one's  philosophical  opinions  may 
be,  there  are  but  two  attitudes  which  can  be 
taken  toward  the  perplexing  problems  of  phi- 
losophy. One  can  decide  to  ignore  altogether 
one  side  of  the  contradiction,  or  one  can  set  out 
boldly  to  transcend  the  contradiction  by  seeking 
some  higher  basis  where  the  apparent  contra- 
dictions will  appear  as  complementary  parts  of 
a  higher  unity.  Both  materialism  and  idealism 
present  examples  of  the  first  attitude.  Modern 
philosophy  as  a  whole  seeks  the  common  ground 
of  mediation.  In  the  end,  the  contradiction 
between  matter  and  spirit,  cause  and  effect, 
thing  and  thought,  comes  to  the  metaphysical 
question  of  first  cause.  Here  the  ancient  sys- 
tems lead  us  only  to  an  ultimate  mystery.  Fol- 
lowing the  way  of  materialism  through  the  suc- 
cession of  effects  and  causes,  we  assume  at  last 
a  cause  so  abstract  that  it  does  not  connect  with 
the  facts  of  life,  or  from  sheer  exhaustion  we  deny 
the  possibihty  of  knowledge.  If  we  take  the 
217 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

higher  road  of  idealism,  we  again  land  in  abstrac- 
tion, finding  the  swamps  of  phenomenalism  little 
better  than  the  quagmire  of  agnosticism.  Be- 
cause of  our  naturalistic  ways  of  thinking  we 
continue  to  be  perplexed  by  the  demand  for  a 
creative  energy  which  is  itself  uncaused.  For 
the  child  of  the  Dragon's  tooth  uncaused 
cause  is  unthinkable,  and  he  feels  it  better  to 
die  in  the  desert  than  in  daring  hope  to  go  on 
toward  a  promised  land.  But  the  moment  we 
look  into  the  mystery  of  personality  we  dis- 
cover the  groundlessness  of  certain  fears,  and 
are  encouraged  to  believe  that  others  may 
disappear  under  the  light  of  larger  knowledge. 
The  reason  for  this  hope  is  that  we  discover  in 
our  own  exercised  power  of  choice  and  purpose 
the  very  element  which  we  considered  unthink- 
able. We  have  within  us  the  power  of  uncaused 
causation.  We  may  choose  to  remove  moun- 
tains and  cast  them  into  the  depths  of  the  sea, 
or  we  may  choose  to  desist.  In  this  primary 
act  of  choice  we  can  locate  nothing  at  all  com- 
mensurate or  equivalent  to  the  effect  produced. 
An  impulse  of  personal  ambition,  a  dream  of  the 
night,  the  scourging  of  the  mind  to  inventive 
action  by  the  sheer  power  of  the  willing  person- 
ality changes  the  face  of  the  earth  and  imlocks 
material  laws  and  forces  of  which  to  that 
moment  the  scientist  had  been  ignorant  or 
218 


AIM  AND  METHOD  OF  REALISM 

skeptical.  How  much  of  the  scientific  stock 
in  trade  is  the  merest  formula  for  getting  at 
facts  rather  than  a  fundamental  metaphysical 
condition  of  things  is  shown  with  great  clearness 
and  cogency  by  Bergson  in  discussing  the 
scientific  overestimate  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
conservation  of  energy.^  If  from  the  fulcrum 
of  a  limited  contact  such  as  the  human  body 
gives  to  the  human  spirit  personality  can  create 
its  own  internal  powers  and  then  turn  them  to 
the  mastery  of  its  world,  why  should  it  seem 
incredible  as  the  attribute  of  a  Supreme  Creative 
Person?  The  reason  for  our  blindness  at  this 
point  has  been  perhaps  our  insistence  upon  the 
existence  of  matter  first,  and  then  upon  spirit 
as  secondary.  But  science  shows  us  spirit  or 
life  in  the  very  act  of  creating  the  material 
fulcrum  from  which  it  enlarges  its  powers  and 
contacts.  Whatever  of  truth  there  be  in  evo- 
lution is  in  this  power  of  life  to  lay  hold  upon 
matter  and  to  bend  it  to  new  purposes.  In 
other  words,  the  purpose,  desire,  or  will  is  able 
measurably  to  create  the  organs  through  which 
life  functions.  Organism  may  be  looked  upon 
as  constructing  itself  by  functioning,  so  that 
structure  cannot  be  said  to  precede  life.  The 
individual  creates  the  structure  by  functioning. ^•^ 

»  Time  and  Free  Will,  pp.  150f. 

^  Compare  C.  M.  Child,  Individuality  in  Organism,  pp.  16f . 
219 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

The  story  of  progressing  life  is  the  story  of 
uncaused  cause,  and  its  opposite  is  death.  In 
personaHty,  then,  we  find  the  key  to  metaphy- 
sics, a  doctrine  surely  as  old  as  Augustine,  but 
too  much  neglected  by  an  age  to  which  the  great 
appeal  has  been  one-sidedly  naturalistic. 

The  objection  may  be  made  that  we  lock  our 
problem  up  in  the  mysterious  deeps  of  person- 
ality which,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  is  unana- 
lyzable  and  indivisible.  If  such  an  objection 
be  raised,  we  are  not  without  certain  consola- 
tions. The  objection  is  not  so  serious  as  it 
seems,  for  it  amounts  simply  to  this,  that  life 
is  greater  than  any  explanation  of  it.  Our  best 
symbols  fail  to  grasp  its  essence,  just  as  the 
fact  of  a  falling  body  is  something  more  than 
the  equation  in  which  physics  represents  it. 
If  the  inadequacy  of  language  continues  to 
dull  our  joy  or  to  prevent  "a  shining  morning 
face,"  we  may  benefit  by  the  reflection  that 
though  we  cannot  adequately  describe  person- 
ality and  life,  we  can  experience  it,  which  is 
better.  As  for  the  objection  that  personality 
itself  is  a  mystery,  we  can  be  comforted  with  the 
thought  that  since  we  must  rest  upon  mystery 
in  any  case,  the  mystery  of  personality  may 
possess  some  superiority  to  the  mysteries  pre- 
sented in  the  fundamental  reality  by  materialism 
and  idealism.  Some  mysteries  assumed  at 
220 


AIM  AND  METHOD  OF  REALISM 

least  do  not  continue  to  raise  difficulties  ad 
infinitum  and  with  such  persistent  frequency 
as  to  raise  the  query  in  honest  minds  whether  the 
system  has  not  left  the  rails  of  consistency  to 
bump  along  on  the  cross-ties  of  facts  with  which 
it  is  in  disagreement.  Thoughts  will  come  that 
the  consequent  bumping  springs  from  going  in 
a  direction  at  right  angles  with  the  facts.  If 
one  is  to  be  thrust  on  mystery  anyway,  it  seems 
well  to  choose  the  mystery  least  incongruous 
with  the  facts  of  experience,  and  giving  greatest 
hope  of  future  elucidation.  Our  choice  lies 
between  an  incoherent  purposeless  accident, 
demanding  an  infinite  regress,  and  therefore 
unknowable,  or  an  inaccessible  pantheistic 
cause  wherein  matter  is  wholly  phenomenal; 
or  we  may  choose  a  seK-creative  personality  as 
the  ground  of  being,  sustaining  itseK  according 
to  general  uniformities  discoverable  in  limited 
and  partial  ways  within  ourselves.  If  we 
choose  personality  as  the  ultimate  mystery, 
there  is  hope  that  we  may  discover  some  things 
about  it  now,  and  there  is  a  yet  higher  hope  of 
that  which  may  be  revealed  by  its  own  self- 
mastery  as  it  mounts  to  the  freedom  of  the  sons 
of  God,  when,  released  from  limitations  of  the 
spatial  and  temporal  order,  it  knows  no  longer 
in  part  nor  after  a  given  order  of  succession,  but 
as  it  also  is  known.  This  investigation  and  this 
221 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

hope  we  cannot  entertain  if  the  fundamental 
mystery  Hes  in  an  invisible  aeon  or  in  the  ineffable 
Absolute.  If  personality  be  the  supreme  mys- 
tery, as  it  is  already  the  undying  interest  of 
life,  we  have  something  suflSciently  concrete  to 
be  studied  in  its  laws  and  manifestations. 
Though  it  be  a  great  mystery  and  we  grow 
impatient  with  the  inadequacy  of  the  solutions 
offered,  we  have  something  which  we  can  at 
least  experience,  instead  of  a  mystery  whose 
doors  are  forever  locked  and  barred  with  the 
sign  of  unreality  which  reads,  "Unknowable," 
or  "Absolute." 


S2S 


CHAPTER  IX 
THE  DEFINITION  OF  PERSONALITY 

It  may  be  desirable  before  precipitating  a 

discussion   of  the  meaning   of  personality   to 

indicate  in  a  prefatory  way  the  line  of  the 
discussion. 

The  Meaning  of  Personality  in  a  System 
OF  Personal  Realism 
It  is  only  fair  to  state  at  the  beginning  that  the 
position  which  a  doctrine  of  personal  realism 
will  take  must  be  that  personality  is  the  fun- 
damental and  indivisible  unit  of  reality.  We 
shall  assume  that  it  is  something  more  than 
states  of  consciousness,  which  apart  from  the 
abiding  nature  of  personality  would  be  but 
disconnected  flashes  of  intelligence.  As  an 
attempt  to  reach  the  realities  of  life  these 
flashes  of  consciousness  by  themselves  alone 
would  be  more  confusing  than  the  intermittent 
glare  of  lightning  to  the  eyes  of  the  belated 
traveler  on  a  trackless  moor.  If  personality  is 
that  which  can  be  divided  up  into  passing 
"states";  if  it  can  be  adequately  defined  or 
understood  by  naming  the  results  of  its  activity, 
as  "sensibility,"  "willing,"  etc.,  then  it  is  the 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

prey  of  eacli  passing  "state,"  and  there  can  be 
neither  freedom  nor  choice.  Personality  is 
likewise  more  than  a  combination  of  any 
number  of  "states"  that  might  be  taken  as  com- 
posing it.  If  personality  is  constituted  by  a 
federation  of  states,  it  becomes  less  than  they, 
and  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  purposive 
and  efficient  causation. 

Neither  does  the  personal  realist  when  he 
uses  the  term  "personality"  mean  to  refer  to  the 
brain  as  the  seat  of  the  independent,  self- 
existing  soul,  nor  to  the  mind  as  conscious  merely 
of  its  own  organic  activity.  In  the  words  of 
one  writer,  personality  "is  nothing  other  than 
the  permanence  of  the  active  principle  which 
constitutes  us."^ 

This  idea  is  not  novel  in  the  history  of  philo- 
sophy, nor  is  it  out  of  keeping  with  modern 
tendencies  in  widely  divergent  systems. 

Applying  this  fact  to  neo-realism,  it  would 
seem  possible  to  recognize  the  personal  element 
in  consciousness,  for  we  find  Perry  seemingly 
admitting  that  "the  so-called"  relational  theory 
of  consciousness  "has  emphasized  this  fact  that 
mental  content  is  distinguished,  not  by  the  stuff 
or  elements  of  which  it  is  composed  but  by  the 


1  Piat,  La  Personne  Humaine,  p.  69.  In  this  connection 
and  also  on  page  28  and  elsewhere  Piat  discusses  this  general 
problem  in  an  interesting  way. 

9,U 


DEFINITION  OF  PERSONALITY 

way  in  which  these  elements  are  composed."^ 
Such  an  admission  makes  clear  that  it  is  not 
less  the  mental  content  than  the  willing  person- 
ality that  determines  the  mental  possession. 
The  way  in  which  the  elements  of  mental  con- 
sciousness are  composed  makes  the  part  of  the 
composer  a  most  important  one.  This  is  our 
old  friend  personality,  brought  into  the  field 
again  though  thinly  disguised  by  an  alias.  The 
neo-realist  claim  for  the  immediacy  of  per- 
ception, that  is,  the  impossibility  of  representing 
perception  by  analysis  into  subject  and  object, 
and  the  contrasting  forms  of  mind  and  matter, 
is  paralleled  in  personal  realism  by  the  claim 
that  it  is  personality  which  defies  analysis. 
When  one  has  analyzed  it  into  functions  and 
states  and  laid  the  contrast  between  one  and 
the  other  he  has  really  missed  its  reality.  The 
reason  for  this  is  plain.  It  is  the  profound  truth 
which  Bergson  sets  forth  in  his  contrast  between 
intuition  and  intelligence,  or  rationalization,  as 
a  means  to  knowledge.  Words  can  never 
adequately  describe  the  fact  of  life. 

Some  Essential  Features  of  Personality 

(a)  Self-Definition  and  Recognition  of  Other  Per- 
sonalities. 
The  first  essential  to  be  named  in  personality 

2  Compare  Perry,  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  p.  277. 
225 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

is  the  self-defining  element  of  self-identity.  In 
the  discovery  of  its  differentiation  from  sur- 
rounding objects  comes  the  dawning  of  person- 
ality. Whatever  else  personality  may  mean, 
it  must  mean  this — ^that  some  unit  of  feeling 
becomes  self-conscious  through  its  reactions. 
The  immediate  corollary  of  this  truth  is  the 
existence  of  other  objects  and  the  recognition 
of  other  personalities. 

Bertrand  Russell  lends  an  interest  to  the 
present  discussion  when,  speaking  of  the  inde- 
finability  of  wholes,^  he  declares  that  a  unity 
cannot  be  broken  up  into  its  terms  except  for 
purposes  of  analysis.  It  is  obvious  upon  re- 
flection that  personal  identity  is  of  quite 
another  order  than  mathematical  identity. 
I  am  not  the  same  to-day  that  I  was  yesterday, 
for,  under  the  impact  of  experience  and  life,  I 
possess  different  qualities  of  mind  and  spirit, 
new  attitudes  and  moods  toward  life.  I  have 
changed,  and  yet  I  have  maintained  my  iden- 
tity. This  would  have  been  impossible  in  the 
rigid  realm  of  mathematics  and  of  logic,  for  here 
the  entering  in  of  new  qualities  into  the  defined 
whole^  would  mean  the  passing  of  the  old  and 
the  arrival  at  a  new  identity.    The  difference 


» Bertrand  Russell,  The  Principles  of   Mathematics,  pp. 
11  If. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  96f. 

9M 


DEFINITION  OF  PERSONALITY 

then  between  identity  in  numbers  or  in  material 
objects  of  any  kind  and  identity  in  finite  persons 
is  one  of  relation  to  the  temporal  order.  The 
person  survives  the  time  order  as  does  nothing 
else.  The  opposing  thought  which  at  once 
arises  to  the  mind  is  the  remembrance  of  the 
duration  of  material  objects  around  us.  Not 
only  do  animals  seem  to  possess  the  same  element 
of  duration  over  time,  holding  for  long  periods 
a  certain  identity,  but  we  seem  able  also  to  affirm 
such  enduring  identity  of  trees,  houses,  moun- 
tains, and  other  natural  objects.  A  little  con- 
sideration, however,  discloses  in  such  claims  a 
largely  subjective  element.  Such  identity  could 
be  really  true  only  as  the  product  of  thinking 
intelligence,  on  the  part  of  the  perceiver,  or  to 
some  supreme  intelligence  to  whom  the  duration 
of  things  possessed  a  meaning,  or  as  trees, 
mountains,  and  animals  were  themselves  con- 
scious of  time. 

Personality  as  the  differentiation  of  self- 
consciousness  from  external  objects  is  plain 
enough;  as  including  a  world  of  other  person- 
alities it  is  not  so  clear.  Nevertheless,  we  can- 
not pass  over  the  part  played  in  personality  by 
the  existence  of  the  social  relation.  If  there 
were  no  other  personalities,  human  or  divine, 
the  whole  problem  of  explanation  would  break 
down.  A  solipsistic  world  could  not  find  nor 
227 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

would  it  need  explanation.  All  could  be  taken 
as  a  unity  of  experience,  a  part  of  the  individual. 
The  perception  theory  of  neo-realism  would 
hold  for  such  a  world  as  well  as  any.  If  the 
recognition  of  other  personalities  were  not 
demanded,  abstract  idealism  would  do  as  well, 
for  this  personal  world  is  exactly  what  neither 
of  the  parties  can  provide  for.  Any  creative 
being  which  is  Absolute  or  pantheistic  must  be 
impersonal.  A  philosophy  of  the  Absolute 
would  quickly  come  to  an  end  if  it  did  not 
unconsciously  assume  personality  in  an  Absolute 
which  is  by  definition  incapable  of  it.  We  can 
make  no  progress  in  the  definition  of  personality 
unless,  first  of  all,  we  describe  it  as  self-defining, 
differentiating  itself  from  all  other  selves  and 
objects.  This  characteristic  is  as  necessary  to 
the  aflBrmation  of  divine  personality  as  it  is  to 
the  human.  This  element  will  be  treated  in  a 
later  chapter. 

That  the  recognition  of  other  personalities  is 
necessary  to  a  definition  of  personality  is  clear 
when  we  come  to  consider  the  possibility  of 
common  ideas  which  ground  the  world  of  rela- 
tion. We  approximate  each  other's  thought  not 
only  by  reason  of  similarity  of  mental  function, 
not  only  because  the  material  world  is  what  it  is, 
with  but  one  story  to  tell  to  all,  but  more  than 
all  else  because  the  world  of  matter  and  intelli- 
^28 


DEFINITION  OF  PERSONALITY 

gence  is  maintained  and  upheld  by  a  personal 
World-Ground.  In  no  other  way  is  it  possible 
to  account  for  a  common  order  of  intelligence. 
There  is  no  other  way  to  meet  the  problems 
thrust  upon  us  by  any  realistic  attempt  to 
define  the  relation  of  mind  to  other  minds  and  to 
the  world.  We  turn  to  Perry  for  illustration.^ 
How  can  we  come  to  a  common  possession  of 
ideas?  The  element  of  personality  so  tinges 
all  ideas  that  I  cannot  be  certain  that  my  friend 
gets  my  exact  meaning.  Into  his  notion  enter 
the  elements  of  his  own  experience,  rendering 
his  thought  more  or  less  different  from  mine. 
We  can  come  only  to  a  reasonable  degree  of 
coincidence  of  ideas.  Here  the  realistic  diffi- 
culty comes  from  distinguishing  mind  as  a 
bundle  of  nervous  reactions,  distinct  from  my 
"me"  or  personality.  It  is  the  fallacy  of  analy- 
sis applied  to  personality,  and  corresponds  to 
the  idealistic  fallacy  which  by  analysis  breaks 
up  reality  into  subject  and  object  in  perception. 
What  are  we  perceiving  when  we  perceive 
the  mind  of  another  .f^  Have  we  not  merely 
changed  our  self-conscious  introspection  for 
another's,  put  into  the  inadequate  form  of  such 
human  expression,  verbal  or  otherwise,  as  we  are 
able  to  command?  However  realistic  I  may 
be,  I  cannot  be  sure,  from  the  realistic  stand- 

*  Perry,  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  p.  288  et  passim. 
229 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

point  even,  that  his  nervous  reactions  called 
thought  have  equivalence  to  mine,  nor  can  I 
look  into  his  brain  and  see  his  ideas.  You  tell 
me  of  your  visit  to  London,^  but  my  ideas  (on 
the  realistic  basis)  will  scarcely  correspond  to 
yours  if  the  only  aggregation  of  houses  I  have 
ever  seen  is  that  at  Hickory  Corners.  My 
interpretation  of  your  ideas  will  depend  about 
as  much  upon  my  personal  mental  content  as 
upon  your  description.  The  more  nearly  our 
experiences  agree,  the  more  nearly  will  our 
ideas  approximate. 

(6)  Duration. 

Any  definition  of  personality  would  be  incom- 
plete which  did  not  recognize  duration  as  an 
essential  element.  We  here  use  the  term  in  the 
Bergsonian  sense.  This  follows  closely  on  the 
assertion  of  self -identity.  As  we  saw  above, 
personal  self-identity  has  a  meaning  quite 
different  from  that  which  holds  in  the  world 
of  matter,  or  mathematics  or  logic.  In  the 
realm  of  personality  we  have  an  identity  sur- 
viving change  and  not  altogether  subject  to  the 
temporal  order.  The  temporal  order  influences 
it  profoundly  but  does  not  conquer  it.  The 
personality  brings  its  past  with  it  at  every 
moment;  it  relates  that  past  to  the  present 


«  Perry,  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  p.  296. 
230 


DEFINITION  OF  PERSONALITY 

moment,  and  both  to  a  possible  future,  thus 
transcending  and  outstripping  the  temporal 
order.  Its  power  to  do  this  differentiates  per- 
sonality forever  from  the  world  about  it.  Per- 
sonality alone  gathers  and  masters  an  accumu- 
lating experience.^  Fite  likewise  calls  atten- 
tion to  the  truth  that  human  consciousness  or 
personality  is  an  indefinitely  graduated  scale 
of  being.  It  is  only  when  our  action  springs 
out  of  a  consideration  of  the  whole  of  life's 
interest  that  we  can  be  said  to  be  fully  con- 
scious. The  creature  of  mere  habit  then,  can 
be  said  scarcely  to  have  lived  at  all.* 

(c)  Freedom. 

The  possession  by  personality  of  duration  is 
necessary  if  we  are  to  have  the  further  essential 
qualities  of  freedom.  Only  that  being  who 
is  in  possession  of  past,  present,  and  future  can 
be  capable  of  any  free  act  of  choice  or  purpose, 
or  can  be  charged  with  any  duty  of  moral 
responsibility.  To  deny  freedom  in  person- 
ality is  to  remove  at  a  stroke  its  chief  glory, 
moral  and  spiritual  accountability. 
{d)  Causality 

But  the  unique  element  of  personality  is  the 
power  of  purposive,  efficient  causation.     Using 

^  Compare  Haldane,  Mechanism,  Life  and  Personality,  pp. 
114-5. 

*  Fite,  Individualism,  pp.  66-67. 
^1 


y 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

its  power  of  choice,  it  can  bring  to  pass  that 
which  is  physically  undetermined.  It  can  so 
bring  under  subjection  its  own  mental  powers 
and  processes  as  to  create  for  itself  new  powers 
of  expression.  Thus  transcending  itself,  it  takes 
flight  to  new  discoveries,  and  moves  to  new 
masteries  of  the  physical  world. 

Bergson  in  a  beautiful  passage  has  noted  this 
unique  element  in  personality.     He  says: 

The  finished  portrait  is  explained  by  the  features  of 
the  model,  by  the  nature  of  the  artist,  by  the  colors  spread 
out  on  the  palette;  but,  even  with  the  knowledge  of  what 
explains  it,  no  one,  not  even  the  artist,  could  have  fore- 
seen exactly  what  the  portrait  would  be,  for  to  predict  it 
would  have  been  to  produce  it  before  it  was  produced,  an 
absurd  hypothesis  which  is  its  own  refutation.  Even  so 
with  regard  to  the  moments  of  our  life,  of  which  we  are  the 
artisans.  Each  of  them  is  a  kind  of  creation.  And  just 
as  the  talent  of  the  painter  is  formed  or  deformed — in 
any  case,  is  modified — under  the  very  influence  of  the 
works  he  produces,  so  each  of  our  states  at  the  moment 
of  its  issue  modifies  our  personality,  being,  indeed,  the 
new  form  that  we  are  just  assuming.  It  is,  then,  right  to 
say  that  what  we  do  depends  on  what  we  are;  but  it  is 
necessary  to  add  also  that  we  are,  to  a  certain  extent, 
what  we  do,  and  that  we  are  creating  ourselves  continu- 
ally. This  creation  of  self  by  self  is  the  more  complete 
the  more  one  reasons  on  what  one  does  ....  We  find  that 
for  a  conscious  being  to  exist  is  to  change,  to  change  is  to 
mature,  to  mature  is  to  go  on  creating  oneself  endlessly. 
Should  the  same  be  said  of  existence  in  general.'^' 

•  Creative  Evolution,  pp.  6-7. 
232 


DEFINITION  OF  PERSONALITY 

We  feel  that  Bergson  should  have  gone  on  to 
make  the  aflSrmation  of  efficient  causality  in 
general,  for  wherever  we  discover  any  unique- 
ness in  the  process,  the  emergence  of  new  and 
materially  uncaused  elements,  any  evolutionary 
progress,  the  element  of  personal  causation  is  a 
factor.  The  only  efficient  and  unique  causa- 
tion of  which  we  have  any  knowledge  is  personal. 

So  when  he  says,  "The  evolution  of  life  really 
continues,  as  we  have  shown,  an  initial  impul- 
sion,"^^ it  is  possible  the  initial  impulsion  of  which 
he  speaks,  in  so  far  as  it  is  now  efficient  above 
the  passage  of  time,  is  but  a  manifestation  of 
that  willing  efficiency  which,  so  far  as  man  can 
rightly  judge,  is  the  unique  characteristic  of  a 
person,  in  this  case,  of  course,  a  Supreme  Person. 
It  is  not  strange  that  man,  finding  himself 
possessor  of  such  uniqueness  of  causal  efficiency, 
should  refer  it  to  a  power  outside  himself. 

Investigation  discloses  that  all  evolutionary 
progress  of  which  we  can  really  find  illustration 
or  take  account  is  personal.  At  this  point  we 
should  keep  scientific  analogy  close  to  the  limits 
of  experience.  If  science  had  always  done  this, 
she  would  not  have  cast  upon  the  world  so  many 
groundless  metaphysical  conclusions.  It  may 
be  thrilling  to  draw  the  ideal  of  evolutionary 
progress  so  that  by  a  system  of  abstraction 

'0  Ibid.,  p.  246. 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

which  accounts  for  nothing  we  seem  to  have 
explained  the  heavens  above  and  the  earth 
beneath,  and  the  waters  under  the  earth.  But 
science  needs  at  this  point  some  of  the  soberness 
of  judgment  that  she  urges  upon  enthusiastic 
theists.  So  far  as  we  know,  intellectual  devel- 
opment comes  actually  through  the  purposive 
will  of  the  subject.  Animal  strains  are  im- 
proved not  usually  by  fortuitous  accident  but  by 
purposive  breeding.  New  fruits  do  not  spring 
forth  haphazard,  but  a  Burbank  perfects  them 
into  being  as  the  result  of  purposive  and  inten- 
sive willing.  The  science  of  eugenics  seeks  to 
apply  this  law  of  personal  purpose  in  evolution 
to  the  well-being  of  society.  Wherever  in  this 
day  we  can  lay  our  finger  upon  any  orderly  or 
continuous  progress  or  evolution  we  shall  find  be- 
hind it,  if  we  look,  a  self -identifying  and  intelli- 
gent purpose.  An  unintelligent  evolution  would 
be  an  unintelligible  one.  Progress,  being  read 
only  in  the  light  of  intelligence,  demands  an 
intelligent  source.  EflScient  causation,  then, 
so  far  as  we  have  any  data  by  which  to  go,  is 
the  unique  possession  of  personality  in  time, 
and  it  would  not  seem  too  much  to  assume  that 
it  is  the  possession  of  personality  anywhere. 
How  this  can  be  may  appear  a  very  great 
mystery,  but  we  cannot  deny  the  element  of 
efficient  causation  in  ourselves  without  denying 
234 


DEFINITION  OF  PERSONALITY 

the  world  of  intelligence  and  moral  responsi- 
bility. 

So  also  with  every  new  idea,  with  every  product  of 
inspiration:  those  to  whom  at  first  and  rarely  such 
inbursts  of  reflexive  insight  come  with  definiteness  and 
power  could  not  have  done  otherwise  than  refer  them  to  a 
supernatural  source.  Moments  of  deep  thought  and  inten- 
ser  fancy,  distinguished  above  the  commonplace  of  exist- 
ence, moments  of  imagination  and  invention — these 
moments  have  in  all  ages  struck  upon  the  mind  as  from  a 
world  beyond  that  of  the  visible  career." 

Is  this  more  than  a  recognition  of  the  fact 
that  unique  causation,  when  it  appears,  is 
spontaneously  viewed  as  the  product  of  per- 
sonality? 

As  an  uncaused  and  efficient  cause,  the  finite 
personality  is  limited  to  a  world  of  relation. 
The  Infinite  or  Supreme  Personality  would 
be  limited  only  by  his  moral  desire. 

All  of  these  definitions  gathered  up  into  that 
strange  reflective  self-possession  which  achieves 
is  what  we  mean  by  personality. 

In  the  words  of  Herder's  "Self": 

**Not  what  thou  seest  (animals  observe) ; 
Not  what  thou  hearest  (brutes  can  likewise  hear) ; 
Not  what  thou  learnest  (ravens  also  learn) ; 
But  what,  perceiving,  thou  dost  understand; 
The  power  that  in  thee  works,  the  inner  seer 


"  Hocking,  The  Meaning  of  God  in  Human  Experience,  p.  9. 
235 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

Who  from  the  past  divineth  what  shall  be; 
The  organizer  who  from  chaos  spins 
The  pattern  of  the  raveling  universe 
Into  the  tapestries  of  mind  and  sense. 
This  art  thou,  even  as  'tis  likewise  God."^' 

The  Self-Conscious  and  Self-Creative 
Elements  in  Personality 

At  least  two  other  elements  must  be  intro- 
duced into  any  adequate  definition  of  person- 
ality. These  are  self -consciousness  and  self- 
creativity,  and  they  are  applicable  alone  to 
human  personality  and  by  analogy  to  the 
Supreme  Personality.  By  self -consciousness 
now  we  mean  something  more  than  self-identi- 
fication and  separation  from  other  individuals. 
The  lower  form  of  self-consciousness  is  in  some 
measure  the  possession  of  animals.  The  self- 
consciousness  of  the  person  is  of  a  higher  order, 
for  man  is  not  only  self-conscious.  He  is  con- 
scious of  his  states  of  consciousness.  He  not 
only  acts  from  motives,  but  he  is  able  also  to 
weigh  and  judge  those  motives,  approving  or 
condemning  them.  And  this  power  does  not 
wait  upon  the  passage  of  time.  It  is  not 
dependent  upon  memory,  for  it  is  possible  for 
man  to  judge  of  his  states  of  consciousness  in 
the  very  moment  of  action.  This  power  of 
the  personality  brings  moral  responsibility  in 

«  Trans,  by  C.  A.  Lane,  Monist,  1911,  p.  105. 
236 


DEFINITION  OF  PERSONALITY 

its  train,  enters  intimately  into  his  possession 
of  freedom,  and  endows  all  the  other  qualities  of 
individuality  with  a  new  meaning  and  signifi- 
cance. Thus  endowed  with  the  possibility  of 
free  moral  choices,  he  needs  only  to  be  empow- 
ered with  the  further  unique  gift  of  self-crea- 
tivity. 

This  self -creative  power  is  peculiar  to  person- 
ality. The  appearance  of  the  new  in  intel- 
lectual grasp,  in  knowledge,  in  insight,  in  reve- 
lation of  unusual  truths,  or  in  unique  expressions 
of  truth,  the  genius  of  Beethoven,  the  insight 
of  Shakespeare,  the  moral  and  spiritual  suprem- 
acy of  Jesus — these  are  but  parts  of  the  self- 
creative  mystery  of  personality.  They  are 
parts  of  the  Ultimate  Mystery,  but  they  are 
no  harder  of  solution  than  the  mystery  that 
gathers  about  Bergson's  vital  "elan,"  or  any 
other  impersonal  explanation  of  first  cause. 
In  personality  we  have  a  first  cause  of  whose 
operation  we  are  conscious,  even  though  we 
are  unable  to  define  or  analyze  it.  It  may  be 
the  part  of  sense  and  sound  judgment  to  con- 
clude to  the  personality  of  the  ultimate  self- 
creative  First  Cause.  We  do  this  because  the 
only  appearance  of  self -creative  energy  we  can 
know  is  inextricably  bound  up  with  personality. 
At  any  rate  this  conclusion  cannot  be  less 
scientific  than  one  which  drives  the  question 
237 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

back  into  an  atomistic  or  ideal  realm  where 
we  are  forbidden  ever  to  observe  it.  The  only 
example  of  purposive,  self-creative  activity  of 
which  we  cannot  escape  the  knowledge  is  in  the 
human  personality  itself. 

Personality  the  Fundamental  Reality 

Haldane,  quoting  Hegel,^^  calls  attention  to 
the  fact,  that  Kant's  categories  can  be  com- 
pleted only  by  adding  the  category  of  life  to  that 
of  substance  as  one  of  the  fundamental  or 
initial  ideas,  and  declares  that  this  would  end 
the  difficulties  of  the  mechanistic  theory  of  life. 
He  likewise  adds  in  another  place,  "Philosophy 
leads  us  up  to  personality  as  the  great  central 
fact  of  the  universe."^'*  We  would  add  that 
personality  is  the  fundamentally  real.  We  have 
noticed  the  self -identifying,  other-identifying 
quality  of  personality,  its  enriching  content  of 
experience  in  the  survival  of  time,  its  freedom 
in  choice  and  purpose,  making  place  for  moral 
responsibility,  its  unique  power  of  uncaused 
causation,  its  conscious  self-consciousness  and 
its  self-creativity,  but  even  the  completest 
analysis  of  function  and  activity  are  no  more 
it  than  the  description  of  a  horse  is  a  horse. 
Primarily,  each  of  these  functions  pivots  upon 

"  Mechanism,  Life  and  Personality,  p.  76. 
"  Ibid.,  p.  1S3. 

238 


DEFINITION  OF  PERSONALITY 

the  self -identifying  unit  of  being  which  in  itself 
is  not  subject  to  change.  This  unchanging 
factor  is  primary  and  real.  It  is  given  in  the 
simplest  perception,  and  is  not  dependent  upon 
intellectualization.  It  is  the  ultimate  content 
of  consciousness.  It  is  simpler  than  "I  think, 
therefore  I  am";  it  is  prior  to  "I  perceive, 
therefore  I  am,"  for  the  moment  the  fact  has 
passed  into  syllogism  it  has  passed  out  of  life 
into  symbol.  Differing  from  the  starting-point 
of  idealism,  it  avoids  ascribing  a  transcendental 
nature  to  reality.  Personality  is  the  reality, 
and  the  system  which  sets  it  forth  might  well  be 
called  either  personalism  or  personal  realism. 


£39 


CHAPTER  X 

PERSONAL  REALISM  AND  THE 
TROUBLESOME  PROBLEMS  OF 
PHH^OSOPHY 

Though  much  of  the  ground  has  already  been 
covered,  it  may  not  be  unprofitable  to  gather 
up  in  summary  the  relation  which  a  personal 
realism  must  bear  to  the  ever-recurring  problems 
of  philosophy.  These  problems  are  such  as 
causation,  space  and  time,  the  dualism  of 
thought  and  thing,  and  the  problems  of  error 
and  evil.  It  is  the  more  necessary  to  make  this 
relation  unmistakable,  for  the  reason  that  the 
whole  system,  as,  indeed,  all  systems  of  thought, 
must  be  ultimately  judged  upon  these  grounds. 
If  a  system  of  personal  realism  is  to  stand,  it 
must  prove  its  practical  worth  in  the  way  it 
answers  the  troublesome  problems  of  philos- 
ophy. 

The  Question  of  Causal  Explanation 
Let  us  consider  what  personal  realism  may 

have  to  oflFer  in  the  matter  of  causal  explanation. 

The  impasse  of  mechanical  causation  often  has 
^0 


PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

been  shown  in  philosophical  discussion.  It 
seems  hardly  necessary  to  call  attention  to  the 
fact  of  the  inadequacy  of  any  causal  explanation 
which  depends  merely  upon  succession  in 
events.^  In  such  a  case  there  could  be  no  first 
cause,  and  any  cause  must  be  assumed  to  con- 
tain within  it  all  effects.  Such  a  scheme  comes 
little  short  of  the  static  universe  of  the  Eleatics, 
as  it  affords  no  opportunity  for  innovation  or 
freedom.  Moreover,  it  makes  insoluble  the 
problem  of  progress.  Evolution  becomes  an 
unthinkable  and  irrational  conception  along 
lines  of  impersonal  causation.  The  vital  neces- 
sity for  all  evolution  is  the  introduction  into 
the  effect  of  that  which  does  not  appear  in  the 
cause;  this  new  element  is  that  which  consti- 
tutes the  progress.  If  we  attempt  to  explain 
the  effect  by  the  cause  in  any  impersonal  way, 
then  all  elements  in  the  effect  must  be  traced 
in  the  mechanical  cause,  and  we  have  not 
progress  but  a  state  of  rest.  Cause  and  effect 
are  on  such  a  basis  identical.  Evolution  is  the 
differentiation  of  one  event  from  another  in  the 
order  of  succession.  This  differentiation,  and 
not  the  order  of  succession,  is  the  problem. 
The  question  arises  whether  we  ever  do  expe- 
rience such  differentiation  by  the  appearance 

1  For  a  clear  discussion  of  this  matter  compare  article  by 
J.  S.  MacKenzie,  in  Mind,  1912,  pp.  339ff. 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

in  the  effect  of  elements  that  have  no  apparent 
physical  source.  Do  we  have  any  experience 
of  self -creativity?  Bergson  says  we  do,  and 
that  this  self-creativity  is  the  "vital  elan,"  the 
essence  of  life  and  reality.  But  "vital  elan" 
is  a  term  as  abstract  as  "fountain  of  perpetual 
youth,"  and  as  hard  to  locate.  We  cannot 
trace  it  to  a  concrete  instance.  It  is  said  to  be 
everywhere,  but  it  is  also  undefinable. 

At  this  point  the  personal  realist  calls  atten- 
tion to  the  self -creative  energy  which  we  do  not 
imagine,  but  experience  and  of  which  each  of 
us  is  conscious.  This  is  the  element  which  Kant, 
who  had  declared  against  self-creativity,  had 
to  acknowledge  in  order  to  retain  the  reality  of 
moral  responsibility.  This  self -creativity  lies 
in  the  free  choice  and  purpose  of  the  individual 
person.  In  personal  causation  the  ultimate  ex- 
planation is  not  adequately  provided  by  any 
mechanical  assumption  whatever.  The  ass  that 
starved  midway  between  two  haystacks  because 
the  external  impulses  were  exactly  equal  and  op- 
posite in  direction,  never  existed  outside  the 
speculations  of  the  closet  philosophers.  The 
deciding  factor  is  not  external  but  internal. 

If  the  human  will  is  but  the  prey  of  external 

impulses,  all  personal  responsibility  for  action 

has  gone  to  the  winds.     There  are  philosophers 

who  consider  the  question  of  moral  responsi- 

242 


PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

bility  to  lie  outside  the  realm  of  philosophy. 
But  the  moral  elements  in  man  are  quite  as 
important  as  the  intellectual,  and  any  philoso- 
phy which  renders  that  realm  unreal  must 
eventually  be  discarded  as  inadequate  and 
unsatisfying,  because  it  is  at  war  with  the  facts 
of  personality. 

The  ultimate  explanation  in  personal  causa- 
tion comes  back  in  every  case  to  individual 
purpose  or  will.  This  uncaused  purpose  brings 
in  the  element  of  novelty  between  cause  and 
effect  which  spells  advance.  If  this  be  true  in 
the  case  of  human  causation,  it  becomes 
plausible  at  least  that  the  evolution  which  we 
witness  in  the  world  around  us  is  to  find  its 
ultimate  explanation  in  the  purpose  and  will  of 
a  supreme  personality. 

While  we  may  be  reluctant  to  admit  so  much, 
it  is  clear  that  on  the  impersonal  or  mechanical 
plane  of  explanation,  the  grounding  of  any 
efficient  evolution  is  impossible.  As  Bergson 
has  pointed  out,^  such  cutting  of  reality  into 
little  bits  like  a  puzzle  picture,  in  order  to  reas- 
semble them  and  attain  an  imaginary  progress, 
is  without  value  as  a  means  of  metaphysical 
explanation. 

The  explanation  of  causation  by  purpose  will 
seem  inadequate  to  many,  because  in  science, 

2  Creative  Evolution,  p.  xiiif. 
243 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

for  purposes  of  clearness,  certain  symbols  must 
necessarily  be  used,  and  these  symbols  seem 
important  in  the  explanation.  Here  science 
has  been  hard  pressed  to  give  any  satisfying 
definition  of  its  terms,  or  any  very  intelligible 
and  tangible  proofs  of  its  affirmations.  It  has 
been  driven  by  the  necessities  of  explanation 
from  the  cruder  forms  of  atomism  through  a 
whole  series  of  symbols,  such  as  monads,  seons, 
electrons,  etc.,  invisible  and  indefinable,  but 
sufficient  upon  which  to  hang  figures  of  speech, 
such  as  vortices,  repulsions  and  attractions,  and 
electrical  action.  The  use  of  these  figures  is 
necessary  to  science,  and  any  symbol  which 
serves  to  meet  the  requirements  of  description 
of  observed  action  is  equally  valuable.  The 
trouble  comes  when  the  figures  or  symbols  are 
assumed  as  the  basis  of  reahty,  and  that  there 
is  no  other. 

It  seems  impossible  in  the  midst  of  the  preva- 
lent scientific  mood  of  the  age  for  the  philos- 
opher to  brave  the  storm  of  scientific  scorn  in 
order  to  affirm  the  figurative  and  symbolic 
nature  of  these  scientific  assumptions.  But  if 
one  thing  more  than  another  is  clear  to  the 
philosophic  mind,  it  is  the  purely  hypothetical 
nature  of  these  assumptions  regarding  the  nature 
of  reality.  Their  real  value  lies  in  their  dis- 
closure of  the  laws  and  uniformities  of  nature. 
£44 


PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

They  are  valid  according  to  their  utility,  but 
they  leave  the  metaphysical  question  of  reality 
and  causation  just  where  they  found  it.  This 
need  cause  no  trouble  nor  embarrassment  so 
long  as  the  limits  of  empirical  explanation  are 
realized.  It  is  only  when  the  scientist  attempts 
to  draw  metaphysical  conclusions  that  he  passes 
from  the  realm  of  reality  into  that  of  conjecture 
where  he  lives  no  privileged  existence,  but  must 
submit  to  metaphysical  rather  than  to  scientific 
tests. 

As  an  illustration  let  us  consider  the  attempt 
to  explain  qualitative  value  by  quantitative 
changes.^  As  different  rates  of  vibration  in 
wave-lengths  give  us  the  scale  in  music  and  the 
various  colors  of  the  spectrum  in  light,  so  it  is 
conceived  that  the  only  difference  between 
sound  and  color  is  a  difference  in  intensity  of 
vibration,  in  the  cosmic  substance.  On  this 
supposition  it  is  possible  to  build  a  complete 
system.  The  whole  world  of  hearing,  taste, 
feeling,  seeing,  subjective  and  objective,  is 
reduced  in  imagination  to  a  system  of  vibrations 
more  or  less  intense.  We  have  not  referred  to 
the  scheme  in  order  to  ridicule  it.  All  this  might 
in  time  be  scientifically  elucidated  and  yet  fall 
short  of  metaphysical  explanation.  One  need 
have  no  quarrel  with  such  a  system  if  it  holds 

3  Matter  and  Memory,  pp.  270ff. 
245 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

to  the  limits  of  its  possibilities,  and  submits 
itself  to  the  facts  whose  explanation  is  desired. 
If  it  is  proved  that  all  qualitative  differences 
can  be  reduced  to  quantitative  changes,  we  are 
still  sobered  by  the  fact  that  we  continue  to 
bear  an  undiminished  burden  of  metaphysical 
and  epistemological  explanation.  The  question 
to  be  answered  is  as  difficult  after  the  admis- 
sion as  before,  for  now  we  must  show  why, 
instead  of  a  quantitative  consciousness  of  vibra- 
tions, we  have  consciousness  of  pitch,  timbre, 
music,  or  noise,  raising  within  our  personalities 
the  surging  tides  of  hope  and  action,  speaking 
to  aesthetic  and  moral  impulses,  or  creating 
within  us  a  vast  despair.  Why  is  difference  in 
quantity  in  vibration  interpreted  by  us  as  a 
difference  between  sound  and  light  .f^  Why  do  I 
distinguish  a  certain  speed  as  the  moaning  voice 
of  the  sea  and  another  as  the  glory  of  the 
mountains?  Whatever  scientific  progress  has 
been  made  by  the  assumption — and  it  is  not 
necessary  to  contradict  the  possibility — it  will 
be  clearly  seen  that  the  whole  personal  world 
which  is  of  value  and  interest  to  man  is  yet  to 
explain.  A  world  of  love  and  hate,  of  heroism 
and  treachery,  of  selfishness  and  sacrifice — this 
is  the  great  mystery  and  miracle.  Why  do  mere 
vibrations,  differing  in  intensity,  bear  so  large  a 
tale  of  meaning.?  It  is  obvious  that  the  asser- 
246 


PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

tion  that  qualitative  diiferences  may  in  some 
scientific  scheme  be  reduced  to  quantitative, 
however  true  for  science,  is  a  begging  of  the 
metaphysical  question.  Having  made  the  aflSr- 
mation,  the  problem  is  still  to  be  answered. 
Why  do  quantitative  facts  represent  qualitative 
meanings.?  The  qualitative  meanings  are  the 
ones  that  carry  the  major  interest. 

Space  and  Time 

With  regard  to  space  and  time,  which  have 
already  received  consideration,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary here  only  to  indicate  the  point  in  which 
personal  realism  would  place  peculiar  emphasis, 
the  relation  of  personality  to  the  spatial  and 
temporal  order. 

First  would  be  the  relative  character  of  the 
spatial  and  temporal  order,  space  and  time  being 
the  categories  under  which  the  individual 
relates  things  and  events  to  himself  and  to  each 
other.  It  adds  to  the  Kantian  dictum  the 
affirmation  that  the  temporal  and  spatial  rela- 
tions are  saved  from  the  solipsistic  judgment  by 
being  part  of  a  temporal  and  spatial  order 
maintained  by  a  Supreme  Personal  Intelligence. 
This  addition  may  seem  to  some  to  complicate 
the  problem.  But  its  metaphysical  results  are 
better,  and  in  the  end  less  confusing,  than  the 
erection  of  space  and  time  into  an  independent 
247 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

order.  This  last  inevitably  lands  in  dualism, 
or  makes  the  temporal  and  spatial  categories 
wholly  subjective  and  their  universal  nature 
inexplicable.  Personal  realism  places  distinct 
emphasis  upon  the  nonspatial,  nontemporal 
elements  in  personality.  This  enables  it  to 
meet  the  objection  raised  against  making  the 
spatial  and  temporal  gain  universal  validity 
through  dependence  upon  a  spaceless  and  time- 
less Supreme  Personality.  It  is  just  the  space- 
less and  timeless  elements  that  are  the  dis- 
tinguishing features  of  human  personality. 
Because  personality  can  make  the  spatial  dif- 
ferentiation between  the  here  and  the  there, 
between  the  me  and  the  not-me,  it  becomes  self- 
defining  and  self-conscious.  It  could  not  make 
this  differentiation  were  it  not  in  some  way 
transcendent  over  space.  It  is  not  confined  to 
the  spot  on  the  earth  where  it  rests  nor  to  the 
limits  of  seeing,  hearing,  or  feeling. 

In  a  similar  way  there  is  a  real  sense  in  which 
the  human  personality  is  timeless.  Its  tran- 
scendence of  time  is  that  which  helps  to  give  it  a 
unique  character  in  the  universe.  It  brings  its 
past  experience  with  it  into  the  present  timeless 
moment,  and  looking  out  into  the  future 
transcends  time  by  active  willing,  purposing, 
and  causing.  It  works  according  to  the  tem- 
poral order,  but  it  is  superior  to  it.  It  is  this 
248 


PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

timeless  and  spaceless  element  in  personality 
to  which  Bergson  refers  when  he  declares: 
"Perception  is  master  of  space  in  the  exact 
measure  in  which  action  is  master  of  time."'^ 
It  is  this  transcendence  of  space  and  time  which 
gives  a  hint  for  the  solution  of  the  relation  of  a 
spaceless  and  timeless  supreme  Personality  to 
the  spatial  and  temporal  order. 

A  further  fact  needs  to  be  mentioned  before 
we  close  the  discussion.  However  arbitrarily 
the  spatial  and  temporal  order  may  affect  the 
physical  side  of  a  man,  it  does  not  touch  the 
inner  springs  of  personality.  In  the  course  of  a 
long  life  the  physical  elements  of  the  body  are 
renewed  many  times.  Physical  changes  take 
place  which  cause  a  man  to  be  unrecognized 
by  his  friends  and  which  astonish  him  with 
differences  marked  by  the  years.  So  far  as 
physical  appearance  is  concerned  it  is  difficult  for 
him  to  recognize  the  little  boy  in  the  grown 
man.  It  is  possible  for  him  to  make  the  dis- 
tinction of  the  poet  who  sings: 


"Across  the  fields  of  yesterday 
He  sometimes  comes  to  me, 

A  little  lad  just  back  from  play- 
The  lad  I  used  to  be. 


*  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  23. 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

"And  yet  he  smiles  so  wistfully 

Once  he  has  crept  within, 
I  wonder  if  he  hopes  to  see 

The  man  I  might  have  been."' 

On  the  side  of  personality,  however,  there  is 
neither  doubt  nor  question,  nor  discontinuity 
in  the  recognition  of  one's  individual  identity. 
One  knows  himself  past  all  the  changes,  as 
identical  with  that  personality  that  walked  with 
confiding  hand  in  the  hand  of  his  father  or  laid 
his  head  to  rest  upon  a  mother's  breast.  This 
strange  power  of  self -identification  is  the  essence 
of  personality.  Time  and  space  are  the  canvas 
on  which  it  relates  its  experiences,  but  neither 
has  power  to  make  inroads  into  it.  This  is  the 
surest  element  in  human  knowledge,  without 
which  the  world,  so  far  as  the  individual  is 
concerned,  spins  away  into  chaos.  One  may 
doubt  the  reality  of  the  world  around  him,  or 
the  reality  of  other  persons,  but  to  doubt  himself 
would  mean  either  insanity  or  idiocy. 

The  Dualism  of  Thought  and  Thing 
One  fact  is  made  apparent  by  the  clearing 
process  in  philosophy,  which  is  that  the  dualism 
between  subject  and  object,  thought  and  thing, 
never  can  be  solved  by  ignoring  either  element 
of  the  problem.    It  is  useless,  on  the  one  hand, 

*  Thomas  S.  Jones,  Jr.,  in  The  Rose  Jar,  Thomas  B.  Mosher, 
Publisher. 

250 


PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

to  deny  to  the  mind  any  reality  beyond  that 
contributed  by  the  world  of  matter,  or  to 
attempt  reducing  thought  to  physical  movement 
or  cellular  readjustment  in  the  brain.  Nor,  on 
the  other  hand,  is  the  result  more  happy,  if, 
affirming  the  reality  of  thought,  we  banish  the 
material  world  to  an  unreality  of  phantom  and 
of  shade,  the  product  of  finite  thought,  having 
no  reality  outside  the  mind.  The  question  then 
arises  as  to  how,  if  we  are  to  maintain  two  orders 
of  reality,  it  is  possible  to  so  relate  them  as 
to  secure  identity  and  continuity  of  meaning. 
This  has  become  the  problem  of  modem  phi- 
losophy. 

In  the  past  the  problem  has  been  met  by  an 
abstraction,  and  the  old  temptation  remains. 
This  fact  finds  illustration  in  that  school  of  neo- 
realism  which  considers  the  fundamental  reality 
to  be  not  the  thinker  nor  the  thing  but  the  rela- 
tion between  them.  In  this  system  the  rela- 
tion is  the  fundamental  reality.  If  this  be  true, 
then  the  act  of  perception  is  indivisible,  really 
unanalyzable.  This  realistic  unity  seems  to  us 
artificial  rather  than  natural.  It  is  a  unity 
that  we  have  to  make  in  our  thought.  We 
have  to  force  our  minds  either  to  leave  out  that 
which  seems  natural  to  perception  or  to  think  as 
indivisible  that  which  in  simple  perception  is 
ever  divided.  The  old  realism  had  less  of 
251 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

strain  put  upon  it  when  it  declared  for  things 
as  they  appear.  It  was  comparatively  easy 
for  the  unenlightened  to  believe  in  the  funda- 
mental reality  of  material  objects.  One  could 
easily  believe  in  the  reality  of  his  personality, 
though  one's  attention  was  not  so  easily  fixed 
upon  the  inner  processes.  But  to  believe  that 
the  reality  is  outside  both  of  the  personality 
and  the  natural  object  is  as  much  of  a  strain 
upon  credulity  as  the  assumptions  of  abstract 
idealism.  One  is  so  close  to  one's  mind  that  the 
unreflective  man  is  not  aware  of  its  presence 
any  more  than  the  healthy  man  is  aware  of  his 
stomach.  To  such  a  man  food  is  more  import- 
ant than  physiology.  So  the  crude  realist  had 
a  certain  consistency  of  thought.  He  was  con- 
scious of  material  objects — nothing  could  be 
surer.  Neo-realism  is  of  quite  another  order. 
It  has  lost  much  of  the  naive  common  sense  of 
the  earlier  doctrine.  This  is  not  the  result  of 
realism,  but,  rather,  of  reflection  that  has  com- 
pelled it  to  vacate  realism  of  the  older  type. 
Subjective  idealism  is  not  a  more  abstract  con- 
ception than  this  of  reality  consisting  of  relation. 
I  have  not  mentioned  this  lapse  from  the  older 
realism  of  common  sense  in  order  to  condemn 
it.  The  departure  from  original  simplicity  may 
be  a  philosophical  advance  and  should  be  con- 
sidered on  its  own  merits.  This  fact  is  men- 
^52 


PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

tioned  in  order  to  point  out  that  neo-realism 
is  nearer  to  idealism  in  its  essential  features 
than  is  commonly  supposed. 

Relation  is  an  abstract  term,  and  to  name  it 
as  the  ultimate  reality  is  akin  to  naming  the 
Absolute  as  the  ultimate  reality. 

How,  then,  does  personal  realism  attempt 
the  compromise  between  the  ancient  views.'* 
The  answer  is  that  the  fundamental  reality  is 
not  in  the  relation  but  in  the  relator.  We  have 
the  individual  relating  the  world  of  things  to 
himself,  and  this  is  possible  because  the  world 
of  things  and  persons  are  mutually  related  by  a 
supreme  Intelligence.  What  is,  then,  the  real? 
The  reality  is  persons  in  a  personal  world. 

If  it  seems  we  have  thus  reintroduced  abstrac- 
tion under  the  term  "personality,"  a  little 
consideration  may  soften  the  harshness  of  the 
judgment.  The  first  of  these  considerations 
is  that  there  is  even  to  the  ordinary  mind  no 
incompatibility  in  the  assertion  of  the  essential 
unity  of  the  personality  in  perception.  Unity 
at  this  point  is  the  sine  qua  non  of  perception. 
One  does  not  perceive  with  a  divided  personal- 
ity. The  observer  has  no  doubt  of  the  world  of 
appearances,  and  this  world  must  possess  as  its 
fundamental  characteristic  intelligibility,  else 
it  cannot  be  understood.  If,  now,  both  thinker 
and  thing  can  be  considered  as  arising  from  a 
253 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

common  Intelligence  and  Purpose,  we  have  a 
sufficient  Ground  for  unity — a  Ground  which 
needs  no  further  explanation. 

A  second  consideration  is  this:  though  person- 
ality may  be  an  inexplicable  mystery,  it  is  at 
least  that  mystery  with  which  of  all  the  universe 
beside  we  are  most  familiar.  It  is  not  an  ab- 
straction. It  is  the  concrete  source  of  all  our 
understanding,  the  crystal  through  whose  mys- 
terious depths  comes  all  the  knowledge  which 
we  possess.  Mystery  of  this  kind  is  much  more 
endurable  than  that  which  hides  itself  in  the 
unprovable  depths  of  atoms,  monads,  seons, 
electrons,  vortices,  or  even  the  Unknowable  of 
sensational  empiricism.  It  seems  even  better 
than  the  abstraction  of  an  indefinite  "relation" 
which  gains  its  unity  by  main  strength  (and 
awkwardness),  putting  together  that  which 
every  man  naturally  puts  asunder.  At  least 
it  may  be  advanced  in  defense,  that  this  personal 
view  gives  us  a  basis  on  which  to  account  for  an 
intelligible  world.  Personality,  at  least  in  its 
human  manifestation,  can  be  studied,  used, 
and  related,  while  abstractions  can  only  be 
imagined,  like  the  unknown  symbols  of  an  alge- 
braic equation. 

Error  and  Evil 

The  problem  chiefly  haunting  realism  of  the 
254 


PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

common  type  is  the  problem  of  error.  The  last 
enemy  of  personal  realism  as  well  as  of  theism 
is  evil  and  death. 

If  reality  lies  in  perception,  it  becomes 
impossible  to  account  for  error.  Whatever  I 
perceive,  or  think  I  perceive,  is  real,  and  is  what 
it  appears  to  be  without  reference  to  any  other 
judgment.  If  the  reality  lies  in  the  relation 
between  thinker  and  thing,  it  is  impossible  to 
see  how  there  can  be  untruth  or  unreality  of 
false  relation.  Every  man's  judgment  is  as 
good  as  every  other  man's.  No  matter  how 
much  they  may  differ  in  perception  all  are  cor- 
rect. To  use  the  ancient  slogan  which  has 
been  recently  resurrected,  "Man  is  the  measure 
of  all  things." 

In  common-sense  realism  matter  was  the 
independent  reality  which  we  could  accept  or 
leave,  but  which  we  could  not  question.  Its 
difficulty  was  not  so  much  in  providing  for  the 
problem  of  error  as  it  was  to  account  for  any 
true  understanding.  The  gulf  between  mind 
and  matter  was  complete.  Mind  might  arise 
and  pass  away  while  matter  remained  forever 
independent.  One  could  not  be  sure  that  the 
mental  picture  which  he  obtained  was  a  correct 
one.  Neo -realism  is  heckled  by  both  the  prob- 
lem of  knowledge  and  the  problem  of  error. 

Pluralistic  realism  makes  no  attempt  to  solve 
^55 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

the  problem,  choosing  rather  to  ignore  it. 
But  in  thus  avoiding  the  issue  others  more 
difficult  rise  up  to  confront  it.  These  are  the 
problems  posed  by  the  apparent  unity  in  the 
world,  problems  of  moral  responsibility,  of 
common  understanding,  of  thought,  and  even 
of  language  and  history. 

Idealism  meets  its  intensest  problem  in  the 
existence  of  evil.  Here  we  are  told  of  the  glori- 
fication of  evil,  pain,  and  sorrow  by  that  spirit 
of  self-sacrifice  which  dignifies  the  human  soul 
and  marks  the  highest  conquest  of  evolutionary 
processes.  This  noble  viewpoint  has  made 
profound  impression  upon  the  choicest  person- 
alities of  all  ages.  Yet  it  needs  ever  to  be 
tempered  by  the  pragmatic  tests  of  concrete 
circumstance  and  action.  The  Jewish  youth 
with  holy  zeal  dedicated  his  all  to  Jehovah, 
saying,  "It  is  corban."  Though  moved  by  the 
loftiest  of  abstract  motives,  he  had  need  to 
bring  his  action  to  the  test  of  concrete  circum- 
stances. The  loftiest  of  religious  motives  and 
the  deepest  of  self-denials  did  not  lead  to  the 
fullest  development  of  self  if  thereby  he  neg- 
lected his  duty  to  his  parents.  So,  an  abstract 
idealism  is  likely  to  see  but  half,  and  that  half 
in  wrong  perspective.  SeK-sacrifice  can  never 
in  itself,  and  standing  apart  from  the  concrete 
instance,  be  hailed  as  the  solution  of  the  problem 
256 


PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

of  pain  any  more  than  can  the  unadulterated 
egotism  that  ignores  it.  The  virtue  of  egotism, 
as  the  virtue  of  self-sacrifice,  is  determined  by 
the  law  of  the  highest  good  to  the  individual, 
and  to  those  around  him.  It  needs  only  to  be 
remembered  that  all  self-reservation  must  be 
kept  from  selfishness,  and  must  never  be  tinged 
by  any  element  of  moral  cowardice,  prevarica- 
tion, or  untruth. 

Neither  the  problem  of  error  nor  the  problem 
of  evil  can  be  met  and  justified  on  the  abstract, 
impersonal  plane.  The  only  justification  for 
either  error  or  evil,  if  justification  there  is,  is 
personal.  There  is  no  abstract  reason  why 
half  the  world  should  be  deluded  in  its  inter- 
pretation of  nature  and  of  life.  When  we  come 
to  actual  cases  we  can  readily  see  how  the  pos- 
sibility of  error  has  been  a  quickener  of  attention, 
a  schoolmaster  to  the  intellectual  powers,  which 
has  presented  us  with  the  better  part  of  our 
mental  equipment.  Through  numerous  failures 
of  judgment,  and  mistaken  interpretations,  man 
comes  to  that  mastery  of  himself  and  his  world 
which  gives  meaning  and  power  to  life.  The 
use  of  judgment  is  a  part  of  that  self -defining  ele- 
ment necessary  to  the  possession  of  personality. 

Likewise,  the  problem  of  evil  can  never  be 
solved  by  reference  to  abstract  principles. 
Sometimes  suffering,  or  the  endurance  of  it,  is 
257 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

the  sign  of  moral  flabbiness  and  lack  of  char- 
acter. The  self-imposed  flagellations  of  closet 
saints,  and  the  meaningless  sacrifices  which  men 
make,  not  for  the  benefit  of  humanity  but  to 
save  their  own  souls,  are  cases  in  point.  Evil 
never  can  be  figured  into  an  abstract  good.  The 
possibility  of  evil,  which  lies  at  the  root  of  all 
moral  responsibility,  will  be  found,  in  concrete 
individual  cases,  necessary  to  a  world  of  freedom 
and  growth.  Whether  the  pain,  suffering,  or 
evil  that  befalls  a  man  is  going  to  prove  useful 
cannot,  however,  be  determined  abstractly, 
but  depends  on  him  individually  in  his  reaction 
to  it.  The  wrongs  suffered  by  the  individual 
may  make  him  bitter,  may  drive  him  into  a 
false  attitude  toward  life,  and  create  in  him 
false  standards  and  ideals.  They  may  weaken 
him  and  render  him  useless.  They  cannot  do 
all  this,  however,  apart  from  his  own  will  in 
the  matter.  On  the  other  hand,  the  presence 
of  the  possibility  of  moral  evil  and  the  impo- 
sition of  suffering  may  be  turned  by  the  indi- 
vidual into  the  source  of  moral  conquest,  the 
achievement  of  the  supreme  spiritual  self- 
possession.  One  thing  is  very  certain:  if  we 
cannot  reach  and  solve  the  problem  through  a 
pragmatic  personalism,  we  cannot  solve  it  at 
all. 

The  problem  arises  from  the  requirements  of 
258 


PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

a  world  of  growth  and  freedom  and  from  the 
transcendent  qualities  of  the  human  spirit,  which 
is  continually  breaking  its  bonds  from  and 
mastering  all  that  is  strictly  material. 

It  is  only  by  a  strict  personalism  that  we  can 
clear  the  Divine  Being  from  participation  in  the 
ancient  wrongs,  the  sins  and  brutalities  of  man. 
If  we  think  of  God  in  the  pantheistic  fashion, 
an  Absolute,  everywhere  in  his  world  of  things 
and  men,  and  lacking  in  those  self-defining 
qualities  necessary  to  personality,  we  have  a  God 
who  is  mistaken  in  our  mistakes,  who  sins  in 
our  sins,  and  who  has  let  loose  upon  humanity 
as  from  a  Pandora's  box  a  brood  of  horrors 
and  crimes  for  which  he  is  responsible  and  for 
whose  ending  he  is  incapable.  But  if  person- 
ality be  the  requirement  of  all  life,  directly  or 
indirectly,  the  Infinite  Personality  is  bound  not 
to  infringe  upon  nor  to  transgress  against  the 
personalities  of  his  creatures.  In  patience  he 
waits  the  late  results  of  that  discipline  by 
which  men  shall  achieve  moral  and  spiritual 
independence  and  self-sufficiency  like  his  own. 
There  are  already  many  indications  that  when 
man  has  become  the  intellectual  master  of  the 
material  universe  and  the  moral  master  of  his 
own  purposes,  thoughts,  and  impulses,  suffering 
and  evil  will  have  vanished  from  his  world. 
They  are  the  growing  pains  incident  to  his 
259 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

youth,  the  concomitants  of  a  passing  imper- 
fection, the  tormenting  evidences  of  growth  or 
of  the  possibility  of  growth,  the  eloquent  re- 
minders of  that  perfect  world  to  come  which 
has  forever  formed  the  object  of  his  untiring 
search. 

To  repeat  here  the  verses  of  T.  E.  Brown 
quoted  by  Bosanquet  in  his  volume  on  the  Value 
and  Destiny  of  the  Individual : 

"The  man  that  hath  great  griefs  I  pity  not; 
'Tis  something  to  be  great 
In  any  wise,  and  hint  the  larger  state 
Though  but  in  shadow  of  a  shade,  God  wot! 

"But  tenfold  one  is  he  who  feels  all  pains 
Not  partial,  knowing  them 
As  ripples  parted  from  the  gold-beaked  stem. 
Wherewith  God's  galley  ever  onward  strains. 

"To  him  the  sorrows  are  the  tension-thrills 
Of  that  serene  endeavor. 
Which  yields  to  God  forever  and  forever 
The  joy  that  is  more  ancient  than  the  hills." 


960 


CHAPTER  XI 

PERSONALISM  AND  THE  GROUND  OF 
BEING 

Personality    Assumed    or    Implied    is    the 

Basis  of  Explanation  in  Current 

Theories 

Because  the  law  of  the  suflScient  reason 
demands  an  intelligent  source  of  intelligible 
results,  widely  differing  theories  and  systems 
pretending  to  impersonalism  and  materialism 
will  be  found  implying  personality  in  the  meta- 
physical ground,  somewhere  in  the  process  of 
their  reasoning.  This  is  quite  sure  to  be  true 
as  a  matter  of  course  in  any  system  which 
attempts  to  explain  a  world  of  which  intelligence 
is  a  part. 

Spencer  hoped  to  found  a  system  that  would 
leave  the  ground  of  being  quite  impersonal. 
Driven  by  the  infinite  regress  of  cause  and  effect, 
he  was  led  to  affirm  unknowable  qualities  of  the 
First  Cause.  But  in  order  to  float  his  theories 
he  had  continual  recourse  to  the  affirmation 
of  personal  qualities,  purpose,  power,  and 
choice  or  selection,  in  this  same  Unknowable 
without  appearing  conscious  of  his  inconsistency. 

More  modern  theories  which  have  recourse 
261 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

for  metaphysical  explanation  to  theories  of 
forces  inherent  in  matter,  to  aeons,  electrons, 
and  vortices,  unconsciously  assume  as  necessary 
to  atoms  and  electrons  that  very  intelligent 
purpose  and  choice  which  it  is  their  purpose  to 
explain.  Even  a  philosophy  of  "vital  elan" 
finds  it  necessary  to  make  a  similar  assumption. 
The  term  "vital  impulse"  is  taken  as  suflBciently 
abstract  to  cover  the  case,  and  then  it  is  dis- 
covered that  a  "vital  elan"  must  have  a  certain 
degree  of  personality  about  it  if  it  is  to  be  used 
in  explanation  of  the  existence  of  a  personal 
world.  So  continually  the  "vital  elan"  is 
referred  to  as  if  it  were  an  abiding  personality; 
and  no  consistent  metaphysics  has  been  able 
to  escape  the  implication.  Of  course,  one  can 
reduce  his  language  to  mathematical  nicety  and 
with  scientific  skill  avoid  speaking  the  fateful 
word  which  will  bring  his  theory  falling  about 
his  ears,  but  he  can  scarcely  avoid  the  attempt 
to  make  his  theory  adequate  to  explain  that 
which  he  proposes  for  explanation.  Just  here 
it  is  that  the  most  violent  impersonalist  endeav- 
ors to  work  personality  into  the  universe  under 
cover.  It  may  be  a  private  satisfaction  to 
endow  an  atom  or  its  more  invisible  equivalent 
with  power  of  choice,  freedom,  intelligence, 
and  purpose,  in  order  to  hold  before  our  aston- 
ished eyes  a  result  that  has  been  wrought  in  the 


THE  GROUND  OF  BEING 

dark  like  the  miracle  of  the  magician.  The 
mind,  however,  which  does  not  desire  to  be 
deceived  cannot  take  seriously  the  thought  that 
the  rabbit,  the  goose,  the  flag,  and  the  deck  of 
cards,  either  sprang  from  thin  air  or  were  really 
concealed  in  the  hat  of  the  entertainer.  The 
really  inquiring  mind  will  seek  for  the  trick  in 
the  uncommon  procedure.  A  progress  toward 
the  explanation  of  intelligence  which  denies 
intelligence  until  it  is,  so  to  speak,  slipped  dex- 
terously from  the  sleeve  of  language  is  really 
not  quite  satisfying  to  the  alert  mind.  It  does 
not  seem  worth  while  to  deny  teleological 
reality  to  the  Ground  of  Being  if  it  is  our  dark 
intention  to  make  the  teleological  inference 
under  a  form  of  words  such  as  "attractions" 
and  "repulsions,"  which  seem  to  explain  only 
because  they  are  purely  hypothetical  and 
abstract;  that  is,  they  beg  the  question.  The 
metaphysical  magician  takes  out  of  the  hat  the 
self-same  rabbit  that  he  put  in,  but  there  is 
nothing  cosmic  nor  metaphysical  about  his 
proceeding,  except  to  the  minds  of  the  very 
credulous. 

Affirming  Personality  in  the  World- 
Ground  IS  not  to  Confuse  God 
with  His  World 

The  greatest  difficulties  of   the  Absolutist 
263 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

philosophy  axise  from  the  identification  of  God 
with  his  world.  Immanence  easily  lapses  into 
pantheism,  in  which  the  world  becomes  the  body 
of  the  indwelling  Infinite,  the  corporate  ex- 
pression of  an  Infinite  and  Eternal  power,  which 
includes  all  things  in  itself,  and  is  the  Ultimate 
and  Absolute  One.  The  trouble  is  that  it  is 
compelled  thereby  to  include  some  very  shock- 
ing and  inconvenient  things,  such  as  an  imper- 
fect world  of  sin,  wickedness,  horror,  and  blood- 
shed. Our  medicine  may  be  sugar-coated,  but 
we  cannot  quite  avoid  the  after  effects  because 
its  real  character  has  been  hidden  from  sight 
and  smell.  We  would  be  saved  this  unsatis- 
factory result  by  affirming  personality  in  the 
World-Ground  and  a  world  of  lesser  person- 
alities and  things  upheld  and  maintained  by  the 
unceasing  purpose  and  will  of  such  self -defining 
Purpose.  God  would  then  be  immanent  in 
his  world  but  not  identical  with  it.  There  is  a 
true  sense  in  which  the  artist  can  be  said  to  be 
immanent  in  his  work.  Every  line,  every  com- 
bination of  color  is  the  result  of  the  artist's 
experience,  character,  skill,  and  personality. 
No  other  man  could  or  would  express  himself 
in  exactly  the  same  terms.  Once  you  know 
the  artist  and  become  acquainted  with  his 
way  of  handling  a  subject,  you  can  tell  his 
work  as  easily  without  his  signature  as  with  it, 


THE  GROUND  OF  BEING 

for  his  work  is  all  written  over  with  himself. 
It  is  the  expression  of  the  unique  in  his  person- 
ality. Now,  no  creator  can  become  identical 
with  his  creation  without  ceasing  to  exist  as  a 
creator.  To  make  God  identical  with  his 
creation  would  be  to  destroy  him.  It  would  be 
ridiculous  to  declare  the  artist  identical  with 
his  picture.  If  the  artist  created  the  picture, 
he  is  something  more  than  the  picture,  though 
he  has  written  himself  into  the  picture  with  the 
greatest  faithfulness,  the  utmost  devotion. 
He  is  in  his  work  it  is  true,  but  it  is  also  true  that 
he  transcends  it. 

A  Changing  World  Implies  not  a  Changing 
BUT  A  Living  God 
A  God  whose  essence  is  change,  whose  quality 
is  to  change  through  and  through,  I  think  has 
been  already  shown  an  impossible  conception. 
Such  a  God,  unable  to  link  together  his  ever- 
flowing  states  would  be  the  mere  creature  of 
the  moving  flux  of  the  world.  Man  would 
then  be  the  only  God  we  know,  for  he  at  least, 
and  he  alone,  in  all  the  changing  universe  is 
master  of  his  own  fate,  directing  his  own  destiny. 
It  is  not  necessary,  however,  to  affirm  a  changing 
God  in  order  to  affirm  a  changing  world.  Our 
own  transcendence  of  the  undeviating  flow 
should  teach  us  this.  In  fact,  the  ancient 
265 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

Jewish  and  Christian  idea  of  a  living  God  will  be 
found  sufficient.  To  live  implies  an  enriching 
content  of  experience,  but  it  does  not  imply 
absolute  change.  It  does  not  imply  change  of 
purpose,  love,  or  identity.  There  never  would 
have  been  the  difficulty  with  this  idea  that  there 
has  been  were  it  not  for  the  confusions  that 
arise  from  ascribing  mathematical  perfection  to 
the  Divine  Being,  instead  of  keeping  to  the 
essentials  of  personality,  purpose,  and  character. 
Here  the  ancient  ghosts  of  spatial  and  temporal 
thinking  have  arisen  to  trouble  us.  If  we  will 
think  for  a  moment  of  the  attributes  commonly 
ascribed  to  the  Divine  Being,  we  shall  see  how 
many  of  them  belong  not  necessarily  to  the 
divine  character,  but  are,  rather,  the  implica- 
tions of  our  human  limitations.  They  are 
human  limitations  from  which  we  feel  that 
God  must  be  free.  And  there  are  certain  of 
the  ascribed  attributes  of  God  that  are  merely 
our  statement  that  God  is  not  holden  of  our 
Hmitations.  Omnipresence,  omnipotence,  om- 
niscience, and  a  brood  of  others  are  quanti- 
tative, and  are  but  the  contrast  of  our  human 
limitations,  the  shadow  cast  by  spatial  and 
temporal  limits  under  which  we  labor,  but  which 
cannot  be  allowed  to  limit  God.  Our  incon- 
sistency springs  not  from  the  affirmation  of 
these    quantitative    attributes    but   from    our 


THE  GROUND  OF  BEING 

attempt  to  measure  their  meaning  to  the 
Supreme  Personality  with  the  yardstick  of  our 
human  limitations.  They  are  the  shadow  of  our 
own  relations  to  the  temporal  and  spatial  order. 
We  do  not  know  their  meaning  for  the  Supreme 
Personality.  These  attributes  are  summed  up 
in  his  self-creative  activity  in  the  ongoing  of 
the  world.  The  relations  of  the  Supreme 
Intelligence  to  the  temporal  and  spatial  order 
cannot  arise  out  of  the  necessities  of  his  being, 
but  are  concerned  with  the  form  of  his  purpose 
toward  an  uncompleted  or  unfinished  world. ^ 
"Why,"  it  may  be  asked,  "did  he  not  make  a 
complete  or  perfect  world  at  the  beginning?" 
The  only  answer  is  that  to  a  moral  being  no 
world  would  be  perfect  without  other  moral 
beings  and  moral  attainment  may  well  be  the 
final  end  of  creative  activity. 

When  we  say  "God  is  love,"  we  affirm  some- 
thing qualitative,  which  is  quite  different  from 
temporal  or  spatial  attributes  and  has  to  do 


1  So  far  as  it  may  be  given  us  to  understand,  space  must 
mean  to  God  the  dififerentiation  between  the  activity  of  his 
own  will  and  consciousness  and  that  of  his  free  creatures. 
Not  being,  as  finite  personalities,  under  the  form  of  corpo- 
reality, space  would  seem  to  be  to  him  some  such  differentia- 
tion. As  to  time,  that  would  be  but  the  story  of  purpose  in 
the  process  of  fulfillment.  The  very  incompleteness  of  that 
purpose  is  a  token  of  contingency  in  result  and  action.  It 
is  the  concomitant  of  freedom. 

267 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

with  character.^  Strictly  considered,  divine  and 
human  perfection  may  require  other  than 
merely  static  elements,  for  it  scarcely  can  be 
conceived  that  any  form  of  existence  is  less 
perfect  than  say  a  geological  formation.  The 
perfection  of  the  living,  on  the  contrary,  lies  in 
its  nonstatic  quality.  If  it  ceases  to  grow,  it 
dies  and  becomes  something  less  perfect.  On 
the  other  hand,  there  are  some  elements  in 
living  personality  which  do  not  change  nor 
pass,  namely,  the  self-identifying  personality 
with  its  consciousness  of  survival  and  differen- 
tiation; the  moral  qualities  of  love,  honor, 
justice,  righteousness,  loyalty;  these  grow  richer 
in  passing  experience,  but  they  need  not  change 
in  perfection.  A  mother's  love,  to  repeat  an 
illustration  already  used,  is  not  changed  in 
essence  and  character  by  the  flow  of  years.  It 
is  as  perfect  when  the  child  is  a  babe  as  it  will 
be  when  the  child  has  become  a  grown  man. 
Experience  in  time  may  have  added  richness 
and  meaning  to  the  content  of  that  love,  but 
neither  joy  nor  adversity,  blessing  nor  bitter- 
ness has  changed  it.  Her  motherhood  may 
be  perfect  from  the  beginning,  though  it  be- 
comes yearly   more  meaningful.     For  contin- 

2  An  interesting  discussion  of  this  phase  of  the  subject  is 
given  by  J.  S.  Mackenzie  in  Mind,  1904,  p.  367  et  passim; 
also  in  Mind,  1912,  p.  341f. 

268 


THE  GROUND  OF  BEING 

gency,  the  possibility  of  doing  differently,  and 
growth,  these  are  necessary  to  the  perfection 
of  the  living  human  personality,  and  it  is  con- 
ceivable that  they  may  be  in  some  manner 
necessary  to  the  perfection  of  a  living  God. 

It  becomes,  indeed,  impossible  to  apply  the 
term  "living"  to  the  Divine  Being  without 
thinking  of  it  in  some  such  way  as  this.  The 
world  in  its  ongoing  is  not  necessarily  a  static 
affair,  forever  predetermined.  It  may  be  on  its 
way  to  an  outworking  all  the  more  sublime 
because  an  Infinite  Free  Spirit  is  at  the  helm. 
The  whole  condition  of  the  present  spatial  and 
temporal  order  might  conceivably  be  changed 
to  meet  rising  conditions  of  life.  Such  changes 
may  be  merely  waiting  upon  new  moral  and 
spiritual  achievements  in  man.  If  it  be  true 
that  "in  him  we  Hve  and  move  and  have  our 
being,"  and  that  creation  calls  for  the  contin- 
uous exercise  of  His  creative  purpose,  every  act 
of  discovery  contains  an  element  of  faith. 
Columbus's  venture  on  untried  seas,  the  trust 
of  the  first  aviator,  the  antennae  of  the  first 
wireless  apparatus  were  as  much  the  act  of  faith, 
the  expression  of  a  prayerful  belief  in  the  Divine, 
as  they  are  expressions  of  scientific  thought. 
So  far  as  man  keeps  himself  in  line  with  the 
orderly  uniformities,  submitting  his  will  to  a 
higher,   there  seem  no  limits  to  his  possible 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

attainment.  The  watchword  of  the  modern 
scientific  investigator  might  well  be,  "Accord- 
ing to  thy  faith  be  it."  God  meets  man's 
intelligent  and  lawful  faith  with  willing  purpose 
as  we  travel  from  the  seen  toward  the  unseen. 
And,  further,  unless  the  content  of  the  divine 
experience  is  susceptible  thus  to  growth  it 
becomes  impossible  to  say  wherein  the  moral 
welfare  of  man,  love,  worship,  or  devotion,  is 
of  any  moment  to  God.  Certainly  in  the 
qualitative  and  positive  attributes  of  the 
Divine  Being  we  have  those  abiding  and  neces- 
sary characteristics  that  form  the  backbone  of 
all  religious  thinking  and  living.  And  we  shall 
at  the  same  stroke  rid  ourselves  of  the  age-long 
dispute  about  the  relation  of  God  to  the  tem- 
poral order,  for  time  in  the  eternal  sense  could 
mean  not  that  the  eternal  is  dependent  upon 
experience  in  time,  but  that  for  him  it  is  but  an 
order  of  succession  dependent  on  his  will  and 
purpose. 

Personal  Realism  Provides  a  Philosophi- 
cal Basis  for  a  Doctrine  of  Incar- 
nation 
(a)  Impossible,  holding  a  view  of  God  as  static, 
to  show  how  he  could  be  in  Christ. 
It  is  impossible  in  any  view  of  God  as  an 
Absolute,  forever  static  and  self-contained,  to 
270 


THE  GROUND  OF  BEING 

offer  a  reasonably  philosophical  hypothesis  for 
a  doctrine  of  incarnation.  Dark  and  unanswer- 
able questions  at  once  arise  as  to  how  any  mani- 
festation in  space  and  time,  bound  to  the  limits 
of  our  human  days  and  years,  could  be  at  the 
same  time  the  Absolute.  And  so  under  the  weight 
of  logical  inconsistency  theism  often  has 
broached  a  departmental  and  divided  God  and 
given  cause  for  the  charge  of  tri-theism  which 
the  hostile  have  been  glad  to  term  polytheism. 

Here  again  the  questions  that  trouble  us  are 
wholly  quantitative,  like  omnipresence,  omnipo- 
tence, omniscience,  and  necessity,  yet  in  spite 
of  all  a  God  but  partially  in  Christ  has  not 
satisfied  the  feeling  of  men. 

Is  it  not  plain  that  life  itself  must  become  a 
horrible  dream  overburdened  with  hopeless 
problems  unless  this  God  who  made  us  is  in 
some  real  and  active  sense  participator  in 
our  struggles,  pains,  and  moral  victories?  If 
as  a  living  God  he  maintains  any  tangible  rela- 
tion to  his  creation  it  must  mean  just  this.  An 
incarnation  is  demanded  to  meet  the  subtlest 
questions  of  the  moral  universe.  Incarnation 
means  a  continuous  divine  participation  in  our 
life,  our  sorrows,  and  our  struggles  with  evil. 
We  must  hold  that  God  in  some  sense  always 
has  been  participator  in  the  life  of  the  world, 
and  so  we  speak  of  an  eternal  incarnation,  and 
271 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

of  the  profound  character  of  the  cross  as  an 
everlasting  principle  of  human  action.  The 
dark  antinomies  of  the  problem  of  evil  grow  less 
dark.  The  existence  of  evil  is  the  price  paid 
for  free  moral  character  and  the  fatherhood  of 
free  spirits.  But  evil  is  within  the  control  of 
man.  As  we  do  away  with  it,  we  help  to  build 
a  perfect  world  in  which  we  can  rejoice  as 
being  free  colaborers  with  him. 

But  questions  will  arise  concerning  the 
limited  nature  of  a  human  God.  To  posit  a 
Divine  Presence  in  Christ  raises  insuperable 
questions  in  many  minds.  There  is  no  more 
limitation  of  the  Supreme  by  his  presence  in 
Christ  than  there  is  in  imagining  him  as  creating 
the  world,  or  in  relation  of  any  vital  kind  to  the 
spiritual  nature  of  man.  The  obscurities  at  this 
point  arise  out  of  assumptions  of  the  temporal 
and  spatial  order  which  do  not  hold  for  the 
Divine  Consciousness.  How  an  incarnation  can 
be  is  doubtless  a  great  mystery.  How  a  human 
body  can  be  possessed  and  influenced  by  a 
nonspatial  soul  is  likewise  a  very  great  mystery. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  an  ascertainable  fact.  We 
need  not  assume  in  order  to  provide  for  an 
incarnation  that  the  Divine  Consciousness  abdi- 
cated the  throne  for  thirty-three  years,  nor,  on 
the  other  hand,  that  the  human  Jesus  was 
consciously  holding  the  planets  to  their  orbits. 
272 


THE  GROUND  OF  BEING 

That  we  have  thought  either  of  these  concep- 
tions necessary  has  been  due  to  fallacies  of 
spatialized  and  temporalized  human  thinking. 
Our  difficulties  are  akin  to  those  that  faced  us  in 
assuming  quantitative  attributes  of  God.  It 
may  help  us  in  this  connection  to  remember  that 
even  human  self -consciousness  is  not  limited  to 
a  single  object  of  consciousness  at  a  time.  It 
can  be  conscious  of  several  objects  and  several 
motives  and  several  goals  at  once.  It  not  only 
can  be  conscious  but  it  can  be  conscious  of  con- 
scious states  without  any  difficulty  or  confusion. 
It  is  only  when  we  begin  analytically  to  emuner- 
ate  states,  to  intellectualize  concerning  them 
as  Bergson  would  say,  that  we  find  theoretical 
difficulties  springing  up. 

(6)  Does  away  with  the  question  of  how   God 
could  manifest  himself  in  historic  time. 
If,  now,  we  turn  from  quantitative  attributes, 
concerning  which  we  can  say  nothing  only  that 
the  Divine  is  not  holden  of  our  temporal  and 
spatial  limitations,  to  the  qualitative  attributes, 
we  find  these  most  important  attributes  repre- 
sented in  the  character  of  Jesus  beyond  power 
of  gainsaying.     Inasmuch  as  we  do  find  these 
and  inasmuch  as  temporal  and  spatial  qualities 
are  the  reflection  of  our  own  necessity  rather 
than  fundamental  divine  attributes,  we  honestly 
273 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

can  declare  that  God  was  in  Christ  in  the  most 
real  sense  that  man  can  know. 

Christology  is  the  assumption  that  the  moral 
qualities  of  God  are  the  essential  ones,  that 
they  are  the  ones  we  are  capable  of  comprehend- 
ing, and  that  they  are  supreme.  The  world 
can  be  completed  on  no  other  basis.  The  con- 
crete appearance  of  goodness  anywhere  is  of 
God,  a  manifestation  of  God,  and  we  need  not 
deny  it  nor  commit  theological  hari  kari  in 
recognizing  it. 

We  are  thus  able  to  free  ourselves  from  the 
perplexity  of  how  God  can  manifest  himself  in  a 
historical  time  and  personality.  Time  and 
space  are  to  him  both  transcendent  and  real. 

A  Personal  World-Ground  Provides  for 
"God,  Freedom,  and  Immortality" 

Let  us  restate  briefly  what  already  has  been 
discussed — the  fundamental  relation  of  a  doc- 
trine of  personality  in  God  to  the  main  problem. 
"How  does  a  personal  World-Ground  provide 
for  God,  freedom,  and  immortality  .f*" 

The  first  consideration  must  be  this,  that  an 
impersonal  World-Ground  leaves  man  in  lone 
moral  possession  of  the  universe,  and  yet  the 
helpless  and  unsurviving  slave  of  dead  matter, 
wholly  unaccountable.  Or  if  this  World- 
Ground  be  conceived  as  an  impersonal  Abso- 
274 


THE  GROUND  OF  BEING 

lute,  he  is  lacking  in  those  personal  qualities 
which  give  him  concrete  value  to  man.  Again, 
though  less  lonely,  the  personality  of  man 
remains  inexplicable. 

In  the  second  place,  any  form  of  imperson- 
alism  reerects  the  closed  system  of  necessity. 
The  one  essential  of  freedom  is  contingency,  the 
power  of  choice,  and  this  is  impossible  to  any 
but  an  intelligent  purposive  being.  It  would 
be  most  difficult  to  explain  how  there  could 
be  either  freedom  or  life  in  an  uncontin- 
gent  Divine  Being.  Nor  does  the  cause  of 
freedom  stop  with  the  Divine  Being.  Unless 
there  is  freedom  in  the  Divine  Being  there  is 
none  in  man.  Man  is  then  but  the  prey  of 
pitilessly  driving  forces  which  rid  him  of  moral 
responsibility  for  his  acts  and  choices. 

Third,  any  system  which  assumes  imperson- 
ality in  the  World-Ground  shuts  the  door  in  the 
face  of  one  of  humanity's  most  cherished  and 
enduring  hopes,  the  hope  of  immortality. 
Perhaps  some  one  will  arise  to  say  that  this  is 
no  affair  of  philosophy,  which  will  be  incorrect, 
for  the  abiding  instincts  of  the  human  race 
cannot  be  ruled  off  the  field  of  explanation 
without  negating  the  explanation  itself. 

If  personality  is  able  in  its  own  intrinsic 
reality  to  abide  the  temporal  flux,  if  it  contains 
self-creative  possibilities,  there  is  nothing  inher- 
%15 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

ently  inconsistent  for  a  belief  in  its  survival  of 
a  world  of  time  and  space. 

And  surely  this  conception  will,  for  men  who 
live  deeply,  in  an  age  that  is  putting  civiliza- 
tion to  its  greatest  tests,  be  more  satisfying  than 
the  suggestion  that  the  only  immortality  for 
which  we  can  philosophically  hope  is  one  of 
works  and  influence,  that  survive  for  some  brief 
and  indefinite  period  after  we  are  gone. 

In  the  view  of  personal  realism,  personality 
stands  upon  a  plane  of  its  own.  It  is  the 
ultimate,  self -causing  reality.  Its  very  nature 
forbids  its  absorption  into  anything  else,  even 
though  that  something  else  be  the  Absolute. 
Its  ability  to  transcend  the  spatial  and  temporal 
order  bespeaks  for  it  an  existence  when  time 
and  space  shall  be  no  more. 

Personality  is  the  sole  surviving  principle  in 
a  world  of  change.  And,  surely,  this  conception 
is  no  more  difficult  than  to  posit  an  original 
"vital  impulse,"  constantly  repeating  itself, 
but  lacking  in  all  power  of  self-direction  and 
purpose,  and  possessing  a  meaningless  sort  of 
immortality.  So  far  as  we  can  have  knowl- 
edge, "God  and  the  soul  abide." 


276 


CHAPTER  Xn 
INDIVIDUALISM    AND    PERSONALISM 

The  crusades  marked  the  break-up  of  an 
institutionalized  and  provincial  world.  In  poli- 
tics, the  crusades,  the  resort  of  kings  to  further 
the  monarchial  system,  were  really  the  faint 
beginnings  of  a  movement  that  ended  far  off 
in  a  high-tide  of  democracy.  Intended  to 
increase  the  power  and  authority  of  the  church, 
they  introduced  a  liberalizing  tendency  that 
resulted  in  the  Reformation.  Entered  upon  in 
a  blind  and  dogmatic  devotion,  they  opened 
the  flood-gates  of  the  revival  of  learning  and 
gave  to  science  its  early  impetus.  In  a  day 
when  philosophy  was  scholastic  and  pedantic 
were  sown  the  seeds  destined  to  revolutionize 
philosophical  systems. 

Of  these  various  developments,  commonly 
known  as  the  Renaissance,  the  deeper  move- 
ments came  to  the  later  flowering.  The  period 
of  revolution  in  government  and  of  the  en- 
lightenment in  philosophy  was  really  the  after- 
flowering  of  the  earlier  attainments. 

The  whole  movement  from  the  fourteenth 
to  the  early  nineteenth  centuries  is  the  story  of 
a  developing  individualism.     It  represented  a 
277 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

breaking  away  from  cramping  institutionalized 
forms,  the  protest  of  tlie  individual  against 
tyrannical  dominance  and  overlordship  of  every 
kind.  It  nursed  the  dream  that  the  largest 
good  to  the  whole  could  come  only  out  of  the 
largest  development  of  the  individual.  Hence 
it  was  a  movement  of  vast  significance  in  its 
historical  results.  Upon  its  doctrine  and 
achievements  have  been  built  some  of  the  most 
precious  accomplishments  of  society. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  some  of  the  late  and 
culminating  achievements  in  this  process,  for 
a  question  arises  whether  we  have  now  reaped 
the  full  possible  results  without  the  introduc- 
tion of  a  new  and  more  far-reaching  principle 
than  that  of  individualism. 

Rousseau  might  be  named  as  the  chief  spokes- 
man for  individualism  in  its  late  political  evo- 
lution. He  represented  that  mighty  political 
revulsion  which  resulted  in  the  establishment 
of  independence  in  America  and  culminated  in 
a  new  democracy  in  Europe, 

Nor  was  Rousseau's  influence  confined  to  the 
realm  of  politics.  He  gave  a  tremendous  impe- 
tus to  the  romantic  movement  in  literature. 
The  prevailing  passion  of  the  age  was  a  passion 
for  self-expression.  Stress  was  laid  upon  per- 
sonal meditation,  reflection,  and  experience 
altogether  out  of  proportion  to  their  real  value, 
278 


INDIVIDUALISM  AND  PERSONALISM 

The  writing  of  intimate  journals  became  a 
common  literary  occupation.  Out  of  this  grew 
an  overvaluation  of  both  the  cultural  and  reli- 
gious worth  of  these  inner  experiences.  One 
most  profoundly  influenced  was  the  poet  Goethe. 
His  life  story  became  one  of  an  effort  for  indi- 
vidual development  at  any  moral  cost.  The 
end  of  emotional  attainment  was  held  to  justify 
the  means,  with  the  result  that  morals,  religion, 
and  sense  of  honor  were  sacrificed  to  individual 
Kultur.  We  note  in  Goethe  the  beginning  of 
that  process  which  has  influenced  so  profoundly 
the  literature  of  the  nineteenth  century  and 
which  has  given  us  Nietzsche  and  the  contempo- 
rary doctrine  of  the  superman. 

Rousseau's  Emile  became  the  basis  of  an 
individualistic  theory  of  education  which  is  a 
widely  prevailing  standard  in  the  educational 
system  of  to-day.  Its  development  has  been 
attended  by  an  ever-increasing  secularization 
of  education.  Worse  than  that,  the  place  of 
morality  and  religion  in  cultural  development 
has  not  only  been  ignored,  in  too  many  quarters 
it  has  become  educational  anathema.  It  has 
been  dubbed  unscientific  and  a  prejudice  has 
been  created  against  it.  Pure  culture  has  been 
held  to  be  not  only  complete  when  separated 
from  deep  religious  sentiment,  but  religious  senti- 
ment has  been  widely  held  as  incompatible  with 
^79 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

deep  culture  or  with  scientific  attainment.  The 
influence  of  individuaHsm  in  education  has  run 
the  hmit  of  its  progress  in  the  Prussian  Kultur 
and  in  many  American  institutions  of  learning. 

On  the  ethical  side  the  progress  of  individ- 
ualism was  strangely  influenced  from  behind 
its  own  age.  Spinoza  was  scarcely  known  for  a 
hundred  years  after  his  work  was  done.  That 
he  became  a  power  then  was  largely  due  to  the 
resurrection  of  his  system  by  Herder  and  its 
acceptance  by  Goethe.  Spinoza's  doctrine  that 
we  become  one  with  God  by  an  act  of  reason 
becomes  the  keynote  of  Goethe's  Faust.  What- 
ever increases  the  understanding  or  is  useful  to 
the  individual  cultural  development  is  morally 
good.  According  to  this  view  pity,  shame, 
remorse,  repentance  are  but  vices  that  repeat 
the  offense.  One  who  regrets  an  evil  past  is 
weak  and  is  conscious  of  his  weakness.  The 
will  to  knowledge  and  to  power  is  the  moving 
element  in  great  characters.  Thus  was  injected 
into  the  world  of  education,  art,  and  literature 
that  subtle  poison  which  has  embarrassed  indi- 
vidualism with  an  intolerable  burden. 

This  ethical  development  might  have  been 
far  more  widespread  among  the  nations  of 
democracy  had  there  not  been  another  move- 
ment contemporaneous  with  it  and  which  pros- 
pered on  the  soil  of  individualism.  This 
280 


INDIVIDUALISM  AND  PERSONALISM 

movement  was  religious,  and  though  technically 
identified  with  Methodism  has  permeated  all 
surviving  forms  of  Protestantism  and  influenced 
Roman  Catholicism  itself.  Methodism  turned 
the  wine  of  the  new  enthusiasm  for  individualism 
into  new  religious  wine-flasks.  Great  emphasis 
was  placed  upon  individual  internal  experiences 
and  upon  individual  culture.  While  this  no 
doubt  led  to  many  excesses  and  to  some  mis- 
understanding of  religious  reality,  it  had  the 
balance  wheel  of  moral  and  religious  devotion 
which  kept  it  from  running  into  a  pure  selfish- 
ness like  that  of  supermanism.  In  fact,  when 
eventual  history  comes  to  be  written  it  will  be 
discovered  as  an  inestimable  influence  in  indi- 
vidual restraint  and  the  moralization  and 
strengthening  of  free  institutions. 

In  truth  had  it  not  been  for  this  deeper 
religious  influence  running  parallel  with  the 
movement  of  individualism,  individualism  could 
have  accomplished  nothing  for  democracy  but 
utter  ruin.  Democracy  without  moral  and 
spiritual  restraint  is  impossible,  and  has  been 
so  demonstrated  from  the  time  of  the  excesses 
of  the  Reign  of  Terror  to  the  exaltation  of 
Russian  Bolshevikism.  True  democracy  means 
self-government,  and  self-government  is  impos- 
sible without  the  presence  in  the  individual  of 
restraining  moral  and  spiritual  influences. 
281 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

Li  science  individualism  has  manifested  itself 
in  the  emphasis  upon  the  empirical  method. 
Each  individual  can  conduct  his  own  experiment 
and  his  experience  becomes  the  ultimate  word 
for  science.  The  tendency  on  the  whole  has 
been  to  protest  against  the  restraining  influence 
of  any  unity  or  system  and  to  emphasize  the 
pluralistic  view  of  life.  The  extreme  of  this 
development  is  to  be  seen  in  men  of  the  type 
of  Haeckel,  and  in  many  unjustified  claims  of 
modern  materialistic  science. 

In  philosophy  this  movement  has  been  along 
the  lines  of  empiricism,  realism,  positivism,  and 
intellectual  skepticism.  A  persistent  attempt 
has  been  made  to  clear  the  philosophical  field  of 
all  religious  and  theistic  implications  in  an  effort 
to  be  more  scientific  and  exact.  The  result  has 
been  a  one-sided  and  inadequate  view  of  the 
human  person.  Viewed  as  a  mere  receptacle 
for  material  and  outward  born  impulses,  or  at 
best  a  conglomeration  of  reactions,  the  indi- 
vidual in  philosophic  thought  has  become  little 
else  than  an  automaton  incapable  of  moral 
action  and  passing  on  the  exact  ratio  of  impres- 
sions received. 

The    Cultural    Ideals    of    Individualism 

With  this  interpretation  of  the  person  it  is 

easy  to  arrive  at  a  perverted  view  of  individual 

282 


INDIVIDUALISM  AND  PERSONALISM 

culture,  such  as  possessed  the  minds  of  many  of 
the  early  and  late  romanticists.  The  emphasis 
on  the  evolutionary  theory  seemed  to  put  the 
weightier  elements  of  development  beyond  the 
power  of  individual  responsibility.  It  further 
laid  great  stress  upon  the  development  of  the 
individual  as  the  goal  of  all  progress.  While  it 
exalted  the  development  of  individuals  it  like- 
wise taught  that  less  fortunate  forms  must 
perish  to  create  the  typical  man.  If  one,  then, 
were  a  "free  spirit,"  typical  man,  or  "super- 
man," there  should  be  no  distress  at  the  suf- 
fering of  the  less  perfect  for  one's  own  better 
advancement  and  deeper  culture.  One  needed 
only  a  certain  egotistic  assurance  that  he  was  of 
the  superman  type  and  all  the  world  was  to  lie 
like  an  oyster  at  his  feet,  to  be  opened  and 
swallowed. 

It  does  not  take  such  an  individualism  long, 
even  though  in  the  beginning  it  starts  from  a 
socialistic  standpoint  of  opposition  to  estab- 
lished society,  to  become  the  narrowest  and 
meanest  kind  of  an  autocracy.  It  may  be  the 
autocracy  of  a  class,  of  birth,  of  education,  of 
religious  beliefs,  or  even  of  the  proletarian. 
Its  significant  mark  is  that  its  hand  is  set  against 
all  other  classes,  its  dream  is  of  individual  pre- 
ferment and  exaltation.  Its  hope  is  the  renova- 
tion of  the  world  by  the  domination  of  all  other 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

wills  to  its  own.  Its  weakness  lies  in  its 
egotistic  selfishness. 

In  the  name  of  individualistic  development 
the  greatest  crimes  have  been  and  are  being 
committed.  The  only  reason  that  such  a 
theory  can  blind  the  hearts  of  men  is  because 
they  fail  to  take  into  account  the  reality  of  moral 
and  spiritual  values.  An  sestheticism  which 
leads  the  poet  or  artist  to  plunge  into  moral 
excesses  for  their  cultural  value  overlooks  the 
fact  that  any  moral  excess  removes  the  fineness 
and  delicacy  which  alone  can  make  art  or 
poetry  great.  A  culture  which  is  built  up  at 
the  expense  of  toil  and  hardship  of  the  forgotten 
multitudes  is  a  false  culture  which  carries  with 
it  its  own  curse  and  its  own  undoing. 

It  is  not  strange  that  such  a  theory  of  culture 
should  eventuate  in  the  immoral  and  perverted 
doctrines  of  Nietzsche,  and  that  these  in  a  land 
where  all  scientific  and  cultural  attainments 
have  for  many  years  been  divorced  from  the 
deeper  religious  and  even  moral  elements,  should 
yield  a  fruitage  of  barbarity  that  has  shocked 
the  whole  world.  Such  is  the  natural  outcome 
of  a  morally  untempered  individualism. 

The   Contrasting   Ideals   of   Personalism 

The   dominant   principle   of   Personalism   is 

the  dependence  of  individual  culture  upon  the 


INDIVIDUALISM  AND  PERSONALISM 

moral  and  spiritual  values.  Recognition  is 
given  to  the  fact  that  any  culture  which  lacks 
these  is  lacking  in  essential  humanity  and  cannot 
possess  a  lasting  influence  over  men. 

In  the  following  out  of  this  higher  individual- 
ism it  may  be  necessary  for  the  individual  to 
make  the  utmost  sacrifice  of  material  advantage 
in  order  that  he  seize  upon  the  finer  gifts  which 
are  possible  to  human  personality.  He  may 
have  to  sink  his  individuality  in  a  higher  good 
in  order  to  rise  to  the  heights  of  personality. 
The  possession  of  life  itself,  often  held  to  be  the 
greatest  good,  is  seen  by  Personalism  to  be 
inferior  to  the  possession  say  of  one's  honor,  or 
integrity,  or  self-respect.  Moreover,  if  the 
well-being  of  the  many  demands  the  self-sac- 
rifice of  the  individual,  the  individual  reaches 
his  highest  possible  personal  development  by 
joyful  surrender.  If  to  be  loyal  to  the  highest 
principles  of  morality  it  be  necessary  to  lay 
down  one's  life,  one  by  that  very  act  does  the 
thing  of  greatest  cultural  value  to  himself.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  one  is  to  save  his  life  by 
dishonor,  by  being  untrue  to  the  moral  welfare 
of  himself  or  others,  life  itself  becomes  of  little 
value  because  unfaithful  to  those  higher  inter- 
ests which  make  it  worth  living.  The  truth  is 
beautifully  expressed  in  Emerson's  quotation 
for  the  soldiers'  memorial  in  Cambridge: 
285 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

**  'Tis  man's  perdition  to  be  safe, 
When  for  the  truth  he  ought  to  die.** 

In  Personalism  the  value  of  individual 
culture  is  not  overlooked.  It  is  simply  carried 
to  the  higher  realm  of  action,  and  here  the 
highest  values  can  be  attained  only  by  the 
highest  self-forgetfulness.  The  culture  of  Per- 
sonalism leaves  no  bad  taste  in  the  mouth,  no 
pangs  of  heartbreak  for  others,  no  blasting  or 
festering  trail  of  evil  behind  it.  It  is  as  benev- 
olent in  the  general  culture  as  it  is  in  that  of 
the  individual. 

The  Present  Conflict  between  Individual- 
ism AND  Personalism 

Never  in  the  history  of  the  world  has  the 
battle  been  so  clearly  drawn  between  these 
conflicting  ideals  of  life. 

Individualism  with  its  exaltation  of  individual 
preferment  at  the  expense  of  the  many,  with 
its  ethical  doctrine  that  whatever  is  useful  in 
furthering  its  culture  is  morally  right,  with  its 
scorn  of  the  weak  and  helpless  as  beyond  the 
pale  of  its  care  and  responsibility,  with  its 
disregard  and  skepticism  toward  all  spiritual 
values,  is  lined  up  in  a  great  world  conflict 
against  all  who  believe  in  the  inviolable  human 
rights  of  the  least  and  feeblest  in  the  social 
structure,  the  personalists. 
S86 


INDIVIDUALISM  AND  PERSONALISM 

The  personalists,  despite  their  philosophy, 
their  previous  condition  of  cultural  servitude, 
and  their  previous  devotion  to  individuahstic 
theories,  are  seeing  with  new  vision  that  no 
elements  are  cultural  unless  they  include  the 
well  being  of  all.  The  swift  lesson  is  now  being 
taught  a  slow  moving  world  that  when  the  fun- 
damental human  rights  of  one  are  menaced  the 
rights  of  all  are  endangered.  And,  better  than 
this,  vast  multitudes  have  learned  how  sweet 
and  beautiful  it  is  to  lay  down  one's  life  not  only 
for  one's  country  but  for  righteousness  in  the 
earth,  and  for  the  coming  kingdom  of  God. 

And  just  in  the  measure  that  men  are  counting 
not  their  lives  dear  unto  themselves,  in  that  same 
measure  do  they  experience  the  coming  of  the 
real  superman — the  man  who  can  lay  down  his 
life  for  his  friends. 

The  Cross  as  the  Solution  of  the  Deeper 

Problems  of  Life 

One  would  be  bold  indeed  who  should  propose 

the  solution  of  the  dark  problem  of  evil,  and  to 

offer   a   principle   on   which   alone  permanent 

institutions  of  society  may  be  organized.     Yet 

in  these  trying  days  gleams  of  light  are  coming 

to  illuminate  our  way.     Not  that  they  have 

been  wanting  to  other  days,  but  those  that  come 

now    are    very   practical    and    very   personal. 

287 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

We  can  see  how  a  crisis  has  been  brought  upon 
the  world  in  which  if  the  things  dearest  to 
civilization  are  to  be  saved  many  men  must 
voluntarily  lay  down  life.  Values  superior  to 
life  itself  have  arisen  above  the  horizon  of  the 
average  human  thought. 

What  man  has,  in  the  days  just  gone,  been 
so  thoughtless  as  not  to  prefer  his  son  dead 
upon  the  field  of  honor  to  having  him  a  slacker 
and  a  sneak — willing  to  live  and  prosper  through 
the  sacrifice  of  the  noble  and  the  brave .^^ 

It  is  impossible  that  some  other  lessons  of  life 
should  fail  to  follow  in  the  train  of  this  recog- 
nition. In  days  of  luxury,  comfort,  and  inde- 
pendence it  was  easy  to  listen  to  the  devil  of  a 
selfish  individualism.  One  could  so  easily  shut 
one's  ears  to  the  sufferings  and  injustices  of  the 
multitudes.  One's  personal  comfort  was  so 
important  that  any  demand  of  humanity  or 
religion  which  broke  in  upon  comfort  was  con- 
sidered preposterous.  That  one  should  en- 
danger his  life  for  others  was  the  brave  act  of  a 
fool.  And  at  the  same  time  we  were  obsessed 
by  a  fear  of  suffering  and  were  crying  out 
against  a  world  of  pain  and  demanding  that 
the  theists  show  us  the  solution  of  the  problem 
of  evil  or  cease  prating  about  a  good  God,  or  any 
other  kind  of  God  for  that  matter. 

In  the  meantime  we  are  coming  to  see  that  the 
288 


INDIVIDUALISM  AND  PERSONALISM 

responsibility  for  the  greatest  suffering  of  these 
times,  and  sufferings  that  make  those  of  other 
days  seem  insignificant,  is  not  to  be  placed 
upon  God,  but  upon  evil  men.  Just  as  the  real 
evil  of  the  world  is  seen  to  be  the  result  of  an 
unholy,  lustful  and  greedy  individualism,  we 
are  beginning  to  see  likewise  that  it  can  be  done 
away  and  an  age  of  peace  brought  in  only  as 
men  are  willing  to  give  up  everything  material 
for  the  greatness  of  a  spiritual  ideal. 

There  is  in  this  fact  too  a  suggestion  for  the 
solution  of  the  problem  of  evil  so  far  as  it 
touches  the  individual.  The  individual  can 
make  the  pains  and  sufferings  of  life  yield  him 
a  rich  treasure  of  personal  and  spiritual  attain- 
ment according  to  the  spirit  in  which  he  meets 
them.  Death  itself  may  become  but  the  glory 
which  consummates  his  earthly  career. 

So  much  for  the  individual  solution.  Where 
it  touches  the  wider  ranges  of  society  at  large 
it  is  not  so  easy.  There  is  much  of  mystery 
and  darkness.  Heavy  responsibilities  are  thrust 
upon  God — why  did  he  make  a  world  that 
could  will  to  evil  and  to  involve  the  innocent 
in  suffering?  There  are  two  considerations  that 
arrest  the  attention  and  constrain  us  at  least 
to  withhold  judgment.  The  first  is  whether 
there  would  be  any  value  or  reality  to  moral 
freedom  if  evil  were  impossible.     The  second 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

regards  the  part  of  God.  Suppose  it  shall  be 
discovered  that  this  life  of  moral  possibility  is 
the  superior  goal  of  creation,  and  that  in  order 
to  create  men  in  his  own  spiritual  likeness  he  has 
himself  been  willing  to  partake  in  their  suffering. 
If  the  concrete  solution  of  the  problem  of  evil 
is  to  be  found  in  the  individual  attitude  toward 
the  woes  of  life  through  a  spiritual  self-mastery 
that  glorifies  all,  then  the  endurance  of  the 
cross  by  the  Master  and  Creator  of  Life  himself 
must  furnish  the  philosophical  and  theological 
justification  of  an  uncompleted  world. 


290 


INDEX 


INDEX 

Absolutism  assumes  personality  in  the  Absolute,  228. 
Absolutist  tendency  toward  pantheism,  263f. 
Atomism,  when  effective,  assumes  personality  in  the  atom,  262. 
Atomistic  conclusion  of  Bergson,  48. 

Bassanio  choosing  the  caskets,  67. 

Beauchamp,  Miss,  as  an  example  of  dissociation,  209f. 

Beethoven,  131. 

Being  as  vibration,  45. 

Bergson  and  idealistic  dialectic,  25. 

impersonalism,  25,  71,  74,  142,  152ff.,  174. 
materialism,  24,  47,  48, 
personalism,  26,  123ff.,  134f.,  142,  176,  188f. 
psychoparallelism,  36. 
committed  to  materialism,  47f.,  154,  187f. 
Bergson's  aim,  24,  25. 

in  his  definition  of  matter,  31. 
criticism  of  Kant's  doctrine  of  God,  152. 
definition  of  freedom,  132ff. 
God,  153f,  174. 
intuition,  82ff. 
life  and  spirit,  34f.,  37f.,  69. 
life  and  spirit  as  duration,  69,  72. 
life  and  spirit  as  intersection  of  matter 

and  spirit,  69ff,  188. 
life  and  spirit  as  vital  impulse,  69,  73. 
definition  of  matter,  31. 

as  inverse  of  movement,  32. 
uncertainty,  32. 
personality,  176ff,  180f,  186f. 
space,  108ff. 
time,  117f. 
doctrine  of  the  world-ground,  153f. 
neo-realism,  58,  61,  77,  78. 
Bolshevism  a  phase  of  individualism,  281. 
Bosanquet,  260. 
Bowne,  26. 

Bowne's  definition  of  matter  and  spirit,  39, 
Browne,  T.  E.,  poem  quoted,  260. 
Burbank,  Luther,  93,  234. 

298 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

Carr,  H.  Wildon,  174. 

Causality  and  duration,  123. 

Causation  and  freedom,  132ff.,  142ff.,  147. 

eflScient,  and  phenomenal,  142flF.,  147f,  231f. 

comes  back  to  purpose,  243. 
mechanical,  static,  75,  148,  151. 
provided  for  in  personal  realism,  240f . 
the  unique  possession  of  personality,  231f. 
uncaused,  in  ourselves,  and  in  God,  128f,   147f., 

150f.,  218f.,  231. 
unexplained  by  potentiality,  75. 
Change,  absolute,  impossible  in  world  of  intelligence,  158f. 
as  original,  156f. 
implies  a  living  God,  265. 
in  God,  158f. 

applicable  only  to  experience,  163f. 
in  human  personality,  158f,  164. 
Changelessness  of  God  in  purpose  and  righteousness,  161,  168f. 
Coe,  The  Psychology  of  Religion  quoted,  210. 
Conservation  of  energy,  an  overworked  doctrine,  219. 
Contingency  necessary  to  freedom,  275. 
Creativity,  human,  131,  150f.,  218f. 
Cross,  the,  as  the  principle  of  life,  272. 
as  means  of  culture,  285f. 
the  solution  of  life's  deepest  problems,  287f . 
Crusades,  influence  on  the  world  of  learning,  277f . 
Culture,  dependent  on  moral  and  spiritual  values,  284f. 

Dante,  131. 

Definition,  importance  of,  to  being,  reality,  and  life,  31. 

Descartes  and  the  philosophy  of  change,  23,  144. 

Descartes'  instantaneous  metaphysics,  123,  143. 

Determinism  in  Bergson,  73f,  157. 

Dissociation,  a  problem  for  neo-realism,  21 1 . 

illustrated  in  the  case  of  Miss  Beauchamp,  209f . 
not    of    personality,   but   of    conscious    states, 
208ff. 
Dualism  and  personality,  68f . 

of  matter  and  spirit,  36f .,  40,  56f . 
ultimate  solution    in  personality,    68f.,   72,    184f., 
250f. 
Duration  and  causation,  123. 

freedom,  121f,  134f. 

personality,  44,  71f.,  124f.,  227,  230. 

speed  of  vibration,  117f. 

spirit,  43. 

294 


INDEX 

Duration  as  succession  in  phenomena,  123. 

cannot  solve  conflict  between  mind  and  matter,43,53. 

causal,  only  in  personality,  124,  129. 

defined,  71f. 

in  God,  156f . 

in  relation  to  time,  120ff. 

in  things  and  persons  must  be  reconciled,  146. 

necessary  to  freedom,  135,  139f,  145. 

of  persons,  121ff.,  134f.,  145f.,  227. 

of  things,  121ff.,  126,  134f.,  145f.,  227. 

possible  only  to  personality,  72,  129,  135,  139f. 

"pure,"  a  succession  in  states  of  consciousness,  123f. 

related  to  space,  114f. 

Education  by    standards    of    individualism,    279. 
in  morals  and  religion,   279. 
secularized,  279. 
Elan,  as  original  impulse,  157. 

in  creative  energy,  145,  156f. 
must  be  intelligent,  157. 
Emerson,  lines  for  the  soldier's  monument,  285f. 
Emile,  Rousseau's  theory  of  education,  279. 
Error  as  viewed  by  neo-realism,  204f. 

not  solved  on  the  impersonal  plane,  258. 
the  chief  problem  of  realism,  254f. 
Ethics  of  individualism. 

Evil,  future  of,  determined  by  moral  agents,  107. 
its  origin,  107. 

its  possibility,  the  condition  of  character,  289. 
may  ofifer  the  opportunity  of  self-mastery,  258f. 
not  solved  on  the  impersonal  plane,  258. 
not  the  work  of  God,  289. 
solved  personally,  289. 
suggestion  of  solution,  289. 
the  chief  problem  of  personal  realism,  254-256. 
the  problem  of  idealism,  256. 
within  man's  control,  272. 
Evolution  and  individualism,  283. 

due  to  an  increment,  150,  241f. 
dependent  on  unconditioned  creative  activity,  75, 
140,  146,  150f.  233f. 
divine  self-consciousness,  161. 
purpose  in,  146f. 
Experience  brings  richer  content  to  mother's  love,  not  greater 
love,  268. 
contracted,  as  time,  117f. 
29d 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

Faith  present  in  discovery,  269. 
Faust  in  Goethe's  philosophy,  280. 
Fite,  231. 

Foreknowledge  and  determinism,  138f. 
Freedom  and  causation,  132ff.,  147f. 
Freedom  and  duration,  134f. 

foreknowledge,  138f. 
miracle,  138f. 
defined  by  Bergson,  132fiF. 
impossible  where  homogeneity  is  the  result  of  initial 

impulse,  73-76. 
in  God  needed  to  ground  freedom  in  man,  275. 
in  impersonalism  impossible,  174flf. 
in  personality  alone,  72,  140f,  147f.  175f,  216f,  231. 
in  the  philosophy  of  change,  102f. 
in  unconscious  life,  135f.,  140. 
not  to  be  had  apart  from  intelligence,  140. 
of  personality  as  attained  through  the  doctrine  of 

duration,  124,  134,  139,  159. 
purposeless,  untenable,  137f. 
through  contingency,  275. 
French  romanticism  and  the  doctrine  of  intuition,  24. 
Functional  response  to  environment  not  freedom,  136. 

Genius  and  intuition,  100. 
God  as  change,  153f.,  156,  158f.,  164flF. 
growing  in  experience,  172. 

living  implies  enriching  content  of  experience,  266. 
rather  than  changing,  265. 
sufficient  for  contingency,  171. 
related  to  duration,  156,  158f.,  166. 
static  could  not  be  in  Christ,  270f. 
contingent,  therefore  living,  275. 
how  immanent,  264. 

in  the  philosophy  of  change,  102,  150,  153f,  158f. 
made  dependent  upon  matter,  154. 
must  be  an  abiding  self-consciousness,  161. 
self-creative,   169. 

transcendent  as  well  as  immanent,  265. 
not  departmental,  271. 
not  responsible  for  evil,  259. 
not  static,  165.  168. 
not  subject  to  his  world,  164. 
related  to  the  world,  165. 

to  time  and  space   through  an  uncompleted 
world.  267. 

296 


INDEX 

God  transcendent  of  time,  166f. 
God's  appearance  in  historic  time  reasonable,  273. 
God's  attributes,   character,   and  relation  to  temporal  and 
spatial  world,  172. 
qualitative  or  quantitative,  273. 

partnership  in  suffering,  290. 

perfection  in  life,  268. 

perfection,  one  of  righteousness,  163. 

relation  to  spatial  and  temporal  order,  160,  166f. 
Goethe  and  individualism,  279. 
Goethe's  Faust,  280. 
Goodness,  a  manifestation  of  God,  274. 

Haeckel's  materialism,  282. 
Haldane  quoted,  238. 
Hegel,  238. 

Herder's  "Self,"  quoted,  235f. 
Hocking,  208  note;  quoted,  128,  235. 

Homogeneity,  as  the  result  of  a  single  creative  impulse,  73. 
dependent  on  free  creativity,  76. 

Idealism,  evil  its  chief  problem,  256. 
Ideals,  cultural,  of  individualism,  282f. 
Image,  as  the  description  of  matter,  33,  37-39. 

dual  meaning  of  the  term  as  used  by  Bergson,  33,  37- 
39,  176f. 
Immanence,  doctrine  of,  tends  toward  pantheism,  263f. 

its  meaning,  264f. 
Immortality,  in  the  Bergsonian  system,  174,  188ff. 

personal,  important  to  philosophy,  188f. 
Impersonalism,  against  the  moral  order,  155. 
in  Bergson's  God,  154. 

philosophy,  25,  164,  176f. 
in  neo-realism,  198. 
in  world-ground,  untenable,  213,  274f. 
Incarnation  assumes  moral  attributes  essential,  274. 

demanded  by  practical  problems  of  life,  271f. 
eternal,  271f. 

inconsistent  with  a  static  God,  270f. 
not  limiting,  272. 
of  God  in  Christ,  164,  171f,  190f. 
philosophically  grounded,  270. 
Individualism  and  autocracy,  283. 
evolution,  283. 
contrasted  with  personalism,  277f, 
in  conflict  with  personalism,  286, 
297 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

Individualism,  in  education,  279. 
ethics,  280. 
Methodism,  281. 
philosophy,  282. 
religion,  281. 
science,  282. 

the  Bolshevik  movement,  281. 
its  achievements,  278. 

cultural  ideals,  282f. 
of  Nietzsche,  284. 
weakness  of,  283f. 
Individuality  applied  to  personality,  181f. 
Instinct,  applied  by  Bergson  to  organic  and  inorganic  worlds, 
82-87. 
conscious  and  unconscious,  85,  135. 
human,  intelligent,  90fiF. 
in  tropisms,  87-89,  135. 
unadaptibility  of,  95f. 
Instinctive  action  in  religion,  105f. 
Intellectualization,  connected  with  freedom,  140f. 

fades  from  habitual  action,  105f. 
Mr.  Bergson's  bane,  51,  76f. 
Intelligence,  adaptable  to  change,  95. 

in  religion,  103f. 
Intuition  and  genius,  100. 

revelation,  99ff. 
as  a  guide  in  vital  matters,  80,  93flF. 

approach  to  life,  86,  104ff. 
human,  inseparable  from  intelligence,  90,  98,  lOlff, 

184f. 
inaccurately  used  by  Bergson,  86f. 
in  religion,  103f. 

in  the  philosophy  of  change,  82,  86. 
"pure,"  50. 

so-called,  established  by  habit,  80f,  140f. 
theory  of  as  an  aid  to  religious  ideas,  99flf. 
Intuitionalism  and  French  romanticism,  24. 
Intuitions,  moral,  related  to  habit,  106. 

Jones,  Thomas  S.,  Jr.,  poem  "Sometimes,"  quoted,  249f. 

Kant,  242,  247. 

criticized  by  Bergson,  152. 
by  Haldane,  238. 
Knowles,   Frederic  Lawrence,   "The  Tenant,"   quoted,   192, 
Kultur  in  Goethe,  279, 


INDEX 

Larcom,  Lucy,  "A  Strip  of  Blue,"  quoted,  127. 
Law  of  the  sufficient  reason,  261. 
Life,  as  duration,  71. 

intersection  of  matter  and  spirit,  153f. 
minimum  cognition,  76. 
movement,  33,  37-39,  45, 
God's  perfect  attribute,  268. 

in  God  implies  enriching  content  of  experience,  266. 
the  expression  of  personality,  finite  or  infinite,  72. 
Lowell,  James  Russell,  quotationfrom  "Under  the  Willows,"  63. 

Materialism,  of  Haeckel,  282. 

problem  of  error  its  chief  difficulty,  31,  217. 
Matter  and  life,  Bergson's  failure  at  distinguishing,  36. 
Matter  as  a  factor  in  its  own  genesis,  35. 
as  exhausted  life,  35. 

the  inverse  of  movement,  33. 
described  as  image,  32,  37-39. 
defined  by  Bergson,  31,  37-39. 

as  independent  of  memory,  54. 
Memory  and  life,  54. 

personality,  60,  64. 
as  synonymous  with  spirit,  59. 
and  the  intersection  of  mind  and  matter,  58,  64. 
Bergson's  definition,  55. 
defined,  60. 

dependence  on  materiality,  65. 
independent  of  matter,  54. 
must  be  of  concrete  facts,  60. 
"pure,"  55-59,  63. 
Metaphysical  explanation  must  include  intelligence,  66. 
Methodism  a  phase  of  the  individualistic  movement,  281. 
Miracle  not  provided  for  in  the  philosophy  of  change,  102f. 

valuable  as  an  indication  of  purpose,  103,  138f. 
Moral  achievement,  high  point  in  personality,  155. 
attainment  the  goal  of  creative  activity,  267. 
qualities  in  God  the  essential  ones,  273f. 
reality  of  moment  to  philosophy,  242. 
Morality  in  education,  279f . 
Movement,  as  life,  33,  45. 

as  transference  of  a  state,  45. 
as  world-ground,  45-49,  156f. 
Mystery  in  personality  may  be  studied,  254. 

in  ultimate  explanation  67,  79,  220f.,  237. 

Naidu,  Sarojini,  poem  "Suttee"  quoted,  190, 
299 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

Neitzsche,  representative  of  individualism,  284. 
Neo-realism,  affirms  error  as  subjectivity,  204. 

and  the  problem  of  dissociation,  211. 

close  to  idealism  in  affirming  reality  of  "relation," 

203f.,  229f.,  251f. 
distinguished  from  personal  realism,  200flF. 
fails  to  solve  dualism,  204f,  251. 
fundamental  propositions  of,  198-201. 
pluralistic,  204f. 

provides  neither    unity  nor  continuity  in  expe- 
rience, 201. 
seeking    reality    apart    from    personality    must 
fail,  196,  229f. 
Neo-realistic  doctrine  of  relation,  abstract,  253f. 

tendency  in  Bergson,  58,  61,  77. 
Number,   a  term  of  distinction,  116. 
as  applied  concretely  115f. 
counted  in  space  or  in  duration,  114f. 

Oppositions  of  philosophy,  21 7f. 
Organism,  self-constructive,  219. 

Perception,  and  intellectualization,  41f,  200. 
contrasted  with  spirit,  42. 
crux  of  problem  in  self-identification,  199f. 
dependent  on  self -defining  quality  of  personality, 

200. 
inseparable  from  intellectualization,  43,  200. 
"pure,"  50,  54-58,  185. 

has  no  concrete  meaning,  62. 
hypothetical    nature    acknowledged    by 

Bergson,  58. 
never  devoid  of  intellectualization,  77. 
Perfection  in  God  implies  life,  268. 
Perry,  R.  B.,  204,  229;  quoted,  224f. 
Personal  equation  in  perception,  42,  57. 
Personal  idealism  holds  to  self-consciousness  as  fundamental, 

211. 
Personal  identity  of  another  order  than  mathematical  iden- 
tity, 226. 
Personalism  and  the  dualism  of  matter  and  spirit,  37,  186f. 
and  the  philosophy  of  change,  26. 
contrasted  with  individualism,  277flf. 
in  conflict  with  individualism,  286. 
its  ideals,  284f . 

provides  for  "God,  freedom,  and  immortality,"  274. 
dOO 


INDEX 

Personal  realism,  aflSrms  indivisibility  of  personality,  201  £F. 
distinguished  from  neo-realism,  200jGF. 
holds  only  to  reality  in  the  concrete,  202f. 
holds  personality  fundamental  to  the  world- 
ground,  212. 
offers  concrete  object,  for  study,  80. 
provides  a  synthesis  for  the  dualism  of  mind 

and  matter,  250f. 
provides  for  a  true  relation  of  persons  to 

space  and  time,  247f . 
provides  for  efficient  causation,  240ff. 
provides  a  philosophical  basis  for  the  doc- 
trine of  incarnation  270f . 
the  acceptance  of  an  indivisible  "self,"  180, 

199f. 
the  expression  of  relations,  74. 
the  synthesis  of  mind  and  matter,  58. 
Personal  Realism's  definition  of  reality,  253. 
Personality,  and  duration,  44,  61,  71f,  215f,  230f. 
memory,  60,  64. 

recognition  of  other  personalities,  227f . 
as   ground   of   being,  71,  154f.,  190f.,  198f.,  200. 

206ff.,  212ff.,  228f.,  233f.,  238. 
Bergson's  view,  39f,  176-178,  186. 
distinction  between  human  and  divine,  214. 
distinguished  by,  creativity,  131,  215,  218f,  237. 
moral  action,  155. 
moral    self-consciousness,    236f. 
self-identity,  178ff,  200,  250. 
in  world-ground  objected  to  as  limitation,  213f. 
its   dissociations   are  those  of  conscious  states, 

208ff. 
its  place  in  personal  realism,  223  ff. 
not  an  association  of  conscious  states,  224. 
perfection  in,  implies  complete  transcendence  of 

time  and  space,  214f,  248. 
so-called  multiple.  208ff. 
the  highest  gift  of  life,  259. 
the  indivisible  unit  of  reality,  223f. 
key  to  metaphysics,  220,  238f. 
solution  of  the  antithesis  between  perception 

and  memory,  62-64,  72. 
source  of  unity,  206f. 
ultimate  mystery,  67f,  220f,  237f. 
ultimate  self-causing  reality,  276, 
time-transcending,  145f,  159,  214f,  247f. 
301 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

Personality,  unity  of,  source  of  recovery  from  "dissociation," 

209f. 
Philosophy  influenced  by  individualism,  282. 
Philosophy  of  change,  appearance  in  history,  23. 
relation  to  Descartes,  23. 
Piat,  La  Personne  Humaine,  quoted,  203f,  224  and  note. 
Pluralism  in  the  neo-realistic  view,  204f. 
Pluralistic  realism  ignores  problem  of  error,  255. 
Pluralistic     universe,     if    consistent,    inexplicable    accident, 

205f. 
Poincare,  Henri,  quoted,  91. 
Prince,  Dr.  Morton,  209  note. 
Problem,  chief,  of  realism,  254f. 
Psycho-parallelism,  79. 
Purpose  in  the  world-ground,  263. 

Qualitative  change  referred  to  quantitative  difference,  246. 

Qualities  as  movement,  34,  45,  50f. 

Quantitative  vs.  qualitative  attributes  in  God,  273. 

Race  experience  imaginary,  85. 
Realism,  crude,  25 If. 

in  perception,  78f,  197,  215. 

its  service  to  thought,  197. 
Realistic  element  in  personal  realism,  20 If,  225. 
Reality  defined  by  personal  realism,  253. 
Reality,  fundamental,  personal,  237f. 
Relation  of  neo-realism  an  abstraction,  253. 
Religion  as  intuitional,  103f. 

in  education,  279. 

intelligent,  103f. 
Renaissance,  influence,  277. 
Revelation,  and  intelligence,  lOlf. 
and  miracle,  138ff. 
tested  by  morality,  101. 
Rolling  snowball  of  experience,  61. 
Rousseau,  and  romantic  literature,  287f . 

as  the  spokesman  of  individualism,  278. 
Rousseau's  Emile,  279. 
Russell,  Bertrand,  187,  226. 

Saint  Augustine's  prayer,  141. 
Santayana,  186. 

Science  influenced  by  individualism,  282. 
Scientists,  metaphysical  conclusions  of,  245. 
Self,  intuitional  and  intellectual  not  separated,  184f. 
302 


INDEX 

Self-consciousness,  perfect,  the  foremost  affirmation  regarding 
God,  161. 

the  higher,  of  personality,  236f . 
Self-creativity,  in  God  and  man,  169ff,  218f,  231f,  236f,  242. 

in  ultimate  being,  174. 
Self-definition  necessary  to  personality,  200,  225f. 
Self-development  and  self-sacrifice,  256f. 
Self-identity  at  heart  of  freedom,  159. 

in  personality,  178ff.  226f. 
Shakespeare,  131. 

Sitaris  and  sphex  as  examples  of  intuition,  94. 
Skepticism  of  Spencer,  151. 
Space  and  time,  a  means  of  relation,  11  If. 

cannot  be  thought  in  homogeneous  terms, 

113f. 
must  not  be  solipsistic,  11  If. 
validated   by  supreme  creative  intelligence, 
112. 
Space  as  homogeneous,  108. 

not  needed  for  counting,  116. 
Spencer,  261. 
Spencer's  skepticism,  151,  169f. 

Unknowable,  261. 
Spinoza,  280. 

Spinoza's  idea  of  causality,  143, 
Spirit,  as  binding  the  moments  of  duration,  48. 

as  synonymous  with  memory,  59. 
Spirit  differentiated  from  perception,  4 If. 
Symbolism  in  science,  244. 

"Things  as  they  are,"  of  realism,  215. 
Thought  not  explained  by  vibration,  52. 
Time,  as  bastard  space,  109,  118f. 
and  duration,  120ff. 
and  freedom  derive  meaning  from  the  incompleteness 

of  the  world,  128. 
and  space,  a  means  of  relation.  111,  247. 

can   mean  for   God   only   an   uncompleted 

world,  267. 
must  not  be  solipsistic,  11  If,  247. 
not  to  be  thought  in  homogeneous  terms, 

113f. 
validated  by  a  supreme  creative  intelligence, 
112,  147. 
and  the  world-ground,  119,  127f,  166f,  214f,  247. 
as  an  arbitrary  measure,  118f. 


BERGSON  AND  PERSONAL  REALISM 

Time,  as  contracted  experience,  117f. 

flown,  as  homogeneous  with  space,  113. 
transcended  only  by  personality,  47,  166f,  214,  248. 
Time  transcendence,  necessary  to  consciousness  of  succession 

or  change,  166f. 
Transcendence  of  God  as  important  as  immanence,  265. 
Truth,  nature  by  Bergson's  doctrine  of  intuition,  96f. 

pragmatic  nature,  97. 
Truths,  universal,  97. 

Unchanging  element  in  personality  necessary  to  thought,  159. 
Unity  of  personality,  source  of  recovery  from  dissociation, 

209f. 
Unity  to  be  found  in  personality,  206f . 

Vibrations,  as  mental  product,  49. 

as  qualities,  34,  46,  52,  246. 
Vibratory  theory,  as  metaphysical  explanation,  45-47,  50,  156. 

as  related  to  duration,  117f. 

does  not  account  for  thought,  52f . 

materialistic  implication  of,  47f. 

the  result  of  "intellectualization,"  50f. 
Vital  elan,  an  abstraction,  262. 

when  efiFective  becomes  personal,  262. 
Vital  impulse  as  source  of  homogeneity,  73. 

World-ground,  as  impersonal  274f. 

personal,  193f,  212f,  215f,  227. 
in  Bergson's  theory,  153f. 
intelligent,  99,  212. 
personal,  an  epistemological  necessity,  193. 

provides   for    "God,    freedom,    and 
immortality,"  274. 
purposive,  263. 

Zeno,  paradoxes  of,  197. 


804 


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